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Abstract 
 
 
Venkateswaran, Kanmani (MSc, Environmental Studies) 
The Vulnerability of Zambian Communities Living Along the Zambezi River Basin  
to Floods 
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Dr. Max Boykoff 
 
The Zambezi River Basin is highly prone to floods and droughts. In the face of 
climate change, it will be critically important to address how such hazards become 
disasters. The Zambezi River Basin Initiative (ZRBI) was launched by the Red 
Cross in 2009 as a means to help communities cope with risk, by reducing their 
vulnerabilities and increasing their resilience to natural hazards. In Zambia, four 
communities – Sikaunzwe, Kasaya, Sikuzu and Situlu – were chosen as pilot sites 
for the ZRBI. To optimally aid these communities, the nature of vulnerability in the 
communities needs to be understood. Vulnerability, however, is difficult to measure, 
especially using standardized methods and indicators. Despite this, the Red Cross 
uses a standardized tool, vulnerability and capacity assessments (VCA), to measure 
vulnerability. In this study, I use a selection of VCA tools – baseline survey, hazards 
maps, focus group discussions, historical data collection – and interviews with 
Zambia Red Cross disaster management staff in the context of the conceptual 
frameworks for vulnerability analysis of coupled human-environment systems 
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(Turner et al, 2003a) and barriers to adaptation (Jones and Boyd, 2010) to assess 
the vulnerability of communities to floods. I find that communities are vulnerable 
and unable to successfully adapt to floods largely due to their poverty, poor 
institutions, and lack of access to knowledge and technology. A major problem, 
however, is that communities are not involved in the design of the VCA and 
knowledge is not co-produced. Community exclusion may disincentivize community 
ownership of the VCA and related initiatives. Furthermore, while VCA data can be 
used to identify characteristics of vulnerability and identify levels of preparedness, 
they cannot be used to discern the underlying mechanisms that cause vulnerability. 
This is largely due to its negligence of the political, historical, and scalar dimensions 
of vulnerability. Without community engagement and understanding of the 
mechanisms of vulnerability, the ZRBI will fall short of its goals of reducing 
vulnerability and increasing resilience in the long-term. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
It is thought that natural hazards will become less predictable and increase 
in magnitude due to climate change (IPCC, 2007). Consequently, the Red Cross has 
taken an interest in helping disaster prone communities become less vulnerable and 
more resilient to climate change and variability. Such a proactive approach is novel 
engagement for the Red Cross given that they have traditionally responded to 
natural disasters after they have occurred, distributing emergency relief and 
providing medical aid, and have not focused much on anticipatory disaster 
management. The reactive response scheme largely stems from existing funding 
mechanisms which mandate that funding can only be mobilized once a disaster has 
occurred and need has been demonstrated. 
The effectiveness of reactive responses has recently come under scrutiny 
within these organizations given that (1) there are difficulties in mobilizing 
resources rapidly upon the occurrence of a disaster and (2) relief operations do not 
actually reduce the vulnerabilities of affected populations and enhance their climate 
resilience (IFRC, 2009; O’Brien et al, 2006). As a result, the Red Cross is working to 
shift to a more holistic disaster management scheme through the implementation of 
community-based disaster risk reduction and preparedness activities in vulnerable 
communities (IFRC, 2009). These measures do not only involve physical risk 
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reduction and preparedness activities such as erecting floodwater barriers and 
digging drainages, but also involve socioeconomic vulnerability reduction measures 
such as crop diversification and alternative livelihoods. The expectation is that 
increasing individual and community resilience to climate change will reduce the 
losses and harm caused by natural disasters and reduce the need for emergency 
humanitarian relief. 
The International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and seven National 
Societies (Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe) launched the Zambezi River Basin Initiative (ZRBI) in 2009 as a means 
to aid hazard-prone communities settled along the Zambezi River. Among the goals 
of the ZRBI is disaster preparedness and risk reduction. Its expected outcomes 
include: increased individual and community resilience and consequent reduction in 
vulnerabilities to recurrent disasters, implementation, use of community-based 
disaster preparedness systems, and increased branch and volunteer capacity for 
disaster preparedness and risk reduction (IFRC, 2009). With greater capacity on the 
Red Cross’ end and a community-based disaster preparedness system (i.e. early 
warning > early action) in place, the Red Cross can be the first community-based 
responders in the event of any climate disaster, small, medium, or large. 
A part of the ZRBI requires that National Societies conduct Vulnerability and 
Capacity Assessments (VCA). The VCA is a participatory research tool which is 
used to understand existing vulnerabilities and capacities, perceptions of risk and 
preparedness, and actual preparedness in the target communities. Once 
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vulnerabilities and capacities are identified, the Red Cross can work with 
communities to reduce their vulnerability to risks by using existing community 
capacities (skills, knowledge and initiative) and in turn, prevent hazards from 
becoming disasters (IFRC, 2007a). 
In this study, I first review the literature on vulnerability and identify 
frameworks that can be used to conceptualize vulnerability and barriers to reducing 
vulnerability. I also review the concept of ‘useable science’ given that the VCA is 
intended to be a tool for collecting information that can then be used by the Red 
Cross to make decisions about community-based disaster risk reduction and 
preparedness measures. Using the literature review, I identify research questions. 
Then, I detail the methods used to collect and analyze data. I go on to report and 
analyze my data and end with a set of conclusions. 
1.1. Literature Review 
1.1.1. Evolution of Vulnerability Research 
 
While hazards such as floods, droughts, and earthquakes are natural, 
disasters are not; rather, they are socially constructed (Cannon, 1994; Oliver-Smith, 
2004). Disasters result from a combination of natural hazards and the social, 
economic and political processes and structures of the area in which they occur 
(Blaikie et al, 1994; Oliver-Smith, 2004). These processes result from power 
relations in social systems and “generate unequal access to opportunities and 
unequal exposures to risks” (Cannon, 1994, p. 14). Researchers have largely focused 
on the concepts of vulnerability, adaptation, resilience, coping capacity, and 
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adaptive capacity when analyzing the social aspects of disasters, but how they are 
defined and linked is contested (Gallopin, 2006; Klein et al, 2003; Smit and Wandel, 
2006; Adger, 2006; Cutter, 1996; Folke, 2006; Klein et al, 2003).  I will limit my 
literature review to the vulnerability literature given that the VCA focuses 
specifically on vulnerability.  
The concept of vulnerability arose in the 80s when researchers realized that 
extreme climate events like floods and droughts alone largely did not cause famines. 
Rather, researchers posited that famines were caused by the absence of individual 
entitlements (Sen, 1981; Sen 1984). Entitlements are the “set of alternative 
commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of 
rights and opportunities that he or she faces” (Sen, 1984, p. 497). In terms of 
famines, individual entitlements include the access to food and the ability to trade 
labour and skills to acquire food (Sen, 1981; Sen, 1984). The problem with Sen’s 
entitlements-based explanations, however, is that they generally ignore the role of 
physical exposure to ecological risk in causing crises such as famines (Adger, 2006). 
The natural hazards research tradition, on the other hand, theorizes that 
vulnerability to natural disasters is a function of geography, resource availability 
and use, and institutions. The risk-hazard (RH) model was developed by natural 
hazards researchers for the purpose of understanding the impacts of natural 
hazards in terms of community sensitivity and physical exposure to the hazard 
(Turner et al, 2003a). RH models showed that the impacts of hazards are highly 
localized, impacting different communities in different ways (Adger, 2006; Burton et 
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al, 1993). RH models were however criticized for (1) ignoring how systems 
themselves exacerbate the impacts of hazards, (2) not providing a deeper analysis of 
system components that could affect the distribution of hazard impacts in a system, 
and (3) ignoring the broader political economy’s effect on vulnerability and disaster 
experience (Turner et al, 2003a; Watts, 1983; Cutter, 1996). 
Political ecology, therefore, attempts to understand the underlying structural 
and political causes of vulnerability faced by communities (Adger, 2006). Political 
ecologists found that marginalized individuals and communities were 
disproportionately affected by natural hazards and attributed this to “differences in 
class structure, governance and economic dependency” as mediated by economic 
development across scales (Adger, 2006, p. 271; Hewitt, 1983). Further analysis of 
underlying discourses led to the understanding that vulnerability and poverty 
reduction require capacity, social and institutional organization, learning, and 
linkages across scales (Eakin and Luers, 2006; Adger et al, 2001). 
Given that natural hazards research and political ecology engage with 
important aspects of vulnerability – sensitivity and exposure in natural hazards 
research and political economy and human-environment interactions in political 
ecology – Blaikie et al (1994) merged them in their pressure-and-release (PAR) 
model. The authors suggested that disasters result from a combination of different 
pressures, including the natural hazard itself and the progression of vulnerability. 
PAR explained vulnerability as a progression, where dynamic pressures, i.e. weak 
institutions, lack of skills and training, population growth, deforestation, etc, 
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“‘translate’ the effects of root causes” of vulnerability, i.e. underlying power 
structures,  “into the vulnerability of unsafe conditions”(Blaikie et al, 1994, p. 24). 
These pressures can only be released through disaster management initiatives and 
the overall reduction of vulnerability (Winchester, 1992; Blaikie et al, 1994). While 
the PAR model was able to integrate physical and social vulnerabilities into a model, 
it was deemed too linear and comprehensive to a fault; it could not explain 
mechanisms of vulnerability or account for the nestedness of system interactions 
(Adger, 2006; Turner et al, 2003a). 
Some of the current research on vulnerability is consequently focused on 
explaining the mechanisms and processes of vulnerability in social-ecological 
systems (SES) (Turner et al, 2003a; Turner et al, 2003b; Luers et al, 2003; Luers, 
2005; Adger, 2006). An SES integrates social patterns and processes such as culture, 
institutions, and information with ecological patterns and processes such as 
primary production, organic matter and disturbance, within a specific political, 
economic, and biogeophysical context (Redman et al, 2004). These systems are, 
multi-scalar, dynamic, and adaptive (Redman et al, 2004; Machlis et al, 1997). 
Turner et al (2003a, 2003b) have studied the linkages and feedbacks that cause 
vulnerability (defined in terms of exposure, sensitivity, and resilience) within 
bounded human-environment systems. Part of this requires looking at how external 
political and environmental forces may shape the vulnerability of the bounded 
system to hazards.  Others have expanded on the Turner et al (2003a) framework in 
order to make it more methodologically tangible, whilst maintaining its conceptual 
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base (Eakin and Luers, 2006; Kasperson et al, 2005; Fussel, 2007). 
A general consensus that seems to have been reached within vulnerability 
research, as a whole, is that vulnerability consists of three key parts: exposure, 
sensitivity, and adaptive capacity/resilience (Adger, 2006; Turner et al, 2003a). 
Exposure refers to the “nature and degree to which a system experiences 
environmental or socio-political stress” (Adger, 2006, p. 270). Sensitivity refers to 
the “degree to which a system is modified or affected by perturbations” (Adger, 2006, 
p. 270). Adaptive capacity is the “ability of a system to evolve in order to 
accommodate environmental hazards or policy change and to expand the range of 
variability with which it can cope” (Adger, 2006, p. 270). Turner et al (2003a), on the 
other hand, state that the third component of vulnerability is resilience, rather than 
adaptive capacity. They define resilience as the system’s capacity to cope or respond 
to perturbations and stresses. Adaptive capacity is, therefore, an element of 
resilience. 
1.1.2. Vulnerability Analysis for Sustainability 
 
One of the most conceptually advanced and useful frameworks of 
vulnerability is the framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science 
developed by Turner et al (2003a). This framework was developed amidst 
frustrations that existing vulnerability frameworks (1) were more focused on social 
vulnerability and largely ignored the vulnerability of biophysical subsystems, (2) 
were too linear in their conception of exposure as a function of a single stress or 
perturbation rather than multiple, interacting stresses and/or perturbations, and 
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(3) did not adequately account for the role of institutions. 
Turner et al’s (2003a) framework treats systems as coupled human-
environment systems in which the human and environmental subsystems interact 
and influence each other’s vulnerability with regards to exposure, sensitivity, and 
resilience. Exposure consists of the different components of the human-environment 
system – social units (i.e. individuals, households, communities, etc) and biophysical 
units (i.e. ecosystems, flora, fauna, etc) – and the characteristics of the stress (i.e the 
magnitude, frequency, duration, and areal extent of a natural hazard). This 
framework does not limit the analysis to just one stress; rather, there can be 
multiple, interacting stresses that the human-environment system is exposed to, i.e. 
the occurrence of a natural hazard during a period of economic insecurity. 
Sensitivity refers to the sensitivity of the coupled human-environment 
system to an exposure, or a set of exposures. This sensitivity is determined by 
interacting human and environmental conditions. Turner et al (2003a) define 
human conditions as social capital and endowments and environmental conditions 
as natural capital and endowments.  Social capital is the “norms and networks that 
enable people to act collectively” (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p. 226). 
Alternatively, Kasperson et al (2005) refer to human conditions as ‘socioeconomic 
conditions’ and define it in terms of socioeconomic endowments and entitlements, 
the range of variability and coping capacity, and the local/regional political economy. 
Natural capital refers to the ecosystem resources which provide ecosystem goods 
and services (Turner et al, 2003a).  
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Both human and environmental conditions affect the coping capacity of the 
system (Turner et al, 2003a). Marginalized groups tend to be excluded from 
decision-making and therefore, members of these groups need to depend on their 
relationships, local institutions, and their resource base, in order to manage their 
risk and vulnerability (Adger, 2003). Natural capital is important because the social 
subsystem depends on ecosystem services and goods to cope with exposure and vice 
versa. In addition, social and biophysical coping mechanisms feed back into each 
other and affect each other’s coping capacities. It is the outcomes of the responses of 
the social and biophysical systems that determine the resilience of the overall 
coupled human-environment system (Turner et al, 2003a). 
It is important to note that vulnerability occurs in the context of internal and 
external social and environmental influences. Furthermore, external influences, 
local influences, and coupled human-environment systems are prone to change, 
meaning that vulnerability is dynamic (Turner et al, 2003a). 
Politics are an important component of these internal and external influences. 
Adger (2006) states that vulnerability cannot be isolated from the wider political 
economy. Politics is not adequately considered in the framework. Political 
conditions can make a system more sensitive to shocks. What is lacking in this 
framework is a cross-scale arrow between ‘sensitivity’ and ‘human influences 
outside the place’ which would indicate that sensitivity is affected by political 
interactions across scales. Political ecology can be used here to understand how 
dominant political discourses affect the environment and development (Pulwarty 
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and Riebsame, 1997; Adger et al, 2001). 
In addition, the historical processes leading to vulnerability are not 
accounted for. Several studies have found that the underlying causes of 
vulnerability have to do with the historical processes of community settlement and 
development and everyday social interactions that occur in the context of the 
environment and history (Morrow, 1999; Pulwarty and Riebsame, 1997; Hewitt, 
1983). Political ecology, through the PAR model, is the only tradition that has 
successful incorporated historical context and process into vulnerability research.  
A further problem with the framework is its complexity. Eakin and Luers 
(2006, p. 383) state that “the challenge of undertaking place-based research while 
incorporating local to global interactions of both social and environmental processes, 
although increasingly viewed as essential in vulnerability research, is 
methodologically difficult”. The authors simplify the framework proposed by Turner 
et al (2003a) in a way that keeps in mind its theoretical elements while making it 
more tangible methodologically and analytically. The advantage of Eakin and Luers’ 
(2006) conception of Turner et al’s (2003a) framework goes beyond just its relative 
simplicity. As I mentioned earlier, the original framework’s treatment of politics is 
lacking. Eakin and Luers (2006), however, incorporate political ecology into their 
conception to explore issues of marginalization, differential exposures, differential 
capacities, and losses and gains. 
1.1.3. Measuring Vulnerability 
 
One of biggest challenges in vulnerability research is measuring vulnerability 
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(Adger 2006; Turner et al, 2003b; Kasperson, et al, 2005; Hinkel, 2006). What are 
the determinants of vulnerability? And what indicators should be used to evaluate 
the determinants of vulnerability?  
Vulnerability cannot truly be measured because it is a theoretical concept 
and “does not denote an observable phenomenon” (Hinkel, 2006, p. 200). Therefore, 
vulnerability needs to be operationalized, rather than measured. One way of 
operationalizing vulnerability is through the use of indicators. There are 3 types of 
indicators: (1) scalar indicators, (2) composite indicators and, (3) vector-valued 
indicators. All of these indicators represent observable variables which indicate for 
theoretical variables (Hinkel, 2006). According to Hinkel (2006, p. 201), the 
development of vulnerability indicators has three steps: (1) “the definition of what is 
to be indicated”, (2) “selection of indicating variables”, and (3) “aggregation of 
indicating variables”.  
Using indicators, however, comes with numerous issues. First, indicators are 
representative of a particular variable at a particular spatial and temporal scale. In 
terms of vulnerability, this is problematic because vulnerability is dynamic with 
constantly changing drivers (Adger, 2006). What is, therefore, needed are 
vulnerability indicators which indicate for a possible future state. This involves 
building predictive models which can predict future states based on changing 
drivers (Hinkel, 2006). Adger (2006) states that in order to capture vulnerability 
more accurately, researchers need to look at social processes and material outcomes 
in systems that are nested, with multiple linkages; however, this is very difficult to 
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do. Second, while vulnerability frameworks such as Turner et al’s (2003a) are 
available, they tend to be abstract and do not provide much direction in terms of 
selecting indicators and aggregating indicators. Third, the selection and aggregation 
of indicators is  a subjective process, making it difficult to replicate vulnerability 
assessments and analysis of the same data set (Hinkel, 2006).  
Several studies have focused on generating standardized determinants and 
indicators of vulnerability and its components (Yohe and Tol, 2002; Brooks et al, 
2005; Adger et al, 2004; Cutter et al, 2003). However, indicators change based on 
place and context (Schroter et al, 2005). A vulnerability assessment conducted in 
the US cannot use the same socio-economic indicators as a vulnerability assessment 
conducted in Zambia. Scale is also important when assessing vulnerability, and 
indicators will change based on the scale studied. National-level indicators of health 
and wellbeing, for example, do not necessarily reflect the nuances in health and 
wellbeing at the local levels that affect the capacities of people to adapt (Adger, 
2006; Cutter et al, 2003). Therefore, indicators used in studies of large-scale 
systems cannot be scaled down to assess the vulnerability of smaller-scale systems. 
Researchers need to select indicators that are relevant to a particular socio-political 
context and scale (Schroter et al, 2005; Birkmann, 2007). 
Despite the difficulties in selecting determinants and indicators of 
vulnerability and its components, researchers have come up with some generalized 
determinants and indicators. These determinants and indicators are broad and can 
be adapted to suit the study. Morrow (1999) finds that community vulnerability 
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largely occurs due to aggregated household vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities 
arise from limited household access to economic, material, human, social, and 
political resources. Adger and Kelly (2009) and Kelly and Adger (2000) find that the 
three primary vulnerability indicators are poverty, inequality and institutional 
adaptation. Poverty is a proxy for marginalization and causes vulnerability by 
limiting coping capacity, entitlements and empowerment. Inequality is a proxy for 
collective responsibility, insurance, and social welfare and causes vulnerability via 
the concentration of entitlements into small sections of the population. Institutional 
adaptation is a proxy for the architecture of entitlements, internal political 
institutions that affect adaptation, and aggregated perceptions of vulnerability. 
Limited or poor institutional adaptation means that institutional structures cannot 
effectively adapt to changing conditions, thereby leading to vulnerability. These 
variables all arise from cross-scalar interactions. 
Engle and Lemos (2010) provide a comprehensive list of the determinants of 
adaptive capacity – as determined by IPCC (2001), Pelling and High (2005), Adger 
(2003); and Yohe and Tol (2002) – that are widely used and referenced in the 
literature. These determinants include: human capital, information and technology, 
material resources, social capital, political capital, wealth, institutions and 
entitlements, equity, and collective action. There is a widespread belief that 
institutions are the most important determinant of adaptive capacity and that the 
other determinants are heavily dependent on institutions (Eakin and Lemos, 2006; 
Brooks et al, 2005; Engle, 2007; Engle and Lemos, 2010; Haddad, 2005; Adger, 
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2001). Despite this, operationalizing governance and institution-related indicators 
has been a challenge (Engle and Lemos, 2010). 
1.1.4. Assessing Barriers to Adaptation 
 
Ideally, vulnerable communities will attempt to reduce their vulnerability to 
shocks through adaptation. Moser and Ekstrom (2010, p. 1) define adaptation as: 
“Adaptation involves changes in social-ecological systems in response to actual and 
expected impacts of climate change in the context of interacting non-climatic 
changes. Adaptation strategies and actions can range from short-term coping to 
longer-term, deeper transformations, aim to meet more than climate change goals 
alone, and may or may not succeed in moderating harm or exploiting beneficial 
opportunities.” 
 
Adaptation, as defined here fits into the resilience box in the Turner et al (2003a) 
vulnerability analysis framework given that it is expressed in terms of adaptive and 
coping capacity.  
Adaptation is governed by social processes and institutions (Jones and Boyd, 
2011). Successful adaptation strategies, in general, are those that are “sufficiently 
robust” across “alternative futures” of uncertain climate, economics, politics and 
culture (Adger et al, 2009, p. 344). Adaptation can be limited by ethics, limited 
access to precise knowledge, perceptions of climate risk by communities and 
governments, and undervaluing places and cultures.  An adaptive society is 
therefore defined as having an “awareness of diverse values, appreciation and 
understanding of specific and variable vulnerabilities to impacts, and acceptance of 
some loss through change” (Adger et al,  2009, p. 350).  
A major element of successful adaptation is collective action. Collective action 
is especially important in communities that have been marginalized as when 
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communities are ignored or excluded individuals have to rely on existing 
relationships, or social capital, within their communities for their own and collective 
good (Adger, 2003). Strong social networks allow for communities to “confront 
poverty and vulnerability, resolve disputes, and take advantage of new 
opportunities” (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p. 226). Individuals lacking in social 
capital, on the other hand, can be excluded from social networks, institutions, 
decision-making and opportunities, thereby enhancing inequities in the community 
and negatively impacting the collective good or welfare. Social capital needs to be 
distributed across the community. (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).  
Social capital, collective action and therefore adaptation are largely mediated 
by the political and institutional environment (Ostrom, 1994; Woolcock and 
Narayan, 2000).  Institutions can be local or extra-local. Institutions are vital for 
gathering and circulating information, increasing resource accessibility, capacity 
building, leadership, and creating connections between communities, decision-
makers and institutions (Agrawal, 2010). The capacity of social groups to act in a 
way that enhances their collective good depends on existing formal institutions 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Strong formal institutions and good government are 
required for local programs to works and communities to thrive. This is especially 
the case for poor communities who need to reduce their vulnerability and poverty 
(Skocpol, 1995; Skocpol, 1996). A set of inadequate and ineffective adaptation 
institutions can therefore enhance the vulnerability of communities to climate 
change. (Agrawal, 2010). 
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Institutions and social process that deter social units (people, communities, 
etc) from adapting are considered ‘barriers’ to adaptation (Jones and Boyd, 2011; 
Moser and Ekstrom, 2010). Barriers are obstacles to adaptation that can be 
overcome, whereas limits are obstacles to adaptation that cannot be overcome 
(Moser and Ekstrom, 2010). 
Moser and Ekstrom (2010) propose a diagnostic framework to identify 
barriers to climate change adaptation in social-ecological systems. This framework 
functions on the assumption that actors are rational and emphasizes the 
importance of context. The framework is scalable and constitutes of three key 
components – understanding, planning, and managing. The understanding phase 
constitutes of the following stages: (1) detecting a problem, (2) gathering and using 
information, and (3) defining or redefining the problem. The stages in the planning 
phase are: (1) developing options, (2) assessing options, and (3) selecting options. In 
the managing phase, actors (1) implement options, (2) monitor outcomes and the 
environment, and (3) evaluate the effectiveness of the different options. Moser and 
Ekstrom (2010) define the kinds of barriers that there can be in each of the stages 
that prevent adaptation or encourage maladaptation. 
Jones and Boyd (2011) propose an alternative framework in which the key 
components are (1) social, (2) human and informational, and (3) natural. Social 
barriers can be normative, cognitive and/institutional. Normative barriers refer to 
barriers resulting from cultural and historical norms. In some situations, 
individuals and communities may be unwilling to change their traditional practices. 
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In addition, normative barriers to adaption arise from persistent historical social 
structures (i.e. caste-based vocation) that exacerbate the vulnerability of particular 
individuals and groups to climate shocks (Jones and Boyd, 2011). 
Cognitive barriers are psychological processes that limit or prevent 
individual action in the face of hazards (Jones and Boyd, 2011). Grothmann and 
Patt (2005) show that perceptions of climate risk (probability of risk and severity of 
risk), especially a perceived lack of coping capacity, can result in ‘avoidant 
maladaptation’, i.e. denial, fatalism, and wishful thinking. In addition, it has been 
shown that individuals are resistant to taking actions that may result in loss, even 
if the potential benefits are high (Baron and Ritov, 2004).  Individual perception of 
coping capacity combined with the costs of coping is referred to as ‘coping appraisal’ 
(Grothmann and Patt, 2005; Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006). 
Institutional barriers arise when the structure of formal and informal 
interactions influence individual response to change and variability (Jones and 
Boyd, 2011). This is in line with the idea that institutions structure “incentives for 
individual and collective action” (Agrawal, 2010, p. 8). Incentives, in turn, 
determine the patterns of interactions that lead to particular outcomes (i.e. 
adapting or not adapting to a hazard). Weak institutions can lead to perverse 
incentives and informational and power asymmetries between different actors and 
motivational issues, and overall inhibit collective action (Andersson et al, 2005). 
A missing type of social barrier in the Jones and Boyd (2011) framework is 
political barriers. While institutional barriers can be considered a type of political 
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barrier, they do not necessarily account for historical and current political processes 
and decisions that affect how people respond to change and variability. 
Human and informational barriers can be knowledge, technology, and/or 
economics-oriented. Knowledge barriers arise when individuals and communities do 
not have access to climate knowledge (i.e. through forecasts) and do not know how 
to interpret and use the knowledge they receive. Patt and Gwata (2002) outline 
situations in which communities may hesitate to use scientific climate forecasts. 
Forecasts will not be used if users do not think they are credible, legitimate, or if 
they will clash with traditional modes of forecasting. In addition, forecasts will 
either not be used or will be used incorrectly if the forecast is communicated in 
inaccessible, difficult, and confusing language. Forecasts are also not necessarily 
used when the spatial and/or temporal scales of the forecasts are too large. 
Conversely, access to knowledge can also be a barrier to adaptation. In Zimbabwe 
and Brazil, for example, banks have taken advantage of the greater access to 
climate forecasts, denying credit to high-risk farmers when forecasts indicate poor 
rains, thereby reducing the adaptive capacity of the farming communities (Hammer 
et al, 2001; Lemos et al, 2002). 
Technological barriers arise when communities lack access to technologies 
that may help them adapt to risks or when technologies actually cause 
maladaptation. Smit and Pilifosova (2003) describe how access to snowmobiles, 
motorized boars and sonar have allowed Inuit communities to reside in one place. 
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This sense of permanence will make it difficult for Inuits to retreat or migrate 
during sea-level rise, thereby increasing the vulnerability to sea-level rise. 
Economic barriers arise when individuals and communities do not feel that 
they have the adequate economic resources to effectively adapt to climate change 
and variability. Adaptation strategies require some input, be it resources or time. In 
the face of low income, limited assets and “limited capital mobility and lack of 
alternative livelihoods”, community members seem to resort to short-term 
strategies which is focused on meeting their and their household’s daily needs – 
“they prefer profits and food now over a continual flow in perpetuity” (Pomeroy et al 
2006, 788). 
Finally, the natural barriers/limits consist of physical features (i.e. 
topography, hydrology, soil porosity) or ecological features and processes (i.e. fires) 
that may prevent communities from adapting to risk. More often than not, these are 
limits rather than barriers because they are difficult for people to change. Instead, 
people have to cope with them or change their behaviors and/or plan with those 
limits in mind. 
1.1.5. Usable Science 
 
For the Red Cross, the purpose of the VCA is to produce knowledge, or ‘usable 
science’, with which informed decisions about potential disaster risk reduction and 
preparedness initiatives can be made. Lemos and Morehouse (2005, p. 61) state that 
usable science “refers to the degree that the science produced through the 
integrated assessment process results in knowledge that meets constituent needs”.  
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The VCA’s utility as a tool to effectively measure household and community 
vulnerabilities and capacities needs to be assessed. In this section, I will be 
reviewing what constitutes as ‘usable’ science for decision-making and how science 
can be made more usable. 
There are two ways in which knowledge is commonly produced: the Science 
Push and the Demand Pull. The Science Push is where knowledge production is 
driven by the “pursuit of knowledge”, rather than the need for solutions (Dilling and 
Lemos, 2011, p. 682). Scientists set the information agenda. Therefore, scientists 
assume what information stakeholders need and therefore determine among 
themselves what knowledge is to be produced (Dilling and Lemos, 2011). The 
Demand Pull is where stakeholders set the information agenda and determine what 
information they need from scientists. 
The linearity of the Science Push and the Demand Pull  is problematic. For 
one, it may be that knowledge users and knowledge producers perceive their needs 
differently. The Science Push privileges the needs of the knowledge producers and 
the Demand Pull privileges the needs of the knowledge users. In the Demand Pull, 
the knowledge demanded may be difficult for scientists to produce (Dilling and 
Lemos, 2011; Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007). Two, neither of the models take into 
consideration the range of perceptions of need and information usability that exist 
within knowledge producer and user communities (Lemos and Rood 2010). Three, 
risk is not universally perceived. Rather, there are “distinct cultures of risk” which 
are socially, culturally and politically influenced (Robbins et al 2010, p. 85). A user 
!21"
community is not merely one stakeholder group with a shared set of values and 
needs. Four, there are also different values and needs within one aggregated 
stakeholder group (Archer, 2003). Phadke (2011), for example, in her case-study of 
the social movement surrounding the Chikotra river dam project, demonstrates that 
the ‘local’ does not constitute of one body of knowledge; the ‘local’ includes project 
beneficiaries and project-affected peoples (PAPs), and within the PAPs, there are a 
multiplicity of knowledges and lived experiences based on geographical location, 
socio-economic status, agricultural practice, and so on. Dilling and Lemos  (2011) 
contend that there is also variation within the producer community. In this sense, 
the knowledge produced does not represent a universal truth, thereby limiting its 
utility in particular contexts (Forsyth, 2003).While boundaries are drawn between 
knowledge producer and user groups as a means to establish order, it is important 
to understand that within aggregate stakeholder groups, there exists a range of 
values, beliefs, and perceptions based on lived experiences and worldviews (Forsyth 
2003; Adger et al 2009).  
Knowledge, therefore, needs to be co-produced between producers and users. 
The concept of co-production recognizes that there is “a world of sciences” which are 
partial, imperfect, and situated in their local contexts (Harding 2011; Haraway 
1988). Jasanoff (2004) claims that co-production of knowledge will produce better 
and more comprehensive descriptions of natural and social phenomena, improve the 
explanatory power of social science theories, and force us to be critical of the ways in 
which societies constitute and reconstitute themselves based on their changing 
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perceptions of nature. In addition, co-production will allow knowledge producers to 
become aware of users’ needs and users of producers’ capabilities, resulting in 
knowledge that is credible, salient and legitimate (Dilling and Lemos, 2011; Cash et 
al, 2006).  This also means that the process of knowledge production will be 
sensitive to changing and differential perceptions of risk within stakeholder 
communities. 
Dilling and Lemos (2011) contend that iteration between producers and users 
is a way of ensuring that knowledge is co-produced and consequently more tailored 
to the needs of users. Iteration is a form of mediation and/or translation. The aim of 
translation is to create hybrid knowledges between new beings, social groups, 
and/or nature and culture and requires cross-scalar interactions to occur between 
the different knowledge producer and user communities (Latour, 1993; Jasanoff and 
Martello, 2004).  
Dilling and Lemos (2011) suggest several mechanisms by which iteration, or 
mediation and/or translation, can take place. First, information brokers can be used 
as intermediaries between knowledge producers and users given that they are well-
versed in both worlds. Second, collaborative group processes can be encouraged in 
situations where decision-making is dispersed and significantly affects a large 
number of stakeholder groups. Third, embedded capacity is when the internal 
capacity of an organization (i.e. human resources, leadership and technical capacity) 
is improved to incorporate scientific knowledge into decision-making. Fourth, 
boundary organizations are like information brokers, but have greater 
!23"
organizational capacity and resources to “tailor information and produce value-
added products” (Dilling and Lemos, 2011, p. 686). Finally, knowledge networks are 
informal and flexible networks comprised of the different stakeholder groups. These 
networks provide stakeholder groups a platform over which to communicate, share 
information, collaborate and make decisions.  
  Knowledge networks have received particular interest. This is due to the 
following reasons: (1) the informality of knowledge networks means that there can 
be a flux of stakeholder groups based on who has stakes given a specific forecast, (2) 
there is recognition that knowledge producer and user communities are bound by 
institutional constraints, (3) the constant iteration and reiteration between different 
stakeholders builds trust and overcomes issues of knowledge credibility and 
legitimacy, and (4) collaboration and mutual learning allows for adaptive climate 
governance (Dilling and Lemos, 2009; Feldman and Ingram, 2009). However, 
Feldman and Ingram’s (2009, p. 10) conception of a knowledge network is 
problematic: 
“[Knowledge networks] are composed of policy makers, scientists, government 
agencies, and nongovernmental organization linked together in an effort to provide 
close, ongoing, and nearly continuous communication and information 
dissemination among multiple sectors of society involved in technological and policy 
innovations for managing climate impacts”. 
 
Where are the vulnerable communities within this network? It is unclear if the 
nongovernmental organizations act as boundary spanners, linking local 
communities with decision-makers. The exclusion of vulnerable communities from 
knowledge networks further disenfranchises them. If knowledge is to be 
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successfully co-produced and result in locally relevant, legitimate and credible 
forecasts, vulnerable communities need to be included in the knowledge network. 
 How are knowledge networks created and established? Knowledge networks 
are created when a need arises to collate the goals, convergent or divergent, of 
organizations and social groups involved in a particular decision-making context. 
The most effective knowledge networks are those that “promote broad, user-driven 
management objectives” (Feldman and Ingram 2009, p. 13). These networks place 
great emphasis on mutual learning, a dynamic and iterative process between 
knowledge producers and users.  Knowledge-action systems need to be flexible to 
allow for the production, use and circulation of knowledge, self-innovation, and 
response to changing conditions.  
At the core of networks and their interactions are institutions (Jasanoff and 
Martello 2004). There need to be institutions that enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of and establish order within a network of interactions. Knowledge 
networks can be institutionalized through boundary organizations (Feldman and 
Ingram 2009). The advantage of boundary organizations is that they recognize that 
knowledge producer and user communities are bound by institutional constraints 
and their own social context, and therefore allow for these communities to maintain 
their epistemic authority. The network can, therefore, function on the basis of a 
modus operandi rather than a shared consensus, which is difficult and often 
impractical to reach (Star and Griesemer 1989).  
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1.2. Research Questions 
The Red Cross’ aim with regards to anticipatory disaster management is to 
reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience of communities to natural 
hazards. They use the VCA to identify vulnerabilities that they need to focus on. 
However, identifying vulnerabilities alone is not enough. It is important to 
determine the barriers that impede the ability of communities to adapt to climate 
change and variability. By focusing on mitigating these barriers, the Red Cross can 
fundamentally reduce the vulnerabilities faced by these communities to natural 
hazards in the long-term. The literature, however, shows that vulnerability is 
difficult to measure and that the determinants of community sensitivity and 
adaptive capacity change based on context. This brings into question the VCA’s 
utility as a standardized toolkit for understanding vulnerability and hence, the 
potential success of the Red Cross’ anticipatory disaster management initiative. 
In my study, I first aim to understand why Zambian communities living in 
the Zambezi River Basin are vulnerable to floods. I use Turner et al’s (2003a) 
framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science to assess 
vulnerability. Then, I identify whether or not communities have been adapting to 
floods. If they have not been adequately adapting to floods, I discern the barriers to 
adaptation using the Jones and Boyd (2011) framework. Finally, I use both 
frameworks to critique the VCA process and determine whether or not it is able to 
evaluate vulnerability and provide a basis for developing community-based risk 
reduction and preparedness activities. 
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In summary, my research questions are: 
1. Why are Zambian communities living in the Zambezi River Basin vulnerable 
to floods? 
2. Are communities adequately adapting to floods? If not, what are the barriers 
to adaptation? 
3. Is the VCA really a useful tool for evaluating vulnerability and making 
decisions to reduce community vulnerability and increase community 
resilience to floods?  
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CHAPTER II 
Methods 
 
The data I use in this study were collected as a part of VCAs conducted for 
the ZRBI. I also use data collected from interviews with Zambia Red Cross (ZRC) 
disaster management staff. Data collection was conducted between June 1, 2013 
and July 10, 2013 in Kasaya, Sikaunzwe, Situlu and Sikuzu, all communities 
located in the Zambezi River Basin. These communities were chosen by the ZRC as 
pilot communities for the ZRBI. 
2.1. Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment 
I conducted vulnerability and capacity assessments (VCAs) in Sesheke and 
Kazungula as per IFRC protocol (IFRC 2007a; IFRC 2007b; IFRC 2008b). I 
conducted the following methods which were all in the Red Cross VCA Toolkit and 
were all designed and conducted based on Red Cross VCA protocol (IFRC, 2007a; 
IFRC, 2007b; IFRC, 2008): (1) baseline survey, (2) historical data questionnaire, (3) 
focus group discussion, (4) hazards mapping, and (5) transect walk. I additionally 
interviewed ZRC disaster management staff. For this study, I will not be using the 
data from the transect walks because they provide information already contained in 
the hazard maps. Before I started my data collection, I organized meetings with 
community leaders from each of the four communities. The purpose of these 
meetings was to inform community leaders of the ZRBI, Red Cross goals, and the 
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research agenda, and to also gain their support and consent for conducting our 
research in their communities. Community leaders have a great deal of influence in 
their communities and command a lot of respect. Their endorsement meant that 
community members would be more likely to cooperate and participate in our 
activities.   
2.1.1. Baseline Survey 
 
The baseline survey is a household-level close-structured survey and was 
used to collect basic information about physical and socio-economic vulnerabilities 
and household perceptions of disasters and disaster preparedness (Appendix 6). 
Households were chosen using a systematic sampling method where I walked 
through the community and surveyed every tenth household. Therefore, the amount 
of surveys is proportional to the number of households in the community (Table 1). If 
household members were not present in a selected household, I continued surveying 
and returned to the same household at a later stage in the day or week. If none of 
the household members were present in the house after a maximum of three 
returns, I surveyed the neighboring household. I obtained informed verbal consent 
from households before they were surveyed. If a household refused to be surveyed, I 
went to the neighboring household and continued surveying. All baseline survey 
respondents were over the age of 18. Names and other identifiable information 
(other than community and village name) were not recorded. In addition, I had a 
Red Cross translator with me to translate the survey questions, which were written 
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in English, and the responses. The data were collated on Excel and analyzed using 
Stata. 
  Kasaya Sikaunzwe Sikuzu Situlu 
No. HH 30 59 10 23 
Table 1. Number of households surveyed for baseline survey. 
2.1.2. Historical Data Collection 
 
The historical data collection consisted of semi-structured questionnaires, 
used to collate local knowledge on climate hazards, create a timeline of hazards 
experienced by communities, and understand how floods with different magnitudes 
manifest in the local context (Appendix 2). I collected data about historical disasters 
(primarily floods and droughts), their consequences, and how communities, as a 
whole, responded to them. I used the snowball method of surveying where I first 
surveyed the community leaders and then surveyed those recommended by 
community leaders as knowledgeable about historical events (i.e. the elderly). I 
obtained informed verbal consent from the interviewees before proceeding with the 
questionnaires. All historical data respondents were over the age of 18. Names and 
other identifiable information (other than community and village name) were not 
recorded. In addition, I had a Red Cross translator with me to translate the survey 
questions, which were written in English, and the responses. The data were collated 
on Excel. 
2.1.3. Focus Group Discussions 
 
During the data collection period, I conducted focus group discussions in each 
of the communities. These discussions consisted of community meetings – both men 
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and women participated – and were focused on understanding community 
perceptions of risk and preparedness, community responses to floods, the 
involvement of external agencies (NGOs, government, civil society organizations, 
etc) in the communities, and the potential for disaster risk reduction and 
preparedness initiatives such as early warning systems. There was a pre-prepared 
list of questions to guide the discussion, however, the discussions were open and 
tended towards the questions and subjects important to community members 
(Appendix 0). I facilitated the discussion with the help of the Red Cross disaster 
management team and a Red Cross translator. The group discussion was video-
recorded and meeting minutes were taken; participants were told that the 
recordings would only be used for research purposes. I transcribed the focus group 
discussions and coded the transcriptions using NVivo (codebook can be found in 
Appendix 5). 
2.1.4. Hazards Mapping 
 
The focus group discussions ended with a hazards mapping session in which 
community members were divided into groups and asked to draw maps of their 
communities using pen and paper. On the maps, they indicated areas of flood risk 
(i.e. vulnerable households, vulnerable fields, submergence zones) and locations of 
local capacities (i.e. clinics, upper lands, possible shelters). The groups were given 
approximately thirty minutes to produce the maps. The groups then presented their 
maps. In Sikaunzwe and Kasaya, groups were divided based on which zone they 
lived in. Therefore, for both communities, there are maps for each of the zones. In 
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Situlu and Sikuzu, community members drew maps of the full community – the 
most informative maps were chosen from each of the communities for the purposes 
of analysis. 
2.2. Interviews 
I conducted three semi-structured interviews with Zambian Red Cross staff 
involved in disaster management. The questions asked concerned past experiences 
with disaster management, the Red Cross’ capacity to manage climate disasters, the 
Red Cross’ decision-making structure, their relationship and interactions with 
external organizations, and how they felt the Red Cross’ capacity could be improved 
(Appendix 14). I obtained informed verbal consent from the interviews before 
proceeding with the interview. The interviews were conducted anonymously and in 
English. The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. These transcriptions 
were not coded because they were used primarily to gauge organizational and 
decision-making structure and relief distribution processes in the Red Cross. 
2.3. Data analysis 
2.3.1. Vulnerability of Communities 
2.3.1.1. Definition of the human-environment system 
My analysis of community vulnerability to floods is conceptually informed by 
the Turner et al (2003a) framework for vulnerability analysis and the components 
of vulnerability assessments as described by Luers and Eakin (2006). Therefore, I 
first define the coupled human-environment system by identifying and describing 
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the communities and their location and I also briefly describe the physical/ecological 
characteristics of the environment. I proceed to explain my focus on floods and base 
it on people’s past experiences with floods using data from the baseline survey, 
historical data collection and focus group discussions. I then define the desired state 
of the human-environment system as defined in the focus-group discussions. To do 
this, I code my focus-group data transcriptions to find what future is valued in each 
of the communities – what goals, desires and hopes do individuals express for their 
communities? I incorporate Red Cross ZRBI goals in order to further define the 
futures valued in these communities given that these communities will need the 
resources provided by and available to the ZRC in order to successfully reduce their 
vulnerabilities. 
2.3.1.2. Exposure 
 
I go on to describe the exposure of the communities to floods. I determine the 
change in flood frequency using the historical data. I count the number of floods 
reported in each decade since the 1950s for each community and determine 
household-level perceptions about change in disaster frequency using the baseline 
survey. I then determine the magnitudes of floods by using the water levels 
reported by individuals in the historical data as a proxy for severity – floods with 
higher water levels are considered more severe. I also use the flood impact data 
provided by individuals in the historical data to gauge flood severity. Next, I 
determine the duration of floods. While I do not have information on how long flood 
waters persist, the historical data does, to some degree, indicate the impacts of 
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floods, many of which have long-term effects. Finally, I describe the areal extents of 
floods in each community using the hazards maps drawn by community members 
and the notes that I took while they were presenting their maps. 
2.3.1.3. Sensitivity 
 
After determining community exposure to floods, I evaluate community 
sensitivity to floods. Kasperson et al (2005) contend that the human conditions that 
make social units (individuals, communities, regions) vulnerable to floods are 
primarily socio-economic in nature and include socioeconomic endowments and 
entitlements, the range of variability and coping capacity, and the local/regional 
political economy. I use data from the baseline survey and focus group discussions 
to gauge how wealth, education, secondary livelihood, agricultural dependency, 
household construction quality, water accessibility, gender and age effect household 
and community sensitivity to floods. I utilize household-level data based on the 
assumption that community vulnerability to disasters is partly based on aggregated 
household-level vulnerabilities (Morrow, 1999; Moore et al, 2004 ). 
I use the baseline survey to test hypotheses of sensitivity at the household-
level (Table 2). To test these hypotheses, I merge my data for all four communities, 
under the assumption that all four communities are similar socially, culturally, and 
economically. Households are identified as being sensitive if they indicated in the 
baseline survey that: (1) house has been flooded in the past, (2) crops have been lost 
due to floods in the past, and (3) household has suffered losses due to floods in the 
past. In Stata, household sensitivity, the dependent variable, was treated as ordinal 
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data where sensitive households were coded as ‘1’ and not sensitive households were 
coded as ‘0’.  
Hypothesis Statistical test 
Wealth is associated with sensitivity to floods Kruskal-Wallis 
Educational attainment is associated with sensitivity  to 
floods 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Having a secondary livelihood is associated with sensitivity 
to floods 
Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney 
Agricultural dependency is associated with sensitivity to 
floods 
Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney 
Household construction quality is associated with 
sensitivity to floods 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Distance to primary water source is associated with 
sensitivity to floods 
Simple logit regression 
Gender is associated with sensitivity to floods Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney 
Table 2. Summary of statistical tests conducted to gauge associations between socio-
economic endowments and household sensitivity to floods.  
I test the association of wealth and household sensitivity using the Kruskal-
Wallis test. Given that the income data collected was poor, I create a wealth index 
using baseline survey data. In this index, I award households points for meeting 
certain conditions (Table 3). A higher score indicates greater wealth, where the 
highest possible score is 31. It is important to note that this wealth index only 
provides a partial explanation of wealth in the communities in question. The 
conditions chosen represent the best indications of wealth in the baseline survey, 
based on community beliefs as to what constitutes as wealth. In addition, the points 
for the different conditions are not weighted based on their relative values. I also 
code my focus group transcriptions to see if there are any indications of the effect of 
wealth on flood sensitivity. 
  Points awarded 
Condition 0 1 2 3 
Does the HH have a primary 
occupation? No Yes  - -  
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Does the HH have a secondary 
occupation? No Yes  - -  
Does the HH have electricity? No Yes  - -  
Does the HH have piper water? No Yes  - -  
Does the HH own a pit latrine? No Yes  - -  
Does the HH have a radio? No Yes  - -  
Does the HH have a TV? No Yes  - -  
Does the HH have a 
clock/watch? No Yes  - -  
Does the HH have an axe? No Yes  - -  
Does the HH have a mobile 
phone? No Yes  - -  
Does the HH have a sewing 
machine? No Yes  - -  
Does the HH own jewelry? No Yes  - -  
What type of transport does 
the HH have? None Bicycle Motorbike Car 
Does the HH have a 
refrigerator? No Yes  - -  
How many 
chickens/turkeys/ducks does 
the HH own?* 0 1 to 15 16 to 30 30+ 
How many cows does the HH 
own?* 0 1 to 5 6 to 10 11+ 
How many pigs does the HH 
own?* 0 1 to 5 6 to 10 11+ 
How many goats/sheep does 
the HH own?* 0 1 to 5 6 to 10 11+ 
What is the house floor made 
of? mud 
tiles, mud with DPC, 
or cement/bricks  - -  
What is the house's outer wall 
made of? mud 
cement, burnt bricks, 
or lumber/board  - -  
What is the house's roof made 
of? 
grass 
thatchin
g 
tarpaulin, 
cement/slate, or iron 
sheets  - -  
Table 3. Wealth index for baseline survey. *The point system for domestic animal 
ownership was subjectively decided by using median, 25% quartile, 75% quartile, 
minimum and maximum values. 
I test education as an indicator of sensitivity based on the rationale that more 
educated households suffer less losses from disasters as they are able to make 
better decisions with regards to household construction and location and overall 
preparedness (Toya and Skidmore, 2007). I use the Kruskal Wallis test to test the 
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association of educational attainment and household sensitivity. Here, I use the 
educational attainment of the household’s most educated member and I categorize 
the data using the following designations: college degree, upper secondary graduate 
(12th grade), some upper secondary (grades 10-11), junior secondary graduate (grade 
9), some junior secondary (grade 8), primary graduate (grade 7), some primary 
(grades 1-6), and no education. I also code my focus group transcriptions to see if 
there are any indications of the effect of education on flood sensitivity. 
I then focus on how having or not having a secondary livelihood impacts flood 
sensitivity. The rationale for this hypothesis is that households without multiple 
livelihood strategies are more prone negative stresses or sudden changes (Ellis, 
2000; Pomeroy, et al 2006). I use the Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test to test if flood 
sensitivity is associated with having or not having a secondary livelihood. I also 
code my focus group transcriptions to see if there are any indications of the effect of 
livelihoods on flood sensitivity. 
I go on to look at the effect of dependence on agriculture (arable and 
livestock) on flood sensitivity. Flooding is very damaging to arable farming as 
floodwaters can damage farm land, wash crops away, cause soil erosion, and 
waterlog fields. Flooding is also damaging to livestock farming because floodwaters 
can damage grazing fields and livestock shelters (Posthumus et al, 2009). I conduct 
a Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test to test if flood sensitivity is associated with 
agricultural dependence, where households are considered dependent on agriculture 
if agriculture is their main source of income. I also code my focus group 
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transcriptions to see if there are any indications of how agricultural dependency has 
affected vulnerability in the face of floods. 
Next, I test the association between flood sensitivity and household 
construction quality using a Kruskal Wallis test. The quality of house variable is 
based on an index I create where I award one point for each of the following 
conditions: (1) house floor is made of tiles, mud with DPC, or cement/bricks, (2) 
house outer wall is made of cement, burnt bricks, or lumber/board, and (3) house 
roof is made of tarpaulin, cement/slate, or iron sheets. The poorest quality house 
has mud flooring, mud outer walls and a thatched roof and will have an index score 
of 0. I also code my focus group transcriptions to see if there are any indications of 
how houses and community infrastructure have been affected by floods.  
I then look at how water availability effects household and community 
sensitivity to floods. Schipper (2009) states that water availability affects societies’ 
susceptibility to disasters. Potable water sources can be contaminated during floods 
and can therefore prevent people from recovering from disasters (IPCC, 2012; 
Braman et al, 2010). To test the association between water availability and flood 
sensitivity, I conduct a simple logit regression, where distance to the nearest water 
source is a proxy for water availability. I also code my focus group transcriptions for 
indications of the effect of water availability on flood sensitivity. 
I proceed to determine who are the most vulnerable groups in the community. 
The most vulnerable groups are the most sensitive and will have the lease capacity 
to respond to floods.  I focus on age and gender. I do not focus on ethnicity given 
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that the individuals from all 4 communities are Lozi. I use the baseline survey data 
and the Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test to test the association between gender and 
flood sensitivity. I do not use baseline survey data to test the association between 
respondent age and flood sensitivity because individuals below the age of 18 were 
not interviewed for the baseline survey. I code my focus group transcriptions for 
indications of particularly vulnerable groups, particularly by age and gender, in the 
communities. 
Another important social component of sensitivity is social capital. Social 
capital refers to the relationships within a society. The idea is that those with 
greater social capital are less susceptible to disasters because they have networks of 
trust and reciprocity that they can count on during a crisis (Woolcock and Narayan, 
2000). In addition, it is thought that greater social capital makes access to social 
goods easier (Pelling and High, 2005). Social capital is difficult to measure and 
accordingly, the baseline survey does not directly measure components of social 
capital like trust and reciprocity. I base my assessment of social capital on the roles 
of individuals (i.e. village headmen, community leaders, community members), the 
structure of communities and villages, and the structure of households and families. 
I code my focus group transcriptions to determine the roles of these different social 
actors. In addition, I test the association between number of household members 
and flood sensitivity using a simple logit regression. The rationale here is that 
households with more people have larger social networks that they can rely on 
during a crisis. To test this hypothesis, I conduct a two-way chi-square test to test if 
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differential sensitivities to floods are associated with the number of household 
members. 
According to Turner et al’s (2003a) framework, system sensitivity to shocks 
also depends on environmental ecological conditions, or biophysical/ecological 
endowments. I, therefore, code my focus group transcriptions to determine what 
ecosystem services and goods the biophysical subsystem provides the social 
subsystem with. I also utilize the hazards maps and my personal observations. The 
baseline survey does not provide any data on the physical subsystem. 
Finally, I also determine how community sensitivity to floods has been 
affected by previous shocks, primarily floods and droughts (Schipper, 2009). I first 
collate the historical data on the impacts of previous natural disasters and 
determine whether or not any of these impacts could have long-term implications 
(based on the literature). Second, I code the focus group transcriptions for 
indications of the long-term effects of floods and droughts and how they have 
affected their sensitivity to floods.  
2.3.1.4. Resilience/Adaptive Capacity 
 
Community sensitivity to floods is largely dependent on resilience or adaptive 
capacity (Turner et al, 2003a; Adger, 2006). Adaptive capacity constitutes of shorter 
term coping capacity and longer term adaptive capacity (Turner et al, 2003a). 
Coping capacity has to do with the ability of a community to cope with disasters and 
adaptive capacity has to do with the ability of communities to adapt to change and 
variability over the long term and become less susceptible to future shocks (Smit 
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and Wandel, 2006). A form of adaptation is preparing for future disasters.  First, I 
gauge how communities have responded to, or coped with, floods in the past. A lack 
of response indicates low coping capacity. I use the historical data to determine how 
the communities have responded to floods in the past and the success of these 
responses. In addition, I code the focus group transcriptions for 
statements/indications of how communities have responded to floods in the past and 
how they respond now.  
I then determine whether or not greater preparedness means less sensitivity 
to floods. I use the following baseline survey question as a proxy for household 
preparedness: Have family members spoken about/planned what to do if a disaster 
occurs? I conduct a Kruskal-Wallis test to test if flood sensitivity is associated with 
household preparedness. 
I proceed to gauge how prepared communities are to respond to floods I first 
use the baseline survey to determine community preparedness based on the 
following questions: (1) Does the community have a committee/organized group that 
decides what to do during disasters, (2) Does the community have a disaster plan, 
(3) Does the community have an early warning system? (4) Does the community 
have evacuation routes? (5) Does the community have a shelter identified where 
people can go in the event of a disaster? (6) Have community members been trained 
to assist others in the event of a disaster? Then, I code the focus group 
transcriptions for indications of community preparedness and capacity to deal with 
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floods. In the next section, I explain the state of community adaptive capacity to 
floods. 
2.3.2. Barriers to Adaptation 
 
According to the literature, the determinants of adaptive capacity include 
human capital, information and technology, material resources, social capital, 
political capital, wealth, institutions and entitlements, equity, and collective action 
(Engle and Lemos, 2010; IPCC, 2001; Pelling and High, 2005; Adger, 2003; Yohe 
and Tol, 2002). A lack of any of these things creates a barrier to adaption and 
adversely affects the coping and adaptive capacities of communities to floods. 
Consequently, I utilize the Jones and Boyd (2011) framework for assessing barriers 
to adaptation. The authors contend that there are three types of barriers to 
adaption: (1) social, (2) human and informational, and (3) natural. 
Before I delve into the barriers to adaptation, I gauge the association between 
perceptions of risk and preparedness at the household level to determine the extent 
to which perceptions of risk have affected preparedness. I conduct a series of chi-
square tests to test the association of whether or not households have spoken about 
disasters (a proxy for actual preparedness) with: (1) household concern for natural 
disasters, (2) perceptions of change in disaster frequency, and (3) household belief 
that a disaster will/will not occur in the next 5 years. If these associations are not 
significant, then it can be concluded that there are other barriers that prevent 
households and communities from preparing for disasters. 
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2.3.2.1. Social Barriers 
 
Social barriers to adaptation can be normative, cognitive and/or institutional 
(Jones and Boyd, 2011). In order to determine the normative barriers that exist in 
the communities, I code my focus group transcriptions for the following questions: 
(1) What are ‘traditional’ practices in the communities? (2) How are these practices 
affected by floods? (3) How do these practices exacerbate the effects of floods? (4) 
Why have these practices not been modified/discontinued?  
To determine the cognitive barriers that exist in the communities, I  
determine perceptions of climate risk and perceptions of preparedness. I code my 
focus group discussions for perceptions of risk and preparedness, and also for 
indication of fatalism, denial, and/or wishful thinking (Grothmann and Patt, 2005). 
In addition, I utilize my baseline survey data to determine perceptions of 
preparedness. I focus on the following questions: (1) Will being prepared help your 
family in an emergency situation? (2) How prepared is your family to handle a 
disaster? (3) Compared to last year, is your family more or less able to handle a 
disaster? If less able, why? (4) Does your family have supplies/other things in the 
home that can be used in the case of a disaster?. I test the associations between 
perceptions of preparedness with their actual preparedness (Have family members 
spoken about/planned what to do if a disaster occurs?) using a series of two-way chi-
square tests. 
I then determine the political barriers to adaptation, an important type of 
social barrier that is excluded from the Jones and Boyd (2011) framework. I code my 
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focus group discussions for indications of political barriers. I also look at documents 
and reports of the political history of the Southern and Western provinces in 
Zambia and identify political factors that may have influenced adaptive capacity in 
the 4 communities.  
I then determine institutional barriers to adaptation. First, I consider what 
formal interactions influence community response to change and variability.  In 
order to do this, I identify the primary actors/agencies involved in disaster response 
(community, ZRC, and Zambian Government) and determine the interactions 
between each of them. I utilize my interview transcriptions with ZRC disaster 
management staff to determine how communities interact with the Red Cross and 
how the Red Cross interacts with the Government. I utilize my focus group 
transcriptions and disaster policy documents to determine how the Government and 
communities interact with each other. I also use the following questions from the 
baseline survey: (1) Has the government been involved in any projects/activities 
related to reducing disaster risk or vulnerability in the past? (2) Are community 
members involved in planning/coordinating with the local government? Second, I 
identify the informal interactions that influence community response to change and 
variability. I code my focus group transcriptions for indications on the role of 
households, individuals and the traditional leadership in disaster management. 
Finally, I determine the incentives that these institutional barriers give rise to at 
the operational and collective-choice levels (based on Andersson et al, 2005). 
2.3.2.2. Human/Informational Barriers 
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There are three types of human/informational barriers: (1) knowledge, (2) 
technology, and (3) economics. I first identify the knowledge barriers that exist in 
the communities. I determine the kinds of knowledge that communities need to help 
them better respond to floods and/or adapt to climate change using the literature – 
this includes forecasts, knowledge on how to interpret forecasts, and knowledge on 
how to better prepare for floods (Suarez and Tall, 2010; Patt and Gwata, 2002). I 
code the focus group discussions for indications of the kinds of 
knowledge/information community members think they need, their access to that 
knowledge, their use of that knowledge, and the involvement of external 
organizations/agencies in promoting preparedness. I utilize the baseline survey. I 
first count the number of people who have received forecasts in the past and then 
conduct a chi-square test to determine whether forecast availability determines 
forecast use. I also establish if communities have knowledge about preparedness. I 
look at the assets that households may have (radio, mobile phone, bicycle,  axe, car, 
and motorbike) and determine whether they perceive these assets to be supplies 
they can use in case of a disaster.  
Furthermore, I look at the following questions to determine preparedness 
sensitization conducted by external organizations/agencies: (1) Have any family 
members attended a meeting on how to be better prepared for a disaster in the past 
year? (2) Have any family members attended a First Aid training in the past year? 
(3) Have any family members participated in a disaster/evacuation drill in the past 
year? (4) Have any family members participated in a community/volunteer activity 
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related to disaster preparedness/prevention? (5) Has a person visited your home to 
talk about disasters in the last 6 months? (6) Have you received a pamphlet/flier 
about disasters in the last 6 months? (7) Have you received information on disasters 
from television, radio, internet, newspaper or other media sources in the last 6 
months? (8) Has the government been involved in any projects/activities related to 
reducing disaster risk or vulnerability in the past year? (8) Can community access 
government resources/programs for disaster response and/or recovery?. I conduct a 
series of two-way chi-square tests to determine the association of external agency 
involvement with disaster preparedness, where preparedness is indicated by the 
question: Have family members spoken about/planned what to do if a disaster 
occurs?  
I also look at household consistency in answering the following questions 
about their community: (1) Does the community have a committee/organized group 
that decides what to do during disasters, (2) Does the community have a disaster 
plan, (3) Does the community have an early warning system? (4) Does the 
community have evacuation routes? (5) Does the community have a shelter 
identified where people can go in the event of a disaster? (6) Have community 
members been trained to assist others in the event of a disaster? (7) Are community 
members involved in planning/coordinating with the local government? 
Inconsistencies in response indicate information barriers within the communities. 
I proceed to determine the technological barriers to adaptation in the 
communities. I code the focus group transcriptions to indicate the following: (1) 
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What kind of technology do communities need to help them better respond to 
floods/adapt to climate change? (2) Do they have access to this technology? (3) Do 
they use the technology that is available? 
Finally, I consider the economic barriers to adaptation in the communities. I 
code the focus group transcriptions to indicate the following: (1) What economic 
resources/assets do communities need to respond to floods? (2) What economic 
resources/assets do communities have access to? (3) Do they use their economic 
resources/assets for the purposes of disaster risk reduction and preparedness? 
2.3.2.3. Natural/Physical Barriers/Limits 
I code my focus group discussions for any indications of how physical and 
natural characteristics and processes inhibit adaptation to floods. 
2.3.3. Utility of the VCA 
This section is primarily a reflections section, detailing my experience 
conducting and using VCA data to deduce community vulnerability and capacity. I 
begin by outlining and critiquing the purpose of the VCA and process by which the 
VCA is produced as per Red Cross protocol. I describe the methods I chose for my 
study and critique how they were structured. Were the methods chosen and 
designed using the iterative process described by Dilling and Lemos (2011)? I then 
determine whether or not the VCA is able to adequately analyze vulnerability as 
per the components of vulnerability described by Turner et al (2003a) – exposure, 
sensitivity, resilience/adaptive capacity, and external political, institutional, 
historical, and economic influences. Furthermore, I determine whether or not the 
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VCA is able to adequately analyze capacity as per the components of vulnerability 
described by Jones and Boyd (2011) – social barriers, human/information barriers, 
and natural/physical barriers/limits. Finally I critique how the information from the 
VCA is used. How useful is the VCA for stakeholders, including community 
members and decision makers (primarily from the Red Cross)? 
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CHAPTER III 
The Vulnerability of Communities to Floods 
 
3.1. The human-environment system 
My research was conducted in the districts of Kazungula and Sesheke, 
located in the Southern and Western provinces, respectively. In Kazungula, I 
worked with the communities of Sikaunzwe and Kasaya and in Sesheke, I worked 
with the communities of Situlu and Sikuzu. All of these communities are located in 
the Zambezi River Basin, either along the Zambezi River or its tributaries and are 
flood-prone (Figure 2 and 3). These communities were selected by the ZRC as pilot 
sites for the ZRBI. The four communities are made up of the Lozi tribe. All four 
communities are located in Zambezian Baikiaea woodland savannah. Sikaunzwe 
and Kasaya border Zambezian and Mopane woodland savannah and Situlu and 
Sikuzu border Central Zambezian Miombo woodland savannah. The soils in these 
areas are sandy. The floodplains adjacent to the communities are primarily 
Zambezian flooded grasslands. Zambian climate is characterized as humid 
subtropical. There are two seasons – the rainy season which occurs from November 
through April and the dry season which occurs from May through October. 
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Figure 1. Map of Zambia (extracted from www.maps.com), study area indicated with 
black circle. The Southern border of Zambia with Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe is 
largely delineated by the Zambezi River. The Zambezi River flows from its source in 
Northwest Zambia, into eastern Angola, into Eastern Zambia, along the Nambia-Zambia, 
Botswana-Zambia, and Zimbabwe-Zambia borders, through Mozambique and finally, into 
the Indian Ocean. 
 
!
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Figure 2. Map of the study area. The communities studied are indicated with place-marks. 
Each of the communities are located either along the Zambezi River or its tributaries. 
Sikaunzwe and Kasaya are vast in size. Sikaunzwe is divided into three 
zones – Nakatindi, Nakalonzwa, and Situwa. Nakalonzwa is located on the lower 
lands of Sikaunzwe, south of the Ngwezi River and North of the Sesheke-Sikaunzwe 
tarmac road. It contains the Nakalonzwa dam. Situwa is located on the upper lands 
and on the east-side of Sikaunzwe. Nakatindi is located to the west of Situwa and in 
the midst of a confluence of the Ngwezi River and two of its tributaries in the lower 
lands. Kasaya is also divided into three zones – Mapani East, Simalaha South and 
Kasaya Central. Mapani East is located near the confluence of the Machile River 
and Kasaya River, around which there are small swamps. Simalaha South is 
located south of  the Sesheke-Livingstone road and north of the Zambezi River. The 
majority of the villages are locked between the Zambezi, Kasaya and Simalaha 
Zimbabwe!
Zambia!
Botswana!
Namibia!
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Rivers. The area is swampy. Kasaya Central spans either side of the Sesheke-
Livingstone road and is near the Kasaya River and is the location of one the 
community’s main dams. 
Situlu and Sikuzu are located closer to the Mwandi Fishing Camp than they 
are to Sesheke town. Sikuzu is located in between the Zambezi and Luanga Rivers. 
Situlu is a vast community, not in terms of population, but in terms of area. It 
contains several rivers and streams, including the Luanga River and the Mutima, 
Litopu and Tukutu Streams. The villages on the west end of Situlu are generally on 
higher lands and the villages on the north side are in much closer proximity to the 
streams. 
I focus on impacts of floods in this study because floods are significant risk in 
these communities. Over 90% of baseline survey respondents exhibited great 
concern with regards to natural disasters in all 4 communities. The majority of 
respondents indicated that both their households and communities were most 
threatened by floods and/or droughts (Table 4). In addition, one of the goals of the 
ZRBI is to implement early warning systems in disaster-prone communities. At this 
stage, shorter-term flood forecasts based on observed or expected rains in the upper 
Zambezi are more reliable than the seasonal forecasts based on ENSO that are used 
to predict droughts. A major factor in the success of community-based early warning 
is the reliability of the forecasts generated and disseminated, and therefore, the 
ZRC felt that it would be better to focus on floods (Patt and Gwata, 2002). 
 
Response Kasaya Sikaunzwe Sikuzu Situlu 
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Don't know 0% 3.57% 0% 0% 
Droughts 89.66% 85.71% 100% 100% 
Diseases (Animal and 
Human) 0% 3.57% 0% 8.70% 
Floods 100% 64.29% 100% 91.30% 
Fires 0% 8.93% 0% 8.70% 
Rains 10.34% 26.79% 0% 21.74% 
Extreme Temperature 3.45% 0% 0% 13.04% 
Tropical cyclone/hurricane 0% 0% 0% 4.35% 
Severe storms 0% 0% 30% 8.70% 
High waves/swells 0% 1.79% 0% 0% 
Locusts 0% 5.36% 0% 0% 
Table 4. Percent of respondents concerned with different types of natural hazards 
threatening their communities. 
In the focus-group discussions, participants made a number of allusions to 
their desired futures. One participant stated the floods make them unstable, 
causing them to move from the lower lands to the upper lands, search for food and 
water, and as a result live almost nomadic lifestyles. This participant stated that 
his community needed help to instill some sort of stability where they could be 
secure and not have to move because of the floods. Another participant stated that 
her hope was for a future free from worries about droughts and floods. A third 
participant stated that she wanted a future where a person could “eat breakfast, 
lunch, dinner, and supper”, indicating a future with food security (Sikuzu Focus 
Group Discussion, 2013).  
The future valued by the ZRC for these communities is also important given 
that the  ZRC is using these communities as pilot sites for the ZRBI. The future 
valued by the ZRC is evident in the ZRBI goal of increasing disaster preparedness 
and risk reduction in communities as a means to increase individual and 
community resilience and reduce vulnerabilities to recurrent disasters. In essence, 
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the ZRC wants these communities to be more resilient and less vulnerable to 
change and variability. 
3.2. Exposure 
3.2.1. Frequency 
As mentioned earlier, the rainy season is from November through April. The 
heaviest rains occur in January, February and March and are the most likely to 
cause floods. Respondents in the historical data collection and participants in the 
focus group discussions reported at least eighteen floods since 1942. Since 2003 
alone, eight flood have occurred. The historical data indicates that flood frequency 
has increased in Sikuzu, Kasaya, and Situlu with flood frequencies hitting their 
highest mark in 2004-2013 (Figure 3, the historical flood profiles of each community 
can be viewed in Appendix 6). However, it is hard to say if this is really the case. It 
is possible that these communities have experienced more floods than what has 
been recorded given that individual memory deteriorates over time (Cutter et al, 
2008). Despite, this the majority of respondents (100% in Kasaya, Sikuzu and Situlu, 
and 89.47% in Sikaunzwe) stated that their communities had been affected by 
natural disasters in the last 5 years and 93.1%, 76.9%, 100% and 87.0% of 
respondents from Kasaya, Sikaunzwe, Sikuzu and Situlu, respectively, stated that 
floods had occurred in the last 5 years. In all 4 focus group discussions, participants 
stated that floods occur every year. 
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Figure 3. Frequency of floods in all 4 communities 
3.2.2. Magnitude 
These floods vary in magnitude and severity.  In Sikaunzwe, a focus group 
participant stated that floods had become more severe (Sikaunzwe Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013). In Kasaya, a focus group participant stated that there are two 
types of floods. The first type is caused by heavy rains and cause muddy areas 
(primarily the floodplain) to get filled with water. The second type consists of the 
floods that occur on the eastern side due to heavy rains upstream. These floods are 
the most serious (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013). Using the historical data, 
it is difficult to gauge whether or not flood severity (as measured by water levels) 
has in fact increased. Respondents reported different water levels for the same flood. 
For example, respondents for Sikaunzwe’s historical data collection stated that the 
water levels during the 2006 floods were knee high, 3.5 m high and 1.5 m high. This 
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is expected given that topography, soil porosity, hydrology, and land use vary such 
that there will be variation in floodwater levels across space (Garrote and Bras, 
1995; Stieglitz et al, 1997; Liu and De Smedt, 2004). In addition, some respondents 
simply stated that water levels were ‘high’ and did not state a specific measurement 
(Appendix 6). In order to truly gauge whether or not floods have become more 
severe, historical flood gauge data would need to be analyzed.  
The historical data does show that flood water levels can be anywhere from 
ankle high to chest high. Ankle high water is enough water to cause damage to 
fields and cause disease outbreaks (as evident in the floods of 1937, 1959 and 2007 
in Sikuzu). What the historical data does show is that more recent floods have the 
same (or highly similar) impacts as historical floods. These impacts include crop 
failure (especially maize), destruction of crop fields, soil erosion, destruction of 
grazing pastures, hunger/starvation/malnutrition, water contamination, human 
disease outbreaks (especially malaria, diarrhea, and bilharzia), animal disease 
outbreaks (especially foot-and-mouth disease), and livestock death (Appendix 6). 
Therefore, it seems that floods of all magnitudes greatly impact households and 
communities and that something other than flood magnitude is causing the 
sensitivity of these communities to floods. 
3.2.3. Duration 
 
 In Situlu a focus group participant stated that floodwaters would remain in a 
particular area for 2 months (Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). Another 
participant from Kasaya mentioned that people are disturbed by floods for at least 
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four to six months, not only because of standing water, but because of the starvation, 
livelihood loss and infrastructural and property damage caused by floods (Kasaya 
Focus Group Discussion, 2013). Flood impacts persist beyond the duration of the 
actual flood. 
3.2.4. Areal Extent 
 
 The flood maps for all 4 communities show that the floods tend to submerge 
the plains around the rivers and streams. In Kasaya, Mapani East is highly 
vulnerable when the Kasaya River floods. The most flood prone villages and fields 
are those adjacent to Kasaya and Liapemba Rivers. Floodwaters advance very 
quickly from the Kasaya River into the Mapani East area (Kasaya Hazard Mapping 
Session, 2013, Figure 4). In Simalaha South, the villages, fields and pastures are 
highly flood prone because they are locked between the Kasaya, Zambezi and 
Simalaha Rivers (Kasaya Hazard Mapping Session, 2013, Figure 5). In Kasaya 
Central, villages tend to be located in the upper lands and are therefore spared 
during floods. However, these villages’ fields are located in the lower lands, along 
the floodplains of the Kasaya River and are therefore extremely flood prone (Kasaya 
Hazard Mapping Session, 2013, Figure 6). 
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Figure 4. Hazards map for Mapani East, Kasaya. !
 
Figure 5. Hazards map for Simalaha South, Kasaya. 
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Figure 6. Hazards map of Kasaya Central, Kasaya. 
 In Nakalonzwa, Sikaunzwe, floods seem to occur primarily due to the flooding 
of the Nakalonzwa dam. The villages on the south-side of Nakalonzwa are 
especially prone to flooding. Water enters the fields and washes away the crops and 
the topsoil. It is also common for the Sesheke-Livingstone road in this area to get 
submerged, making access into and out of the area difficult when there are floods 
(Sikaunzwe Hazard Mapping Session, 2013, Figure 7). Situwa, located on the upper 
lands of Sikaunzwe is not very prone to floods. Rather, they face problems with 
droughts (Sikaunzwe Hazard Mapping Session, 2013, Figure 8). Nakatindi, however 
is flood prone, especially in the area surrounding the Ngwezee River where the 
small streams collect a lot of water. The roads in the Nakatindi area can get 
submerged during the floods, making access to the villages difficult (Sikaunzwe 
Hazard Mapping Session, 2013, Figure 8 and Figure 9). 
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Figure 7. Hazards map for Nakalonzwa, Sikaunzwe. Blue arrows indicate direction of 
water flow during floods. !
 
Figure 8. Hazards map for Nakatindi and Situwa, Sikaunzwe. Situwa is located on the 
upper land to the east and is more affected by droughts and water scarcity. Nakatindi is 
located on the west of the eastern most road on the map. 
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Figure 9. Hazards map for Nakatindi, Sikaunzwe. Community members have suggested 
sites for dams on the map. 
The hazards map of Sikuzu shows the direction of floodwater flow. 
Floodwaters travel from the Luanga River in to the fields and villages adjacent to 
the Zambezi River. Interestingly, households in villages in the path of the flood, i.e. 
Aluni, rarely get submerged. The submersion of fields is a much more prevalent 
issue (Sikuzu Hazard Mapping Session, 2013, Figure 10). In Situlu, the village in the 
western part are generally on higher lands and are therefore not very flood prone. 
The villages on the north side, however, are very flood-prone due to their proximity 
to the streams. The hazards map shows the floods mainly occur around the Luanga 
River and can reach the tarmac road. Both fields and villages are located in this 
area. In Situlu, floodwaters are unable to drain back into the Zambezi River and 
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therefore persist for a long time (Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Situlu 
Hazard Mapping Session, 2013; Figure 11).  
 
Figure 10. Hazards map for Sikuzu. Red arrows indicate direction of water flow during 
floods. 
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Figure 11. Hazards map of Situlu. 
3.3. Political Context 
During colonial times, the 4 communities were located in Barotseland, a 
region in Western Zambia that cut into Namibia and Angola. Currently Barotseland 
includes the Western Province of Zambia; Kazungula district is no longer a part of 
Barotseland, however Sesheke is. Barotseland is the land of the Lozis, an 
indigenous group that are the majority in the area. It is ruled by the Lozi chief. 
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Barotseland was and remains a contested territory. Since colonial times, they have 
been seeking secession. In 1964, Kenneth Kaunda, the Prime Minister of Northern 
Rhodesia (now Zambia) signed the Barotseland Agreement which incorporated the 
Northern Rhodesian portion of Barotseland into Zambia and gave the Lozis limited 
autonomy in matters of government, land and resources. During this time, 
Barotseland was governed according to Lozi customary laws (Caplan, 1970). 
However, tensions mounted when all of Barotseland was incorporated into Zambia’s 
Reserves and Trust land laws in 1970, stripping Barotseland of its autonomy. By 
1972, all of the land in Zambia was vested under the President (van Loenen, 1999). 
Barotseland continued to lobby to remain a separate state and at times wanted to 
completely secede from Zambia. In retaliation, the Zambian government starved the 
Barotseland area of resources and left it underdeveloped. Infrastructure remains 
very poor without proper roads, electricity, water, and communications systems 
(Noyoo, 2012).  
3.4. Sensitivity 
3.4.1. Socioeconomic endowments 
Sensitivity to floods is associated with agricultural dependency (Wilcoxon 
Mann-Whitney, z=1.678, p < 0.05, Table 5) . The majority of respondents practice 
subsistence agriculture, making agriculture the most important income source in all 
4 communities (Figure 12). Almost 96% of households cultivate. Farmers largely 
practice smallholder agriculture, planting 0-5 acres during a given agricultural 
season. The most dominant crop planted in all 4 communities is maize even though 
!64"
the returns are marginal (Holmes and Slater, 2007). Many farmers do not produce 
enough harvest to be able to sell the surplus; fifty percent of survey households from 
Kasaya, 35.71% from Sikaunzwe, 66.67% from Sikuzu, and 82.61% from Situlu 
stated that they do not sell their agricultural products. The susceptibility of 
agriculture to floods was demonstrated throughout the focus group discussions and 
historical data collection where participants and respondents stated that floods 
wash away crops, damage fields and cause crop failures. This in turn results in 
malnutrition/hunger/starvation because people do exist at the subsistence level 
(Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013; 
Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Appendix 6). Starvation and malnutrition can 
stunt the physical development of children in the community1. Food insecurity and 
the loss of livelihood will slow down recovery from the flood.  
Hypothesis Statistical 
test 
Test result Implication 
Wealth is associated 
with sensitivity to 
floods 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
chi-squared with ties 
=  18.909 with 15 d.f. 
probability = 0.2179 
 
The null hypothesis that 
wealth is not associated 
with sensitivity to floods 
cannot be rejected. 
Educational 
attainment is 
associated with 
sensitivity  to floods 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
chi-squared with ties 
= 6.892 with 7 d.f. 
probability = 0.4402 
The null hypothesis that 
educational attainment 
is not associated with 
sensitivity to floods 
cannot be rejected. 
Having/not having a 
secondary livelihood is 
associated with 
sensitivity to floods 
Wilcoxon-
Mann 
Whitney 
z =   1.678 
Prob > |z| =   0.0934 
 
The null hypothesis that 
having a secondary 
livelihood is not 
associated with 
sensitivity to floods 
cannot be rejected. 
Agricultural Wilcoxon- z =   2.430 The null hypothesis that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 School-going children get at least one meal a day through the Zambian government’s 
school-feeding programme – this should help curb malnutrition, to some degree, within the 
youth. 
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dependency is 
associated with 
sensitivity to floods 
Mann 
Whitney 
Prob > |z| = 0.0151* 
 
agricultural dependency 
is not associated with 
sensitivity to floods is 
rejected. 
Household construction 
quality is associated 
with sensitivity to 
floods 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
chi-squared with ties 
= 0.920 with 3 d.f. 
probability = 0.8207 
 
The null hypothesis that 
household construction 
quality is not associated 
with sensitivity to floods 
cannot be rejected. 
Distance to primary 
water source is 
associated with 
sensitivity to floods 
Simple logit 
regression 
Number of obs = 115                                        
LR chi2(1) = 0.48                                              
Prob > chi2 = 0.4902 
Log likelihood = -
65.767827                       
Pseudo R2 = 0.0036 
The null hypothesis that 
distance to primary
water source is not 
associated with 
sensitivity to floods 
cannot be rejected. 
Gender is associated 
with sensitivity to 
floods 
Wilcoxon-
Mann 
Whitney 
z =  -2.508 
Prob > |z| =   
0.0122* 
 
The null hypothesis that 
gender is not associated 
with sensitivity to floods 
is rejected. 
Table 5. Statistical tests conducted to gauge associations between socio-economic 
endowments and household sensitivity to floods. Test results significant at the p=0.05 
alpha level are bolded and starred. 
 
Figure 12. Primary occupations of survey respondents 
Food insecurity, however, is not solely caused by climate shocks. Rather, 
conditions and systems that cause weakened food systems are in place. According to 
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Gregory et al (2005), food insecurity results from a combination of poverty, lack of 
education, increases in food prize, unavailability of employment, failures in 
property rights, poor market access and climate/environment. A large proportion of 
the respondents do not have sources of non-farm income and/or do not have 
secondary occupations. In short, there is a lack of alternative livelihoods (Table 6). 
Interestingly, having/not having a secondary livelihood was not associated with 
household sensitivity to floods (Table 5). This is potentially because turning to a 
secondary livelihood such as charcoal burning, making mats from reeds, selling cut 
reeds, etc, does not actually reduce household sensitivity to floods due to the lack of 
market/demand for the goods produced (Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
Situlu and Sikaunzwe seem to have particularly poor market access. 
  Kasaya Sikaunzwe Sikuzu Situlu 
% Respondents without non-
farm income 44.83% 35.09% 40% 69.57% 
% Respondents without 
secondary occupation 43.33% 28.81% 20% 60.87% 
% Respondents without 
secondary occupation and non-
farm income 30% 22.03% 10% 47.83% 
Table 6. A lack of alternative livelihoods. 
As mentioned above, poverty can cause food insecurity (Gregory et al, 2005). 
Poverty is also an indicator of marginalization because it is directly related to 
resource access which is important in the face of hazards and risks (Adger and Kelly, 
1999). All four communities are poor. The majority of respondents – 59.26% in 
Kasaya, 70.18% in Sikaunzwe, 70% in Sikuzu and 66.67% in Situlu – live in 
thatched mud huts (thatched roofs, mud walls, and mud floors) with 1-2 rooms. In 
Kasaya and to a lesser extent in Sikaunzwe and Situlu, there has been a shift from 
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thatched roofs to iron sheet roofs. Over 95% of the households surveyed do not have 
electricity and over 97% of households surveyed do not have piped water in their 
homes. Figure 13 shows that household-level wealth is positively skewed and that 
most households have lower wealth index scores. 
 
Figure 13. Histogram of household-level wealth. 
However, wealth was not associated with household sensitivity to floods 
(Table 5). A possibility is that my wealth index is not an accurate representation of 
household wealth. In addition, it may be because I did not take into account other 
indicators of wealth such as income, acres of land owned/farmed, and so on, or 
weight the chosen wealth indicators appropriately when calculating my index. 
Nevertheless, participants in the focus group discussions indicated that their 
poverty made it difficult for them to respond to floods and the aftermath of floods. 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
De
ns
ity
0 5 10 15 20
Wealth
!68"
They claimed they had no resources, that they were unable to afford food in the 
market, and that they needed food relief from the government, ZRC, or other NGOs. 
Furthermore, while poverty exacerbates the effects of floods, floods also exacerbate 
poverty through the loss of livelihood and resource expenditure to fix/rebuild houses 
and buy food and supplies to survive in the short-term. Focus group participants 
stated that they had to rebuild their houses every year (Kasaya Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). Communities are therefore 
forced to sell productive capital such as property and livestock and spend the 
limited resources they have when hazards occur so they can bear the cost of their 
immediate needs.  
Disaster vulnerability has been linked to educational attainment. A lack of 
education can restrict lifetime earnings and also make it harder for individuals to 
access and understand warning and recovery information (Cutter et al, 2003). There 
seems to be a serious effort by households to educate their children (Table 7). These 
children, in their primary and secondary years, are educated in community-run or 
government schools located in their areas. Most of the government schools and 
community-run schools in these areas, however, do not have an upper secondary 
school (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013). Families send their children to 
boarding schools in nearby towns if they can afford to. The inability of households to 
afford boarding school is suggested by the significant drops between the percentage 
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of households with members educated to at least Grade 9 and those with members 
educated to at least Grade 10 in all 4 communities (Table 7).  
% HH surveyed with 
member having completed… Kasaya Sikaunzwe Sikuzu Situlu 
Grade 4 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Grade 5 100% 91.23% 100% 100% 
Grade 6 100% 91.23% 90% 100% 
Grade 7 93.33% 91.23% 80% 100% 
Grade 8 70% 70.18% 60% 86.96% 
Grade 9 66.67% 56.14% 40% 82.61% 
Grade 10 40% 28.07% 0% 47.83% 
Grade 11 30% 22.81% 0% 34.78% 
Grade 12 30% 15.79% 0% 26.09% 
College 3.33% 0% 0% 0% 
Table 7. Levels of education in all 4 communities. 
While my statistical analyses suggest that educational attainment is not 
associated with household-level flood sensitivity, the focus group discussions 
attested to the important of education for coping with disasters (Table 5). In 
Sikaunzwe, female focus group participants stated that they needed to be educated 
in skills that could be used to generate income. They also stated that they needed to 
be educated on how to maintain their rangelands (Sikaunzwe Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013). Furthermore, in the baseline survey, some community members 
from Kasaya, Sikaunzwe and Situlu reported having received rainfall forecasts from 
the Met in the past. These mainly seem to have been seasonal forecasts which were 
then used by community members to prepare their fields. However, some did not 
use the forecasts that they received (Table 8). When asked why, they gave the 
following reasons: (1) lack of knowledge about the forecast, (2) prefer to wait for a 
situation and act accordingly, and (3) unsure about forecast reliability. This 
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indicates that knowledge/education is needed to decrease community and household 
sensitivity to disasters. 
  Kasaya Sikaunzwe Sikuzu Situlu 
Total households 29 56 10 23 
Number of households that have received a 
forcast in the past 3 14 0 10 
Number of households that did not use the 
forecast 2 5 0 0 
Number of household that used the forecast 1 9 0 10 
Table 8. Rainfall forecast access and use. 
Floods also negatively affect education. Focus group participants from Situlu 
and Sikuzu stated that children cannot attend school during the floods because the 
roads from their villages to the schools get submerged (Sikuzu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). In Sikaunzwe, focus group 
participants stated that the floods have the tendency to contaminate water sources 
in the community. Therefore, community members need to go further away to 
collect water for the household. Children do not go to school for 2-3 weeks during 
these times because the adults need their help for carrying water from the water 
source back to the house (Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
Water accessibility, as suggested above is a major problem for households. 
Although water accessibility was not statistically associated with community 
sensitivity to floods, it was indicated in all four focus groups that water accessibility 
is a problem. In Sikaunzwe, a female focus group participant stated, “The only help 
we need is water”. During the floods, the wells and dams that people depend on can 
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become contaminated2. This is partly because waterborne and parasitic diseases 
like cholera and malaria, respectively, thrive during floods and because people are 
forced to share their drinking water sources with livestock – it is difficult to take 
livestock to alternative, farther away water sources when the lands are submerged. 
In addition, water is scarce in the upper lands. In all communities, focus group 
participants stated that they needed dams (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013; 
Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013; 
Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
While there are disease outbreaks, communities do not have adequate access 
to health services or clinics. Only Sikaunzwe and Situlu have clinics that can be 
used to treat injuries and diseases resulting from floods. During the historical data 
collection, several community leaders and elderly complained that access to 
medicines and making it to follow-up check-ups were difficult (Appendix 6). The 
lack of substantial medical services can lengthen immediate and long-term recovery 
from particularly severe flooding events. 
Household construction quality was not associated with flood sensitivity, 
however focus group participants in all communities stated that their houses were 
prone to floods (Table 5). In general, focus group participants exhibit more concern 
towards their fields than their homes. This could be (1) because fields are located in 
the flood plain, whereas houses tend to be located further away and are therefore !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 In Kasaya, 40% of the households surveyed depend on shallow wells, 33.33% depend on 
river water, and 30% depend on dams as their main sources of drinking water. In 
Sikaunzwe, 66.10% of households surveyed depend on shallow wells and 35.59% depend on 
borewells. In Sikuzu, all households surveyed depend on river water. Finally, in Situlu, 
78.26% depend on shallow wells and 21.74% utilize borewells. 
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less likely to flood and/or (2) because the overall cost of losing a field is greater than 
the cost of losing a home constructed by locally, freely available materials. However, 
the reality is that floods will damage homes if the floodwaters reach the villages 
given that thatched mud hut houses are not permanent structures (Kasaya Focus 
Group Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus 
Group Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
In addition, infrastructure is poor in all 4 communities, thereby enhancing 
community vulnerability. The bridges have been damaged/destroyed by floods in the 
past (Appendix 6). The roads are also prone to becoming submerged. The majority of 
these roads are not tarmac. Rather, they are graded using sand and floods become 
rivers of mud that are largely impassable. This is problematic partly because the 
communities do not have the resources to repair the roads and more so because the 
communities (especially Situlu, Sikuzu and interior parts of Kasaya and 
Sikaunzwe) can be entirely inaccessible by road until the floodwaters recede. Cell 
phone infrastructure is also poor as signal range is limited and intermittent 
(Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013; 
Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
Sensitivity to floods is associated with gender (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney, z = -
2.508, p < 0.05, Table 5). Women are particularly vulnerable to floods. A female focus 
group participant from Sikaunzwe stated,  
In fact, as women we are the most vulnerable people because we are the ones taking 
care of the children at home. The man, they can just go to the fields. We are taking 
care of those children. So what we do, we suffer a lot because our job is to look for 
food for those children.” 
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Family structure may also contribute to this vulnerability given that many of the 
men practice polygamy and move between their different households. As a result, 
the women are largely responsible for the household and care-giving.3 They also 
have relatively little access to income – the ‘jobs’ that they perform tend to be at the 
household level (i.e. gardening). Recently, however, women have gained some 
support from newly established loans associations which provide women with loans 
to start small businesses with the aim of empowering them (Sikaunzwe Focus 
Group Discussion, 2013). It is unclear if women from Kasaya, Sikuzu and Situlu 
have access to these associations. 
 Several women in these communities not only care for their children, but 
often also care for orphan children, the elderly, and the disabled  (Table 9). 14.1% of 
the households interviewed from Kasaya and Sikaunzwe and 12.1% of the 
households interviews from Sikuzu and Situlu have disabled members. Focus group 
participants stated that children and the elderly were among the most vulnerable 
groups (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 
2013). A focus groups participant from Kasaya stated that “there are some aged 
people who cannot do anything now”, making them particularly prone to floods 
(Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
 
  Kasaya Sikaunzwe Sikuzu Situlu 
Avg. number of 
individuals/HH 4.90±2.37 5.07±2.16 5.1±1.37 5.48±2.27 
Avg. number of males/HH 2.93±1.64 2.54±1.41 2.6±1.51 2.83±1.72 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Personal observation 
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Avg. number of females/HH 1.93±1.36 2.54±1.62 2.50±1.43 2.70±1.43 
Avg. number of infants (0-5 
yrs)/HH 0.77±0.77 0.54±0.68 0.90±0.57 0.74±0.86 
Avg. number of children (6-
17 yrs)/HH 1.97±1.88 2.36±1.72 2.30±0.95 2.30±1.64 
Avg. number of elderly (65+ 
yrs)/HH 0.23±0.43 0.25±0.48 0.10±0.32 0.48±0.59 
Avg. number of HH 
members enrolled in school 1.83±1.64 2.34±1.68 2.60±1.07 2.48±1.68 
Table 9. Summary of HH constituents. Errors reported are standard deviations. 
3.4.2. Social Capital 
Social capital is required as a means of obtaining informal resources during 
times of crisis. Social networks that people rely on during times of crisis are made 
up of several social actors. In the context of the 4 communities, these can include 
community members, village headmen and community leaders.  
Each of the communities contain villages. Each village has a headman or 
headwoman who serves as the decision-making authority for the village and 
generally ensures that village life runs smoothly. The village headmen, in turn, 
report to community leaders. The villages all vary in size – some villages have just 
one household, whereas others can have over 50 households. It is common to see 
clusters of households surrounded by grass fences within the villages. These 
clusters are family compounds in which the household head lives in the main house 
and the surrounding houses are for his/her spouse(s), children, and/or relatives.  
As mentioned earlier, the males are polygamous and the wives can be 
scattered throughout different villages. A possible advantage of such a family 
system is that it expands the social networks (and therefore the financial and 
psychological resources) available to individuals. However, studies have found that 
!75"
polygamous family structures in poor communities do not necessarily expand social 
networks or build social capital because family relationships in such situations can 
be “fragile, contested, and constraining” due to inter-family politics and the inability 
of relatives to monetarily afford keeping in contact (Cleaver, 2005). 
In the Sikaunzwe and Kasaya focus group discussions, participants stated 
that they had ‘manpower’ in terms of flooding. In addition, community members in 
Sikaunzwe come together, under the Community Agricultural Committee to write 
reports to the government, requesting flood relief (Sikaunzwe Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013). This suggests that community members can be brought together 
to work on a collective issue. Furthermore, village headmen and community leaders 
are deeply respected and have greater authority than the other community 
members to mobilize people and resources. In effect, the leaders have great social 
capital and can tap more easily into existing networks for the collective good 
(Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
 A further concern is that floods can actually harm social networks and capital. 
A focus group respondent described some contention between the elders and the 
younger community (Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013): 
“The elders try and tell the community and some will move to the upper land, 
but you find that those that are younger still plant in the lower lands and if the 
floods come, they will wipe away all their crops.” 
 
In addition, respondents in the historical data collection reported a number of cases 
where the stress and shock from floods had caused domestic disputes (Appendix 6). 
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Such contentions can harm relationships and therefore social networks and social 
capital. 
3.4.3. Physical/Natural Endowments 
All 4 communities practice livelihoods (agriculture, fishing, charcoal burning, 
selling grasses/reeds) which are tied to the land and available natural resources. 
Fields tend to be located in the lower lands, in the floodplains, due to the water 
availability and soil fertility. The upper lands are too dry and the soils are too sandy. 
However, the clearing of trees to make way for fields has resulted in soil 
degradation. As a result, fields are moved closer and closer to the river. According to 
a focus group participant in Sikaunzwe, the soil degradation has caused the river to 
become shallower and flood more easily (Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
Water is a major problem for the communities of Kasaya, Sikaunzwe 
(primarily Situwa) and Sikuzu because they are above a salt water aquifer. These 
communities, therefore, cannot use boreholes and wells. Rather, they are reliant on 
dams and nearby rivers for water (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013; 
Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
3.5. Resilience 
The resilience of these communities is not mutually exclusive from their 
sensitivity. Resilience and sensitivity interact and feedback into each other, as 
indicated by Turner et al’s (2003) framework. In this section, I describe the 
resilience of communities in terms of how communities have responded to floods in 
!77"
the past, how they currently respond, their perceptions of preparedness and 
capacity, and their actual preparedness and capacity. 
Looking at the data, all four communities seem to have low coping and 
adaptive capacities. While respondents in the historical data collection indicated a 
range of flood responses – no response, shift from lower lands to upper lands for 
shelter, shift livestock from lower lands to upper lands for pastures, construct 
ridges to obstruct floodwaters, dig furrows to drain floodwaters, farm on anthills, 
eat wild fruit (before 1980), request government assistance, and switch to 
alternative livelihoods (mainly fishing, cutting and selling reeds, charcoal burning, 
making mats, and gardening) – it is evident that, more often than not, community 
members do not respond (Appendix 6). Historically, community members were more 
inclined to shift to the upper lands during floods, forage for wild fruit, and eat a 
type of local grass (Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). However, it seems that 
communities have become more hesitant to respond or adapt to floods in recent 
times. Temporary dislocation for cultivation, grazing and/or shelter purposes can 
negatively impact household members mentally (e.g. stress/shock due to hazard and 
its impacts), socially (e.g. domestic and social disputes due to stress/shock) and 
economically (e.g. cultivating on unfamiliar lands) (Appendix 6). 
In Kasaya, focus group participants stated that, in the past, they would 
evacuate and go to the higher lands with their livestock. Other participants stated 
that they would go to Kazungula town and try to generate some income by doing 
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small jobs (mostly domestic help). Now, they normally do not take any actions to 
minimize their risk against floods and do not take actions when traditional 
forecasting methods indicate a flood is arriving. They also stated that they did not 
take any measures after a flood, i.e. contacting the government for help and relief. 
The bulk of their actions consist of rebuilding their houses if they get damaged and 
waiting until the next opportunity to plant crops. In addition, some individuals 
catch fish during the floods to feed their families and sell in the market (Kasaya 
Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
The Sikaunzwe community, on the other hand, seems to be more proactive in 
flood response. They have a Community Agricultural Community that congregates 
after floods to write reports to the government requesting help. Focus group 
participants stated that, in the past, they would write reports immediately after the 
flood and by May or June, the government officials would come to the community to 
determine how many people were affected by the floods and accordingly distribute 
food relief (primarily maize meal). However, in recent times, these reports have 
largely been unanswered and unacknowledged by the government. One participant 
stated, “We have tried by all means to take reports to the government saying please 
the water will kill us. Nothing has been done”. Focus group participants also 
mentioned that, in the past, they had tried to “mend the cracks” in the ground near 
the river through which floodwaters come using Mopani poles and sand, but that 
these efforts were unsuccessful. When asked what they do when floods wash their 
crops away, participants stated that many do not attempt to cultivate until the next 
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season unless external organizations (primarily NGOs) distribute seeds. For the 
most part, community members turn to alternative livelihoods, i.e. small businesses 
(selling fish, charcoal, and reeds). Women have found some support through 
recently established loan associations which provide women with loans to start 
small businesses (Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013).  
In Sikuzu, focus group participants also stated that they moved to the upper 
lands during floods in the past. In the upper lands, they would cultivate on anthills 
and termite mounds until the floodwaters receded and they could return to the 
lower lands.  Now, they are more likely to stay in the lower lands unless the 
government evacuates them. A female focus group participant stated that when 
crops fail, she and other women go into the bush and collect grass and reeds that 
they sell to generate some income. Some women also garden, however, these 
gardens can only be kept for a short period of time due to water availability issues. 
A male focus group participant stated that the men go to the floodplains when there 
is crop failure. Historically community members would go to Namibia to sell 
produce and other items and look for jobs; however, this has become difficult due to 
stricter border control (Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
In Situlu, several focus group participants stated that they did nothing when 
their crops failed. A focus group participant stated, “We do nothing, we just stay 
like that”. When pushed further, they stated that the only alternative to farming 
was to go to the riverside and catch fish. However, community members are afraid 
of going to the riverside due to the presence of crocodiles that have killed 
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community members in the past. Furthermore, focus group participants stated that 
they only go to the upper lands to find grazing pastures for their livestock. 
Otherwise, they remain in their homes in the lower lands. A male focus group 
participant stated that community members had unsuccessfully attempted to block 
floodwaters from entering their fields in the past by digging furrows and drainages 
(Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
Although community members do turn to alternative livelihoods when 
floodwaters wash their crops away and damage their fields, they are generally 
unable to generate enough income to afford food due to the lack of markets in which 
to sell their products. This is evident in the historical data collection where 
starvation, hunger and malnutrition are commonly listed consequences of floods 
(Appendix 6). A male focus group participant from Sikaunzwe stated,  “the NGOs 
try to help” with relief food, “but we are many. Those that can afford [food], they can 
buy”, but the majority cannot. A female focus group participant from Sikuzu stated 
that most households were restricted to only eating once a day in the face of food 
insecurity caused by the floods (Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013).  
A major part of the problem is that community members and communities, 
overall, are not prepared to deal with floods. Household sensitivity to floods is 
associated with household preparedness (Kruskal Wallis, = 11.812, 2 df, p < 
0.05). 4  Household members themselves do not feel that their households are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Whether or not households have spoken about disasters or not in their homes is only one 
element and not a holistic indicator of preparedness. However, is widely accepted that 
preparedness reduces susceptibility to disasters. 
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prepared to deal with floods (Figure 14). Of those respondents who claim that their 
households are very or somewhat prepared to handle disasters, many do not have 
supplies they perceive can be used in emergency situations and/or have not spoken 
about or planned for what to do if a disaster occurs (Table 10).5 Contrary to what is 
indicated in Figure 14, focus group participants from Sikuzu stated that they were 
not prepared to deal with floods (Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). This can be 
partly attributed to the lack of access to forecasts. Without forecasts, communities 
and households cannot take anticipatory action  (Table 8).  
 
Figure 14. Perceptions of household-level preparedness to deal with disasters. 
 
  Kasaya Sikaunzwe Sikuzu Situlu 
Total respondents 29 57 10 23 
No. respondents who claim to be 16 19 6 10 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
5 It is possible that the baseline survey’s definition or representation of preparedness was 
limited. It may be that respondents need to be asked in what ways they are prepared to 
handle a disaster in a more open, semi-structured survey format. 
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somewhat or very prepared for a 
disaster 
No. respondents who stated they 
have supplies in their homes which 
can help in emergency situations 9 12 0 2 
No. respondents who stated HH 
members have spoken/planned 
what to do it a disaster occurs 16 11 2 6 
Table 10. Preparedness of HH who perceive that they are somewhat or very prepared to 
handle disasters. 
This lack of household preparedness adversely affects overall community 
preparedness (Moore et al, 2004). Community preparedness is also affected by the 
lack of community-based disaster preparedness measures. In all four communities, 
focus group participants answered ‘no’ when asked if their communities have early 
warning systems, disaster committees, or disaster plans. This is further evidenced 
in the baseline survey responses outlined in Table 11. In addition, communities do 
not seem to be utilizing existing traditional forecasting methods. In all four focus 
group discussions, participants stated that the presence of cobwebs at the start of 
the rainy season is an early warning for floods. In Kasaya, a focus group participant 
stated that large frogs will come out of the ground and cry, also indicating coming 
floods. However, these warnings are rarely taken heed of because they are not 
reliable – on several occasions, these warnings have not been followed by floods 
(Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013; 
Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
  Kasaya Sikaunzwe Sikuzu Situlu 
% HH stating that community has 
committee/organized group that decides what to 
do during disasters 0% 7.14% 0% 4.35% 
% HH stating that community has a disaster 
plan 0% 8.93% 10% 0% 
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% HH stating that community has an early 
warning system 3.45% 7.02% 10% 4.76% 
% HH stating that community has shelter 
identified where people can go in the event of a 
disaster 0% 14.29% 10% 4.76% 
% HH stating that community has evacuation 
routes 3.45% 10.53% 50% 4.76% 
% HH stating that community members have 
been trained to assist others in the event of a 
disaster 0% 21.05% 0% 14.29% 
Table 11. Existing community-level risk reduction and preparedness measures indicated 
in the baseline survey. 
Another part of the problem is that households and communities perceive 
that they do not have capacities that can help them cope with or adapt to flood risk. 
In all four focus group discussions, participants mainly spoke about capacities in 
terms of ‘resources’ and repeatedly stated that they have no resources with which to 
respond to or prepare for floods. In Kasaya, a participant stated,  
“We are normally disturbed by these floods, but whenever we see these 
floods… it’s a part of our life. We are just lacking the resources, as the last speaker 
has already said. Normally, when these floods occur, we have no capacity to harvest 
or dam this water.” 
 
In Sikaunzwe, a participant stated, “We don’t have resources, but we have 
manpower”. 6  In addition, as mentioned earlier, the communities do not have 
adequate health-related capacities such as clinics. The lack of substantial medical 
services can lengthen immediate and long-term recovery from particularly severe 
flooding events (Du et al, 2010; Keim, 2008). What community members do not 
realize is that they do have resources such as Mopani trees, reeds, sand, manpower, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 While this statement can be interpreted to represent heroism that arises in the context of 
institutional shortcomings, recent literature suggests that the ‘heroic actor’ narrative 
should be avoided given that non-entrepreneurial actors are also engaged in actions that 
facilitate institutional change (Suddaby et al, 2010). 
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shovels, etc, that can be used to protect their fields and homes from floods. This was 
also evident in the baseline survey where respondents were asked if they had 
supplies that could be used during an emergency (Table 10). Many of the households 
have supplies that could be used during emergencies, i.e. radios and cellphones, 
that they do not know are supplies.7  
Community members conflate capacities with resources. Capacities, however, 
can include social capital or networks, which are both “a source of informal 
resources and coping capacity (Pelling and High, 2005, p. 315). Capacities can also 
include links to external organizations that can provide assistance, information (i.e. 
early warnings), and knowledge (Suarez and Tall, 2010; Jayasinghe, 2013; Eriksen 
and Selboe, 2012). Overall, households and communities need to realize their 
existing local capacities. 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this section, we identified the characteristics of households and 
communities that indicate vulnerability to floods. Communities are exposed to 
floods due to their location in the Zambezi River Basin. Flood hazards become 
disasters because communities are sensitive to floods based on their poverty, lack of 
education, dependence on agriculture, lack of market/demand for goods, and poor 
household construction. Women, children and the elderly were recognized as the 
most vulnerable groups in the communities. Communities also have low coping and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Percentage of respondents with cellphones – 72.4% in Kasaya, 52.5% in Sikaunzwe, 70% 
in Sikuzu, and 43.5% in Situlu; Percentage of respondents with radios – 72.4% in Kasaya, 
43.4% in Sikaunzwe, 50% in Sikuzu, and 52.2% in Situlu 
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adaptive capacities in terms of floods. Their lack of preparedness and resources, 
perception of local capacity, the failure of past flood responses, and their hesitation 
to evacuate their lands temporarily during floods have disincentivized community 
members from taking action before, during, and after floods. The sensitivity and low 
adaptive capacity of these communities occurs in the context of the Zambian 
government’s troubled relationship with Barotseland which has left the Western 
and part of the Southern provinces critically underdeveloped.  
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CHAPTER IV 
Barriers to Adaptation 
 
Both the baseline survey and the focus group discussions, so far, have shown 
that communities do perceive floods as a recurring risk. Their perceptions of risk, 
however, are not associated with their actual preparedness (Table 12). This indicates 
that household perceptions of flood risk do not influence household preparedness; 
those that perceive floods to be a risk will not necessarily take anticipatory or 
preparatory actions against floods. Rather, there are other factors at play which 
determine how these communities will cope with or adapt to floods. 
Hypothesis Statistical 
test 
Test result Implication 
Household 
preparedness is 
associated with concern 
for disasters 
Chi-squared Pearson chi-squared 
= 2.8876 
Pr=0.577 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
concern for disasters 
cannot be rejected. 
Household 
preparedness is 
associated with 
perception of change in 
disaster frequency 
Chi-squared Pearson chi-squared 
= 3.8162 
Pr=0.702  
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
perception of change in 
disaster frequency 
cannot be rejected. 
Household 
preparedness is 
associated with belief 
that a disaster will/will 
not occur in the next 5 
years 
Chi-squared Pearson chi-squared 
= 1.7624 
Pr=0.779 
 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
belief that a disaster 
could occur in the next 5 
years cannot be rejected. 
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Table 12. Statistical tests conducted to gauge associations between perceptions of risk 
and actual preparedness at the household level.  
It is evident that community members do not often take measures to prepare 
for or respond to floods even though they are recurring (Section 3.5, Appendix 6). 
Year after year, community members lose their homes, fields, and livestock to floods 
and suffer from a variety of flood-triggered diseases and food insecurity, 
exacerbating their vulnerability to future shocks. This is not to say that all 
community members do not respond. For example, during floods, some community 
members will dig drainages or construct ledges around the perimeter of their homes 
and fields and/or temporarily shift to upper lands. After floods, some community 
members may shift to alternative livelihoods or cultivate in upper lands until their 
fields can be used again. While some community members take such actions, many 
do not, thereby reducing overall community resilience to climate change and 
variability. Why is it that these communities are unable to improve their 
vulnerability through adaptation or improving their adaptive capacity to floods? In 
this section, I look at the nested contributing factors to the social, 
human/informational, and physical barriers that prevent communities from taking 
collective action and  reducing their vulnerability. It must be noted that these 
barriers to adaptation are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are dynamically 
interacting.  
4.1. Political Barriers 
As mentioned in Section 3.3, the political problems between Barotseland and 
the Zambian government have left the Western province very underdeveloped with 
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poor infrastructure. Roads are poor – there are few paved roads and the ‘roads’ 
within the communities are unpaved. When floods occur, these roads are 
impassable, making it difficult for community members to access higher ground and 
markets in Kazungula and Mwandi to sell market goods (Kasaya Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). In addition, public health 
services are poor, evident by the lack of government clinics and hospitals in the area. 
Strong public health services help community resilience and preparedness during 
and after floods (Keim, 2008). Furthermore, without electricity, storing produce, fish, 
livestock products to sell or consume during the rest of the year becomes difficult. 
The lack of water has also been problematic. Over 95% of homes surveyed did not 
have access to piped water. In Sikaunzwe, focus group participants stated that they 
were forced to drink water out of the wells and dams used by livestock and that this 
had caused disease outbreaks (Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013). Cell 
phone and radios services are also critically underdeveloped, making it difficult for 
people to access information. Communities, especially Situlu and Sikuzu will have a 
hard time adapting to floods for as long as the Zambian government deprives the 
Barotseland area of infrastructure, resources and services. 
An additional political barrier is the development of the Simalaha 
Conservancy. Zambia is attempting to expand its wildlife tourism market and 
received funding from the WWF Germany and the Swedish Postcode Lottery to 
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create a new wildlife conservancy in Southwestern Zambia. 8  The goal of the 
conservancy is to increase elephant populations and to create new wildlife corridors. 
Therefore, a fence is being built along the boundaries of the conservancy (Sparrow, 
2011). While the expectation is that communities will be able to profit from the 
tourism that the conservancy will bring, the current reality is that communities are 
being denied access to resources that they need for their survival – this includes the 
reeds and grasses that community members sell to generate income when their 
crops have failed and use to construct and repair their homes (Sikuzu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013). 
These political barriers show that Kasaya, Sikaunzwe, Sikuzu and Situlu 
have been and continue to be marginalized. Their marginalization and consequent 
exclusion from decision-making has created institutional problems that hinder their 
efforts to adapt to flood risk. 
4.2. Institutional Barriers 
The primary actors that influence community response to floods are the 
communities themselves, the ZRC, IFRC, donors, the Zambian government, and 
civil society/non-governmental organizations. Patterns of interactions between 
different actors result in predictable outcomes. The main outcome of patterns of 
interactions between vulnerable communities and external agencies with regards to 
floods has been a lack of collective response to floods at the community-level. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 http://www.peaceparks.org/programme.php?pid=25&mid=1120 
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Patterns of interactions are largely influenced by institutional incentives 
(Andersson, 2005). 
Institutional factors and the nature of the ‘good’ can influence the outcomes 
of interactions between actors (Andersson, 2006). The ‘goods’ in question are 
disaster risk reduction and preparedness measures. These can include physical 
objects such as flood barriers and drainages or services such as alternative 
livelihood training and preparedness planning. These are public goods in the sense 
that the one individual’s use of the good does not detract from others’ use of the 
good and the exclusion of others from using the good is not possible or practical 
(Andersson et al, 2005). 
At the collective-choice level, Zambian government, ZRC and community 
institutions affect community and individual response to floods. The government 
has a series of disaster management policies and flood contingency plans9. The 
provincial and district offices of the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit 
(DMMU) are responsible for implementing disaster policies geared towards 
community resilience to climate. A significant focus of these policies is sensitizing 
vulnerable communities on disaster risk reduction, and government recovery 
programs (DMMU, 2005; DMMU, 2009; DMMU, 2010). The government also seems 
to be particularly interested in incentivizing disaster risk reduction and 
preparedness activities through food for work and/or cash transfer programs 
(DMMU, 2009). The government does not seem interested in setting rules that will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 The most recent national flood contingency plan I could find was for 2009/2010, therefore 
my information on current disaster policy and planning is not up to date. 
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coerce individuals to comply. It is unclear, however, what specific programs have 
been designed and implemented. It is also unclear when the government started to 
incorporate disaster preparedness, risk reduction, and recovery into its disaster 
policies. 
The problem here, however, is that existing government institutions are 
weak and/or bad. Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 234) state that “the very capacity 
of social groups to act in their collective interest depends on the quality of the 
formal institutions under which they reside”. Decision-making in the government 
has traditionally been top-down, thereby limiting the scope for feedback through 
civic engagement (Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004). Communities are unable to 
directly communicate with key decision-makers (i.e. the ZRC’s Secretary General or 
the Director of the DMMU); rather, information needs to be passed through 
numerous channels to reach the decision-maker (ZRC Disaster Management Staff 
Interview, 2013). Information is lost at every stage. In such a system of missing 
information and informational asymmetries, it is difficult to evaluate and improve 
existing institutions and consequently change the underlying incentive structures 
which determine community actions (Andersson et al, 2005). As a result, there are 
missing, weak and/or bad institutions. 
Government disaster policies and contingency plans are vague. All of these 
plans, for example, highlight the need for community sensitization on disaster risk 
reduction, preparedness and government recovery programs, but do not specify 
targets or objectives that enforcing parties should strive for (DMMU, 2005; DMMU, 
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2009; DMMU, 2010). Furthermore, monitoring protocol for these programs is 
unclear. For example, do district and provincial officials need to produce progress 
reports? If yes, how often? Without monitoring systems in place, district and 
provincial governments cannot be held accountable regardless of whether they have 
carried out their duties or not.  
In addition, existing government initiatives do not seem to be far reaching. 
While 40.7% of baseline survey respondents stated that the government has been 
involved in projects/activities related to reducing disaster risk or vulnerability in 
the past year, only 2.5 only 2.5% of respondents stated that they had attended a 
meeting conducted by the government on disaster preparedness; the same 
percentage of respondents stated that they had participated in an evacuation drill 
conducted by the government. In addition, while the Zambian Government does 
have a social protection program in place (highlighted in Holmes and Slater, 2007), 
community members seem to not know about it (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 
2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 
2013; Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
Why are these activities not far-reaching and why do they have such limited 
community attendance and participation? First, this may be due to the fact that the 
meetings take place in areas that are difficult to access for community members. 
Second, this may be because, at the district level, DMMU tasks are delegated to the 
District Commissioner (DC), who is not a DMMU-specific employee. The DC may 
not have the motivation to perform DMMU tasks effectively because he/she is (1) 
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overwhelmed by the responsibilities assigned by other government offices and/or (2) 
not specialized in or passionate about disaster management. Third, it may be 
because the government has not adequately incentivized community participation 
in disaster-related government activities.  
Fourth, this may partly be attributed to the ZRC’s role in disaster 
management in Zambia. The ZRC is auxiliary to the Zambian government and is 
legally mandated to respond to disasters (ZRC Disaster Management Staff 
Interview, 2013). Therefore, the government may feel less responsible for actively 
participating in disaster management. In addition, the ZRC has access to funds 
from international donor communities which can be used fund disaster 
management activities. In a sense, this is an example of rent-seeking behaviour as 
government rules regarding the role of the ZRC allow for more international aid to 
funnel through Zambia. While this does not strictly increase the fortune of the 
political elite, it allows the Zambian government to spend its limited resources on 
maintaining the support of groups that are essential for the continued power of the 
administration as opposed to the welfare of socially excluded and vulnerable groups 
(Andersson et al, 2005).  
In the ZRC, disaster-related decision-making is also traditionally top-down 
and involves very little community participation or input. Participation is limited to 
the rapid assessment process where local Red Cross volunteers participate in 
beneficiary selection; selection, however, is based on criteria outlined by Red Cross 
protocol. Moreover, decision-making is influenced by the IFRC because they have a 
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say in how DREF funds (if needed) will be allocated. Decision-making and 
implementation are top-down (ZRC Disaster Management Staff Interview, 2013). 
The structure of the ZRC’s decision process and the resulting exclusion of 
community members from humanitarian decision-making does limit social learning, 
the accumulation of social capital and, consequently, collective action within 
communities (Adger, 2009)10.  
 
Figure 15. Traditional ZRC response to floods. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The implementation of ZRBI goals is expected to eventually allow for greater community 
engagement in this decision-making process. 
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The ZRC’s top-down relief distribution process has, to some extent, resulted 
in the Samaritan’s Dilemma which is where the “Samaritan prefers that the 
recipient puts in high effort, but the structure of the interaction guarantees the 
recipient gives only low effort” (Andersson et al 2005, p. 38). The Red Cross is a 
humanitarian organization, committed to helping people in need. In the aftermath 
of floods, this means providing emergency relief. The only community members that 
are involved in the distribution of relief are local Red Cross volunteers. Otherwise, 
there is relatively little effort that aid recipients need to put in to receive the aid – 
the benefit of receiving aid far outweighs the cost of reaching the relief distribution 
point. The problem with this is that communities have become used to handouts 
from the ZRC. This was evident while baseline surveys were being conducted and 
focus group discussions where community members would frequently ask for 
handouts (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013). To some degree, ZRC flood response has become a moral hazard 
given that those who do not take disaster risk reduction and flood response 
measures are those who most need and are likely to receive humanitarian relief. 
Individuals are disincentivized from dealing with community vulnerabilities and 
increasing their resilience to climate due to their reliance on frequent handouts.11 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Harvey and Lind (2009) argue that humanitarian assistance does not necessarily create 
dependency at the community-level. This, however, was not my experience in the field. It 
could be that this culture of dependency is not fully caused by humanitarian activities, but 
also by missionary activities in the communities since the early 1900s. 
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At the operational level, community members’ actions are governed by 
informal and formal institutions. Communities contain several villages and each 
village has a headman or headwoman who serves as the decision-making authority 
for the village and generally ensures that village life runs smoothly. The village 
headmen, in turn, report to community leaders. The traditional leadership are 
deeply respected by community members. The leadership, however, is not elected; 
rather, they come from particular families in the community. One of the 
communities, Sikaunzwe, has an agricultural committee that writes reports to the 
government about their agricultural situation (Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 
2013).   
Given the lack of rules and institutions that specifically govern community 
response to floods, households are quite autonomous at the operational level. In the 
event of a flood, one household may choose to evacuate their house and another 
household in the same village may choose to remain in their house; this has 
happened time and time again during past flooding events. This is, however, not 
necessarily the case if the flooding is particularly severe and the government 
mandates that community members evacuate their homes (Kasaya Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). According to the historical 
data, such government-mandated evacuation has only occurred once – during the 
2008 floods, some villages in Kasaya were evacuated to Kazungula town (Appendix 
6).   
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Furthermore, as discussed earlier, disaster risk reduction and preparedness 
measures, i.e. flood barriers, can be considered public goods. Community members 
need to act collectively and pool their resources to produce these goods. According to 
Mancur Olson (1965, p.2):  
“Unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion 
or some other device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests”. 
 
 In the case of the Zambian communities, there is no coercive mechanism, i.e. an 
enforceable agreement or involvement of external authority, by which community 
members are forced to act collectively; communities do not have flood contingency 
plans and the government does not require communities to take disaster risk 
reduction and preparedness measures. As a result, some community members 
choose to undertake individual actions such as building flood barriers around their 
household or field rather than collective actions.  
Collective action problems at the operational level also exist due to power 
asymmetries within their communities. Communities have established power 
hierarchies – villages are led by headmen and communities, overall, are led by 
community leaders. In addition, community members that are Red Cross volunteers 
have higher social standing. These power asymmetries are evident during 
beneficiary selection and relief distribution. While beneficiaries are supposed to be 
chosen objectively, based on Red Cross selection criteria, this is not always the case. 
In the past, the Red Cross has had problems with local volunteers selecting 
beneficiaries that were either their family or friends. Headmen and local 
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community leaders can influence this selection process due to their position in their 
communities (ZRC Disaster Management Staff Interview, 2013). These inequities in 
distribution cause issues of mistrust in the communities which jeopardize future 
collective action initiatives (Andersson et al, 2005). 
4.3. Economic Barriers 
All 4 communities are poor (Section 3.4.1). This is largely why community 
members claim that they do not have the resources for risk reduction and 
preparedness (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013). Community members depend on subsistence agriculture as their 
primary livelihood. Significant barriers include the lack of access to seeds and the 
dependency on maize which provides low marginal returns, provided that farmers 
actually produce enough to be able to sell the surplus (Sikuzu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Holmes and Slater, 2007). In addition, they have few livelihood 
alternatives. Their income is therefore limited and highly dependent on climate. 
Poverty in the villages is also exacerbated by a lack of education. The majority of 
adult community members have approximately a 9th grade education. Community 
members have few assets, low income, a lack of skills, and livelihoods that are 
highly vulnerable to climate shocks. While communities are interested in preserving 
their livelihood and financial security over the long-term, they end up focusing their 
attention and resources on daily survival needs (Pomeroy et al, 2006). As stated by 
a female focus group participant, in the aftermath of floods, households expend the 
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majority of their time and resources trying to find food for their children 
(Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013). When disasters occur, they are forced to 
sell productive capital such as property and livestock and limit their meals from 
three a day to just one (Appendix 6, Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). This 
poverty means that community members are dependent on government welfare and 
social security programs and external help from humanitarian, civil society and 
non-governmental organizations. 
Furthermore, accessing markets is difficult. Kazungula, the closest town to 
Sikaunzwe, and Mwandi, the closest town to Kasaya, Situlu and Sikuzu, are still far 
enough that community members cannot easily reach them with the goods they 
want to sell in the market. As a result, community members sell their goods on the 
side of the main road between Kazungula and Sesheke. This is likely why switching 
to alternative livelihoods has been largely ineffective. There is a lack of a market for 
charcoal, reeds, and mats where the communities are located.  
An action that community members do undertake collectively is appealing to 
the government for aid when a flood has occurred (Sikaunzwe Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013). After the 2008 floods, the Kasaya community wrote to the 
government asking for help (Appendix 6). Similarly, after the 2006 floods, the 
Sikaunzwe community appealed to the government for relief (Sikaunzwe Focus 
Group Discussion, 2013; Appendix 6). Community members are more inclined to 
participate in such collective activities because the benefit of appealing for aid and 
the government responding far outweighs the cost of making the appeal and the 
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government not responding. Conversely, community members are not necessarily 
willing to spend limited resources and time collectively building a flood barrier as 
there is no guarantee that the barrier will actually obstruct floodwaters. 
4.4. Normative Barriers 
A major normative barrier to adapting to floods is the dependence on 
traditional livelihoods such as agriculture and livestock-rearing. Agriculture and 
livestock-rearing are both highly flood-prone livelihoods. As it has been 
demonstrated, floods wash away crops, destroy fields, destroy grazing pastures, and 
cause livestock disease outbreaks (Appendix 6). Despite this, communities return to 
their traditional livelihoods once floods have passed. This dependence on traditional 
livelihoods is also problematic during floods. A focus group participant from Kasaya 
stated that they “have to go back to the river for [their] livelihood” given that their 
fields are located in the floodplain, along the river. Fishing, another traditional 
livelihood, brings people to the river during floods (Sikaunzwe Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion). Going back to the river during 
floods can be highly risky because (1) there are crocodiles in the area that have 
killed people, (2) flowing floodwaters can be dangerous, and (3) stagnant 
floodwaters can lead to disease outbreaks, i.e. malaria (Situlu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013).  
Furthermore, community members are hesitant to move to the higher lands 
during floods, even temporarily. This is partly because they do not want to leave 
their traditional lands. A focus group participant from Situlu stated, “I cannot agree 
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to go somewhere else. Even if you take us to some other places, it’s not good”. 
Others stated that leaving their lands would be “impossible” and that in previous 
occasions when they had moved, they quickly returned to their lands because they 
“felt it would be better to return to [their] lands” (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 
2013). This hesitation to leave their traditional lands, even temporarily, exacerbates 
their risk during floods. 
4.5. Cognitive Barriers 
According to Grothmann and Patt (2005), perceptions of risk greatly 
influence behavioural adaptations – these adaptations can be adaptive or 
maladaptive. In this case, the maladaptation is that people are not adequately 
adapting to or coping with floods (Section 3.5). Grothmann and Patt (2005, p. 206) 
go on to state that  “cognitive biases and lack of perceived adaptive capacity” can 
play a role in adaptation. In Table 13, we see that household perceptions of 
preparedness are associated with actual preparedness, an element of adaptive 
capacity. As noted in Section 3.5, community members perceive that they are not 
prepared and do not have the capacity needed to cope with and adapt to floods. This 
perceived lack of capacity can cause maladaptive behaviors and reduce adaptation 
intention. In Kasaya, Sikaunzwe, Situlu and Sikuzu, maladaptive responses (i.e. 
not adapting to floods) include the avoidant reactions of fatalism/helplessness and 
wishful thinking (Grothmann and Patt, 2005). 
Hypothesis Statistical 
test 
Test result Implication 
Household 
preparedness is 
Chi-squared Pearson chi-squared 
= 10.7259 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
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associated with belief 
that being prepared 
will/will not help 
family in emergency 
situations 
Pr=0.030* is not associated with 
belief that being 
prepared will/will not 
help family in 
emergency situations is 
rejected 
Household 
preparedness is 
associated with 
perception of 
household’s 
preparedness to handle 
a disaster 
Chi-squared  Pearson chi-squared 
= 16.3182 
Pr=0.038* 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
perception of 
household’s 
preparedness to handle 
a disaster is rejected 
Household 
preparedness is 
associated with 
perception of family’s 
current ability to 
handle a disaster 
compared to last year 
Chi-squared Pearson chi-squared 
= 22.11000 
Pr=0.001* 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
perception of family’s 
current ability to handle 
a disaster compared to 
last year is rejected 
Table 13. Statistical tests conducted to gauge associations between perceptions of 
preparedness and actual preparedness at the household level. Test results significant at 
the p=0.05 alpha level are bolded and starred. 
During the focus group discussions, community members expressed feelings 
of helplessness and fatalism. Focus group participants made statements such as “we 
have tried by all means to take reports to the government saying please the water 
will kill us”, “there is nothing we can do”. Community members feel that dealing 
with the flood is not within their capacity and that they require external help to 
survive. Community members also stated, “We have prayed, but we have failed”, 
when asked how they have prepared for or reduced their risk to floods in the past. 
Community members are deeply religious and attribute the consequences of floods 
to ‘God’s will’.12 Therefore, individuals think there is little sense in taking disaster 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 While communities historically practiced local religions, missionary activities throughout 
the 1900s (and even now) have caused most Zambians to convert to Christianity. 
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risk reduction initiatives. Rather, what will happen will happen and there is no way 
of mitigating it or adapting to it. 
 There were also indications of wishful thinking. A  focus group participant 
from Sikaunzwe stated: 
“The elders try and tell the community and some will move to the upper land, but 
you find that those that are younger still plant in the lower lands and if the floods 
come, they will wipe away all their crops.” 
 
The younger generation seem to be planting crops in the lower lands despite 
warnings from the elders. While it might be that the benefit of planting in the lower 
lands and harvesting a good yield outweighs the risk of planting in the lower lands 
and losing crops to a flood, the younger generation are still making decisions based 
on hopes and desires over the reality of recurring floods. 
 Existing perceptions of preparedness and avoidant reactions partly result 
from the lack of knowledge about how to cope with and adapt to disasters. 
4.6. Knowledge Barriers 
Missing information prevents communities from effectively arriving at 
solutions for collective action problems (Andersson et al, 2005). Community 
members associate disaster risk reduction and preparedness with a high cost. For 
example, approximately 54% of baseline survey respondents stated that their 
households were less able to handle a disaster as compared to last year. The most 
common reasons given for this were: (1) cost of living has increased, (2) loss of job or 
income source, and (3) reduced earnings. Although floods are recurring, there is no 
certainty that they will occur in a particular year, making it difficult for 
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communities to justify spending their scarce monetary resources. This  was 
supported in the focus group discussions where participants stated that traditional 
forecasts were unreliable and that they did not have any resources to prepare for 
disasters (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013). Community members, therefore, feel that they are too poor to 
cope with disasters. While poverty can inhibit preparedness, communities have 
access to common-pool resources (i.e. wood and sand), skills (i.e. woodwork, sewing, 
construction) and other capacities (i.e. manpower) that can be used to implement 
low-cost disaster risk reduction and preparedness measures.  
Part of this misperception is because individuals simply do not know what 
disaster risk reduction and preparedness entail. For example, 52.1% of baseline 
survey respondents stated that their households were not prepared to handle an 
upcoming disaster, 42.9% claimed to be somewhat or very prepared, and 5% did not 
know how prepared their households were. Of those respondents who claimed that 
their households are very or somewhat prepared to handle disasters, many did not 
have supplies they perceive can be used in emergency situations and/or had not 
spoken about or planned for what to do if a disaster occurs. Communities have not 
been adequately sensitized about natural disasters as evident from the lack of 
community participation in disaster risk reduction and preparedness initiatives and 
involvement of external agencies such as the government and other NGOs and civil 
society organizations (Table 14). The involvement of external agencies is with 
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household-level preparedness, particularly in situations where households have 
been visited by external agencies to talk about disasters (two-way chi-squared, = 
12.3818, p < 0.05) and where households have participated in a community or 
volunteer activity related to disaster risk reduction or preparedness (two-way chi-
squared, = 11.7749 p < 0.05, Table 15). Household and community preparedness is 
negatively affected by the lack of external involvement because there is then no 
social learning process by which communities interact with external agencies to 
integrate scientific and traditional knowledge to develop low cost, contextually-
relevant disaster risk reduction and preparedness measures (Mercer et al, 2010). 
External involvement alone, however is not enough; external agencies need to 
adequately incentivize community participation in their initiatives.  
 % HH that have…. Kasaya Sikaunzwe Sikuzu Situlu 
attended a meeting on how to be better 
prepared for a disaster in past year 13.79% 14.29% 10% 26.09% 
attended a First Aid training in past year 0% 3.57% 0% 0% 
participated in a disaster/evacuation drill in 
past year 10.34% 3.57% 0% 4.35% 
participated in a community/volunteer activity 
related to disaster preparedness/prevention in 
past year 3.45% 5.36% 0% 4.35% 
had a person visit their home to talk about 
disasters in the past 6 months 6.90% 3.57% 0% 13.04% 
received information on disasters from media 
sources 3.45% 19.64% 0% 8.70% 
received a pamphlet/flyer about disasters in 
the past 6 months 0% 5.36% 0% 8.70% 
received information on disasters from a 
government source in the past 6 months 3.70% 14.29% 0% 4.35% 
received information on disasters from other 
sources (i.e. family, friends) in the past 6 
months 0% 16.07% 0% 0% 
Table 14. Household participation in community-level preparedness and risk reduction 
initiatives. 
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Hypothesis Statistical 
test 
Test result Implication 
Household preparedness is 
associated with attendance 
at meeting on how to be 
better prepared for a 
disaster 
Chi-
squared 
Pearson chi-
squared = 3.6180 
Pr=0.460 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
attendance at meeting 
on how to be better 
prepared for a disaster 
cannot be rejected 
Household preparedness is 
associated with 
participation in a disaster 
or evacuation drill 
Chi-
squared 
 Pearson chi-
squared = 1.6940 
Pr=0.792 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
participation in a 
disaster or evacuation 
drill cannot be rejected 
Household preparedness is 
associated with attendance 
at a First Aid training 
Chi-
squared 
Pearson chi-
squared = 4.8246 
Pr=0.090 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
attendance at a First 
Aid training cannot be 
rejected 
Household preparedness is 
associated with 
participation in a 
community or volunteer 
activity related to disaster 
risk reduction or 
preparedness 
Chi-
squared 
Pearson chi-
squared = 12.3818 
Pr=0.002* 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
participation in a 
community or volunteer 
activity related to 
disaster risk reduction 
or preparedness is 
rejected 
Household preparedness is 
associated with household 
visit by external 
agency/individual to talk 
about disasters 
Chi-
squared 
Pearson chi-
squared = 11.7749 
Pr=0.019* 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
household visit by 
external agency/ 
individual to talk about 
disasters is rejected 
Household preparedness is 
associated with having 
received a pamphlet/flier 
about disasters 
Chi-
squared 
Pearson chi-
squared = 2.6551 
Pr=0.617 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
having received a 
pamphlet/flier about 
disasters cannot be 
rejected 
Household preparedness is 
associated with having 
received information on 
disasters from the media 
Chi-
squared 
Pearson chi-
squared = 0.6860 
Pr=0.710 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
having received 
!107"
information on disasters 
from the media cannot 
be rejected 
Household preparedness is 
associated with having 
received information on 
disasters from a 
government source 
Chi-
squared 
Pearson chi-
squared = 1.0194 
Pr=0.907 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
having received 
information on disasters 
from a government 
source cannot be 
rejected 
Household preparedness is 
associated with having 
received information on 
disasters from any other 
sources 
Chi-
squared 
Pearson chi-
squared = 1.9013 
Pr=0.754 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
having received 
information on disasters 
from any other sources 
cannot be rejected 
Household preparedness is 
associated with government 
involvement in 
projects/activities related to 
reducing disaster 
risk/vulnerability 
Chi-
squared 
Pearson chi-
squared = 2.3224 
Pr=0.677 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not with government 
involvement in 
projects/activities 
related to reducing 
disaster 
risk/vulnerability 
cannot be rejected 
Household preparedness is 
associated with access to 
government 
resources/programs for 
disaster response and/or 
recovery 
Chi-
squared 
Pearson chi-
squared = 7.5130 
Pr=0.111 
The null hypothesis 
household preparedness 
is not associated with 
access to government 
resources/programs for 
disaster response and/or 
recovery cannot be 
rejected 
Table 15. Statistical tests conducted to gauge associations between the involvement of 
external agencies in communities and actual preparedness at the household level. Test 
results significant at the p=0.05 alpha level are bolded and starred. 
 Not only is there poor participation in the few existing initiatives, there is 
inconsistency in household knowledge about existing community-level initiatives 
(Table 14). One household in a village will claim that the government is involved in 
their community while another household in the same village or a nearby village 
will answer ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’ to the same question (Table 11 and Table 14). This 
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shows that information about risk reduction and preparedness and related 
initiatives are not being disseminated appropriately across communities. 
Inconsistencies between households makes the community less prepared and 
resilient as a whole. 
The information/knowledge needed by communities does not only include 
short-term preparedness and risk reduction strategies. A focus group participant 
stated that her community did not know how to manage their rangelands. Decades 
of deforestation to make way for fields have resulted in soil degradation and in turn 
exacerbated flood risk (Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013). Therefore, the 
knowledge required by these communities includes longer-term natural resource 
management which will help communities adapt to flood risk and improve their 
overall vulnerability. 
Another informational deficit lies within the lack of community access to 
scientific forecasts. While communities do have traditional forecasting methods, 
many community members perceive traditional forecasts to be unreliable and 
inaccurate (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013). In the baseline survey, 76.3% of respondents claimed that they 
had never received a scientific forecast. Of those who did receive forecasts, 35% 
stated that they did not use the forecasts due to (1) lack of knowledge about the 
forecast, (2) prefer to wait for a situation and act accordingly, and (3) unsure about 
forecast reliability.  
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Problems with forecast reliability and lack of knowledge about forecasts can 
be considered principle-agent problems where the principle is the community and 
the agent is the forecast provider; while forecast providers have greater information 
about the forecast (i.e. likelihood of occurrence, what the forecast means), 
deterministic communication of the forecasts to forecast users means that 
information is missing (Patt and Gwata 2002; Andersson et al, 2005; Roncoli et al, 
2009). Figure 16 shows an example of a 7 day weather forecast provided by the 
Zambian Met via email. While communities cannot access these specific forecasts, it 
is representative of the type of information disseminated by the Zambian Met to the 
public via radio, newspapers, TV, and email. The forecast has a number of issues. 
First, it is not downscaled enough. A forecast for the Southern Province cannot be 
used with great reliability or accuracy to make forecast-based decisions in Kasaya 
or Sikaunzwe. Second, it uses terminology and concepts, i.e. Intertropical 
Convergence Zone, that cannot necessarily be understood by people who have not 
learned about it. Third, it does not state how much rain is actually expected. Rather, 
it says ‘heavy falls’. Are these heavy falls heavy in the sense that they are good for 
crops or in that they will cause floods and destroy crops? Fourth, it does not give 
any indication of forecast uncertainty. What is the likelihood of heavy rains 
occurring? Is the likelihood high enough that early actions should be taken? Fifth, 
the forecasts are point-forecasts. While these forecasts may be useful for 
understanding if heavy rains will cause on-location floods, they are not useful for 
predicting floods caused by heavy rains in upstream areas. Forecasts and warnings 
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need to be credible, salient, and legitimate and they need to be packaged in ways 
that are understandable and useful to communities (Dilling and Lemos, 2011; Cash 
et al, 2006; Patt and Gwata, 2002; Roncoli et al, 2009). 
 
Figure 16. Sample 7 day forecast provided by the Zambian Met via email. 
4.7. Technological Barriers 
Communities have the greatest difficulties with floodwater obstruction and 
floodwater harvesting. In terms of floodwater obstruction, community members 
have attempted to build ridges and dig furrows/drainages in the past. However, the 
ridges have been washed away and the furrows have been overwhelmed on several 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA 
MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT 
ZAMBIA METEOROLOGICAL DEPARTMENT 
WEATHER MONITOR 
ZAMBIA SEVEN DAY WEATHER FORECAST. 
12thD18th!December,(2012. 
12thD15th!December The! InterTropical! Convergence! Zone! (ITCZ)!which! is! the!main! rain! belt! system!will! continue!Oscillating! about! the! Southern! and! Central! parts! of! Zambia! leading! to! wide! spread! rainfall!across! the!country.!During!this!period!the!whole!country!is!expected!to!be!mainly!cloudy!and!rainy!during!the!day,!and!night!rains!in!places.!Thundery!activities!and!heavy!falls!are!expected!over!NorthWwestern,!Copperbelt,!Eastern!and!Central!provinces.!
 
16D17th!December A!ridge!from!SouthWeast!(Indian!Ocean)!will!extend!to!Eastern!Province!and!north!eastern!part!of!Muchinga!Province!pushing! the! ITCZ!slightly! to! the!NorthWwest,! reducing! rainfall! activities!over!Eastern,!Lusaka!and!north!eastern!parts!of!Muchinga!Provinces.!During!this!period!Lusaka,!Eastern,! and!north! eastern!parts! of!Muchinga!provinces!will! be! expected! to! be!sunny!at! first!becoming! partly! cloudy! to! cloudy! by!mid! day,! afternoon! showers! and! thunderstorms! in! few!places.!The!rest!of!the!country!will!be!mainly!cloudy!and!rainy!in!most!places.!Heavy!falls!will!be!expected!over!Western,!NorthWwestern!and!Copperbelt!Provinces. ! 
18th!December The! ridge! is! extepected! to! withdraw! over! eastern! province! and! allowing! more! winds! from!Congo!to!reach!the!southern!parts!of!Zambia,!there!by!increasing!rainfall!activities!over!Lusaka,!Southern!and!Eastern!Provinces. 
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occasions (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013). In addition, communities are 
unable to harness floodwaters to use for the rest of the year. In Sikaunzwe, a focus 
group participant from Sikaunzwe stated that her community was storing 
rainwater in 210 liter pits left behind by contractors involved in the construction of 
Nakatindi road. These pits cannot store enough water for a month. In addition, 
existing dams dry out quickly. This becomes deeply problematic during the dry 
season. Focus group participants suggested digging a series dams in their 
communities that could both obstruct floodwaters from reaching fields and homes 
and harvest water that communities can use for the rest of the year. The problem, 
however, is that they do not have the technological know-how or the resources to go 
about digging those dams. 
Another technological barrier in these communities is the lack of an early 
warning system. Community members expressed that traditional methods of 
forecasting are unreliable and therefore largely unused. Early warnings and 
forecasts disseminated by the Zambian Met are not particularly useful, as discussed 
above. In addition, these forecasts are difficult to access due to the poor radio and 
cellphone networks in the communities. Community members reported getting 
clearer Namibian radio signals over Zambian radio signals (Kasaya Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikuzu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013; Situlu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). An early warning system 
which provides credible, reliable and legitimate warnings will help communities 
take action in anticipation of a hazard.  
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4.8. Physical/Natural Barriers and Limits 
Temporary shifting from lower lands to upper lands for shelter has been 
challenging for many households because their fields and homes are located in the 
lower lands. The temporary shift puts cultivation on hold as cultivation in the upper 
lands is difficult due to water availability and sandy soils. Soil is much more fertile 
nearer the river (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013). 
 In addition, when they shift, they have to take their livestock with them 
which can be very difficult, especially when the household has a lot of livestock. As 
a result, many households are hesitant to evacuate their homes, even temporarily. 
Leading livestock from lower lands to upper lands on a daily basis for grazing 
pastures has also been challenging for households (Kasaya Focus Group Discussion, 
2013). Shifting to higher grounds is also unfeasible, especially in Kasaya and 
Sikaunzwe, because there is a lack of water in the upper lands (Kasaya Focus 
Group Discussion, 2013; Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
 Furthermore, Kasaya, Sikaunzwe and Sikuzu are above a salt water aquifer. 
Therefore, boreholes and wells cannot be used. These communities are therefore 
dependent on rivers for daily water needs and in many instances, these rivers are 
far away from villages. The salt water also makes it difficult for community 
members to keep gardens (Sikuzu Focus Group Discussion, 2013). Existing wells (in 
areas without salty water) have become quickly clogged with sand (Situlu Focus 
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Group Discussion, 2013). Otherwise, wells dry out quickly during the dry season 
(Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
 A major issue is the soil degradation around the river that has been caused 
by the clearing of trees to make way for agricultural fields. The degradation means 
that loose soil is dragged into the water when floodwaters recede. As a result rivers, 
in parts, have become shallower overtime and are more likely to flood during heavy 
rains (Sikaunzwe Focus Group Discussion, 2013). 
 Sikaunzwe focus group participants also stated that water would come 
through cracks in the ground. They stated that they had tried to fix the cracks, but 
had been unsuccessful in doing so. They seem to be referring to water coming out of 
the ground when water table levels get very high. Ridges and drainages cannot 
obstruct this water from entering fields and homes (Sikaunzwe Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013). 
 Furthermore, floods can be preceded by dry spells or droughts. The crop 
failures resulting from the droughts make it difficult for households to prepared for 
upcoming floods.  
4.9. Conclusion 
The different types of barriers interact to prevent households and 
communities from adapting to floods. Political barriers have led to institutional, 
economic and knowledge barriers. Institutional barriers have also contributed to 
knowledge barriers by way of information asymmetries across different scales of 
interactions (ZRC-community, government-community, community-community). 
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Knowledge barriers have led to cognitive barriers. Normative barriers such as the 
dependence on traditional, but flood-prone, livelihoods and physical/natural barriers 
and limits have further exacerbated poverty and, therefore, economic barriers to 
adaptation. Finally, poverty and a lack of access to technology (due to 
marginalization) means that there are also technological barriers to adaptation. 
These barriers, especially institutional and knowledge barriers, disincentivize 
communities from adapting to floods. These barriers to adaptation can be used to 
explain why communities have been unable to reduce their sensitivities and 
improve their adaptive capacities to floods.  
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CHAPTER V 
The Utility of the VCA 
 
5.1. VCA Objectives 
The IFRC defines the VCA as a “participatory investigative process” by which 
risks and vulnerabilities to hazards and capacities to cope with those hazards can 
be assessed (IFRC, 2007a, p. 6). By identifying risks, Red Cross National Societies 
can assist vulnerable communities in reducing their risks by utilizing local skills, 
knowledge and initiative. Overall, the goal of the VCA is to help vulnerable 
populations better prepare for hazards and mitigate their impacts and in turn avert 
disasters. 
The VCA action-research framework has 4 components (1) research/identify 
problems, (2) develop solutions, (3) implement projects, and (4) evaluate and modify 
solutions (IFRC, 2007a). The VCA should be conducted before disaster risk 
reduction and preparedness solutions are developed. However, this is not often case. 
In terms of the ZRBI, for example,  the Red Cross decided that community-based 
early warning systems needed to be implemented before the VCA was conducted 
and analyzed. This largely occurred due to the funding process; the Red Cross had 
to provide donors with a project proposal detailing specific goals, expected outcomes, 
a budget, and a timeline in order to acquire funding. The Red Cross could not 
consult with communities during this process as they did not have project-specific 
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funds and did not want to make promises to communities about a project that may 
not ultimately get funded. Therefore, the ZRBI, despite its focus on community 
engagement, was planned without community input and lists preparedness 
measures (i.e. early warning systems) that communities should implement without 
knowing whether these measures are community appropriate. Communities have 
relatively little say in the design of specific project goals which brings into question 
the participatory nature of the VCA. It also brings into question the necessity of 
conducting the VCA given that vulnerabilities, risks and capacities were assumed 
in the ZRBI before the VCA was even conducted.  
 Initiatives like the ZRBI require community engagement. First, involving 
local people in mitigation initiatives is a major component of building resilience 
(Norris et al, 2008). Communities should be encouraged to act collectively to 
promote innovation and strengthen social networks, information-sharing, and social 
learning, especially in the face of poor institutions. Second, communities have 
firsthand knowledge about their vulnerabilities (Blaikie et al, 1994; Gaillard et al, 
2007; Wisner, et al 2004). This Red Cross needs this information so that they can 
monitor the success of ZRBI activities overtime. Third, community experience with 
disasters means that they know how disasters manifest locally and what responses 
have and have not worked in the past (Mercer et al, 2009). This information will 
help the Red Cross design appropriate community-based risk reduction and 
preparedness activities. Fourth, the ZRBI aims to implement community-based 
programs and solutions such as early warning systems which require the 
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participation of community members for the purposes of implementation, 
information dissemination, monitoring, and maintenance. Community engagement 
will build local ownership of the ZRBI. While the ZRBI is expected to be phased out 
in 2017, project goals need to be sustained beyond this period to ensure that 
communities continue to become more resilient to climate change and variability. 
Community ownership will incentivize communities to sustain project goals in the 
long-term, and eventually institutionalize project goals within the communities 
(Andersson et al, 2005). However, considering that ZRBI planning did not involve 
community input, communities may not feel like they have ownership over the 
project. Therefore, the lack of community engagement could mean the failure of the 
VCA and related initiatives like the ZRBI. 
5.2. The Research Process 
The ‘VCA toolbox’ contains a list of  quantitative and qualitative tools that 
can be used to conduct successful VCAs. These tools include: (1) review of secondary 
sources (written reports and documents, preferably about the communities in 
question), (2) baseline survey, (3) semi-structured interview, (4) focus group 
discussion, (5) direct observation, (6) participatory mapping, (7) transect walk to 
identify risk, vulnerability and capacity in the most risk prone areas, (8) seasonal 
calendar, (9) historical profile, (10) household/neighborhood vulnerability 
assessment, (11) livelihoods/coping strategy analysis, (11) social network analysis, 
(12) community organization analysis, and (13) Venn diagram. Any combination of 
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these tools can be chosen to conduct the VCA. The tools chosen are heavily 
influenced by funding and the National Society’s capacity.  
The VCA guidebook details exactly how these tools should be used, i.e. what 
information is sought, how they should be designed, how they should be conducted 
and how they should be analyzed (IFRC, 2007a). In this sense, the VCA is not 
flexible to accommodate different research needs. It is very much a management-
oriented research tool. In addition, this inflexibility means that alternative 
conceptions of vulnerability, capacity, preparedness, institutions, etc cannot be used. 
This is especially the case for structured surveys such as the baseline survey.  
In most situations, Red Cross volunteers are trained by Red Cross staff to 
conduct parts of the VCA, i.e. the baseline survey, historical data collection, transect 
walks, interviews. Red Cross staff do not conduct the full VCA themselves (IFRC, 
2007b; IFRC, 2008b). This is beneficial for a number of reasons. For one, community 
members are more likely to speak honestly with local volunteers than with Red 
Cross staff that they are unfamiliar with. Two, local volunteers already know their 
communities, and therefore planning the logistics of conducting surveys and 
questionnaires will take less time (i.e. where are the villages, how do we get there, 
etc). Three, by designating tasks across a larger number of people, the VCA can be 
completed more quickly. Four, by training volunteers how to conduct VCAs, 
communities are being given greater ownership of the VCA and resulting 
initiatives/projects.  
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However, this dependence on volunteers is also problematic for a number of 
reasons. First, in communities where the training facilitators need to utilize 
translators, a lot may be lost in translation during the training, leading to 
misunderstanding and poor data collection. Second, if 10 volunteers are designated 
to conduct baseline surveys, it is likely that baseline surveys will be conducted in 10 
different ways, given differences in understanding, perceptions, and styles of asking 
and explaining questions. Interviewer error is difficult to control for. Third, the 
reliance on volunteers prevents Red Cross staff from fully engaging with the 
communities (by walking through, talking to different people, etc) and therefore 
limits the extent to which they can familiarize themselves with the communities. 
This is likely to be problematic when it comes to analyzing the VCA and generating 
and implementing solutions as the staff may not be familiar enough with the local 
context. 
5.3. Assessment of Vulnerability and Capacity 
Here, I use the Turner et al (2003a) and Jones and Boyd (2011) frameworks 
to evaluate the VCA’s role in understanding vulnerability. The Turner et al (2003a) 
framework provides an integrated approach to vulnerability analysis in its 
treatment of systems as coupled human-environment systems, where social and 
environmental subsystems interact in the context of external influences. This 
framework, however, does not address how vulnerabilities are caused and why they 
exist. The Jones and Boyd (2011) framework sheds some light on the mechanisms of 
vulnerability given its focus on factors that limit adaptive capacity and hinder 
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adaptation. I will additionally evaluate the VCA’s consideration of cross-scalar 
political factors. Neither of the frameworks adequately account for political factors 
that affect adaptation and vulnerability. 
The VCA process does not treat systems as coupled human-environment 
systems given that it cannot be used to identify the environmental conditions that 
contribute to hazard sensitivity, i.e. the biophysical endowments. The hazards maps 
and the questions in the baseline survey, historical data collection, and the focus 
group discussions do not focus on biophysical endowments. While the focus group 
discussions revealed some issues such as soil erosion exacerbating flood risk and 
changes in seasonal temperature and rainfall patterns, these claims could not be 
confirmed. The VCA is more adept at measuring the social endowments that 
contribute to hazard sensitivity.  
The VCA is also unable to reconcile different scales of vulnerability. 
Aggregated household vulnerabilities should reflect overall community 
vulnerability (Morrow, 1999; Moore et al, 2004). However, when assessing 
vulnerability, it became clear that the aggregated baseline survey data did not 
always map onto vulnerability expressed during the focus group discussions. For 
example, statistical analysis suggested that educational attainment was not 
associated with household-level flood sensitivity, whereas, the focus group 
discussions attested to the importance of education for coping with disasters (Table 
5). Focus group participants stated that they needed education to learn skills, how 
to manage their rangelands and how to use forecasts (Sikaunzwe Focus Group 
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Discussion, 2013). This discrepancy between the household-level data and focus 
group discussions indicates that the baseline survey is not able to fully identify 
vulnerabilities. Part of the problem may be the structured format of the baseline 
survey where questions were posed in multiple-choice format. On one hand, the 
structured format allows for the data to be used quantitatively and allows for the 
baseline survey to be repeatedly conducted and compared in order to keep track of 
changes in socio-economics, perceptions, preparedness and capacities over a long 
period of time. On the other hand, such a format prevents the interviewer from 
delving into the nuances of people’s thoughts, beliefs and perceptions. 
In addition, the baseline survey makes a lot of assumptions as to what 
constitutes as vulnerability and capacity. Assets, for example, were evaluated based 
on whether households owned a radio, TV, clock/watch, axe, mobile phone, bicycle, 
sewing machine, jewelry, car, motorbike, and/or refrigerator. These ‘assets’, as 
defined by the Red Cross, may not actually be valuable or available in these 
communities. Furthermore, they might not be representative of the full range of 
assets considered valuable by community members. In this sense, the assets chosen 
by the Red Cross may not be reliable representation of household wealth. Similarly, 
the baseline survey also makes assumptions as to what preparedness entails at the 
household level; the questions focus on whether or not households have 
made/discussed a disaster plan and household participation in preparedness 
activities organized by internal and external agencies. Furthermore, the baseline 
survey’s conception of forecasts is limited to scientific forecasts – traditional 
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forecasts (i.e. the presence of cobwebs which indicate heavy rains) are ignored. It is 
possible that community members define preparedness differently to the Red Cross. 
It may, for example, include having social networks that individuals and households 
can rely on during emergencies and/or a reliable traditional forecasting system. 
Therefore, the baseline survey may not be capturing the actual vulnerabilities 
experienced by and the capacities present in households. Conversely, the more open 
structure of focus group discussions allows community members to explain their 
experiences based on their definitions of vulnerability and capacity. This is 
potentially a partial cause of the discrepancy between the results of the baseline 
survey data and focus group discussions.  
This discrepancy also brings into question whether quantitative data can 
truly map onto qualitative data. In quantitative data analysis, hypotheses are 
tested to determine the statistical significance of relationships (or associations or 
correlations). Significance is usually tested at the 0.05 alpha level. This alpha level 
has been controversial. First, it measures the extent to which the observed result 
can be due to chance rather than the chance that a hypothesis is correct. Therefore, 
a p-value cannot determine causality. Second, 0.05 is an arbitrary number. 
Numerous results have been discounted because they have not met the 0.05 alpha 
level condition for statistical significance. Should associations with p-values greater 
than yet close to 0.05 (i.e. 0.06, 0.07) be discounted entirely? Third, given that such 
statistical testing is only able to test correlations, it is possible that highly 
implausible hypotheses can have statistically significant results (Nuzzo, 2014). It 
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must be noted, however, that I conducted simple tests of associations which do not 
produce confidence intervals or signal the direction of an effect. For example, a 
Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test will not tell me if agricultural dependence increases or 
decreases household sensitivity to floods. It is likely that a logistic regression with 
multiple dependent variables would have greater statistical and explanatory power 
due to its ability to measure the relative strengths of effects of dependent variables 
on an independent variable via confidence intervals and effect sizes (Nuzzo, 2014). 
Therefore, it would be beneficial to generate logistic regressions to determine the 
effects of different indicator variables (i.e. education, gender, wealth, etc) on a 
dependent variable (i.e. sensitivity). 
 Furthermore, the closed-structure of the baseline survey and the consequent 
difficulty in capturing nuance in risk experiences and perceptions means that there 
were few differences across Sikaunzwe, Kasaya, Sikuzu and Situlu. The households 
across the communities answered the questions in similar ways and were therefore 
similar in terms of vulnerability, preparedness, and capacity. It may be the case 
that these communities are similar given their proximity, cultural, social, economic, 
and political similarities. However, it may also be that the baseline survey does not 
capture existing differences. While the focus group discussions should ideally 
capture these nuances, their open structure meant that the discussions were varied. 
In Sikaunzwe, participants spoke of the challenges faced by women, whereas, in 
Sikuzu, participants stressed the need for seeds. This does not mean that access to 
seeds is not a problem in Sikaunzwe or that women are less vulnerable in Sikuzu. 
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 In addition, the VCA is not designed to understand why community 
vulnerabilities exist. Political ecologists maintain that vulnerability is caused by 
inequalities arising from historical and existing political, legal and institutional 
structures; yet, it is difficult to identify these underlying causes of vulnerability 
using the VCA alone. While the VCA toolkit does provide some tools for 
institutional analysis (i.e. social network analysis, Venn diagram), it is evident that 
the IFRC’s conception of an institution is narrow. The institutions considered are 
local organizations (e.g. Sikaunzwe’s Agricultural Committee) and the analysis is 
limited to assessing “people’s perceptions of the role and significance” of these 
organizations within their communities (IFRC 2007a, p.21). The VCA, therefore, did 
not allow me to engage with external political economy and political climate during 
data collection. Part of the reason for this is the Red Cross’ principle of neutrality. 
The principle of neutrality states that humanitarian organizations should remain 
politically neutral meaning that they cannot enforce their own political interests or 
external political interests in their activities (IFRC and ICRC, 1995; Pictet, 1979). 
In terms of disaster response, the expectation is that the Red Cross can then ensure 
that the benefits of humanitarian responses and initiatives are distributed 
equitably across vulnerable, hazard-prone communities. In addition, the National 
Societies are auxiliary to their respective governments, and are therefore 
responsible for upholding government policies. This is reflected in the VCA process 
where questions about external institutions, politics and political economy are 
avoided. While community marginalization can be assumed given poverty levels and 
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lack of government involvement in the communities, the underlying causes of 
marginalization cannot be parsed out. The problem arises from the fact that 
vulnerability cannot be isolated from the broader political economy and the 
institutions in which it exists (Adger, 2006).  
A final issue in the assessment of vulnerability and capacity using the VCA is 
that of respondent bias. It is possible that baseline survey respondents, historical 
data respondents, and focus group participants were not providing accurate 
answers. The Red Cross, after all, is a humanitarian organization that is known for 
providing relief. A focus group discussion participant stated (Sikuzu Focus Group 
Discussion, 2013):  
“From what we know, the Red Cross likes to help. When you go to Namibia, you find 
that people, they rely too much on the Red Cross. So now when we see you here, 
now we are what? You have come to help us. Our needs are now in your hands”. 
 
Community members did state on numerous occasions that they had no resources 
with which to cope with and adapt to disasters. It is unclear if this is really case and 
if this ‘perceived’ lack of resources can largely be attributed to not knowing what 
preparedness entails. Furthermore, communities have managed to survive despite 
recurring floods, suggesting that their coping capacities are not so low after all. If 
community members were exaggerating their risk exposure, sensitivity and 
inability to cope, then their actual vulnerability and capacity cannot be assessed.  
5.4. VCA Use and its Implications 
Currently, the VCA follows the Science Push model of knowledge production 
where the information agenda is set by the Red Cross (Dilling and Lemos, 2011). 
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The Red Cross utilizes its definitions and measures of vulnerability and capacity to 
assess communities. These generalized conceptions of vulnerability and capacity are 
developed in Geneva, in the Red Cross headquarters, and do not entirely 
accommodate the nuances that arise from differences in social, economic, political, 
and ecological contexts. This will be problematic because vulnerability and capacity 
will not be accurately assessed, making it difficult to design and implement locally 
relevant disaster risk reduction and preparedness measures. This is evident in the 
discrepancies between the baseline survey results and the focus group discussion 
data. In addition, the Science Push model can set a precedent of community 
exclusion from Red Cross activities and therefore make community members feel 
like they have less ownership of Red Cross sponsored projects such as the ZRBI 
which require community engagement to be successful over the long-term. 
Consequently, this variety of ‘situated knowledges’ needs to be acknowledged 
by co-producing knowledge (Haraway, 1998). In the context of the VCA, this means 
involving communities in the design of the VCA. The IFRC’s recommendation that 
researchers review secondary sources, i.e. reports or documents about the 
communities, prior to beginning VCA fieldwork is not sufficient (IFRC, 2007a). For 
one, reports on Sikaunzwe, Kasaya, Sikuzu and Situlu do not exist (or are difficult 
to access). Two, such reports are not likely to cover issues of vulnerability and 
capacity in the face of climate hazards. If they did, then there would be no reason to 
conduct a full VCA. Therefore, it is vital that researchers visit and spend time in the 
communities that they want to conduct the VCA in to gauge community definitions 
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of vulnerability, preparedness, capacity, and so on before the VCA is designed and 
conducted. This will ensure that the VCA tools used are designed in ways that are 
relevant in the local context. Community involvement does not mean that 
communities dictate the VCA process. If this were the case, then knowledge 
production would follow the Demand Pull model and run the risk of discounting the 
Red Cross’ goals, objectives, and capacities (Dilling and Lemos, 2011). Rather this is 
a collaborative initiative where the Red Cross and communities share information 
on goals, objectives, definitions, concepts and research design.  
 In addition, the VCA cannot be used to solve (or challenge) the underlying 
causes of vulnerability i.e. poor institutions, marginalization, underdevelopment. 
Berkes (2007) states that vulnerability can be reduced by building resilience. In 
order to build resilience, (1) communities need to learn to live with variability, 
change, and uncertainty, (2) ecological, social and political systems need to be 
diversified to increase options and reduce risk, (3) learning and problem-solving 
needs to be encouraged, and (4) opportunities for self-organization must be created 
by improving local institutions and building networks across scales. O’Brien et al 
(2006) and Berman et al (2012) emphasize the importance of changing institutional 
structures and enhancing governance for managing climate risks. Thomalla et al 
(2006) emphasize the importance of facilitating learning and knowledge exchange, 
both of which need to be institutionalized, and cannot occur effectively in a system 
where governance and decision-making are top down. The Red Cross’ neutrality 
principle makes it difficult for researchers to identify institutional shortcomings 
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using VCA data and for the Red Cross to engage in the institutional change 
necessary to fundamentally reduce community vulnerability to natural hazards.  
 Realistically, the VCA can be used to implement ‘soft’ solutions such as early 
warning systems, designating shelters, and planning evacuation routes given its 
focus on identifying disaster risk reduction and preparedness systems in place. 
While these solutions may not profoundly reduce community vulnerability and 
poverty, they will help product individuals from the immediate impacts of floods (i.e. 
loss of life and property). If the Red Cross works to enhance community engagement 
in and ownership of the VCA and consequently initiatives like the ZRBI through the 
co-production of knowledge, community-based disaster risk reduction and 
preparedness activities can be sustained over the long-term. This will increase the 
capacity of communities to cope with hazards. The VCA can be conducted 
repeatedly over the long-term to evaluate if the implemented solutions are 
improving the coping capacities of communities with regards to floods.  
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CHAPTER VI 
Conclusions 
 
Communities in the Zambezi River Basin are vulnerable to floods, based on 
their exposure, sensitivity and resilience. Communities are exposed to floods due to 
their location and livelihood activities in the Zambezi River Basin. Communities are 
sensitive to floods due to poverty, lack of education, dependence on agriculture, 
household construction quality, poor infrastructure, and lack of access to potable 
water. Particularly vulnerable groups in the community include women, children, 
and the elderly. Communities have low adaptive capacity to floods, evidenced by 
their lack of preparedness, their inaction during floods, and their lack of capacity to 
cope with floods. What became evident was that the barriers to adaptation were 
also the causes of sensitivity and low adaptive capacity (or resilience). Poverty, 
institutions, and limited access to knowledge and technology have led to 
vulnerability and prevent households and communities from adapting to floods. 
Therefore, the barriers to adaptation and the causes of vulnerability are not 
mutually exclusive. 
My research found that the most pertinent barriers to adaptation in the four 
communities are the institutional and knowledge barriers. The exclusion of these 4 
communities from humanitarian and government decision-making has prevented 
social learning and co-production of knowledge, led to poor institutions and 
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consequently disincentivized individuals from these communities from acting 
collectively to enhance community resilience to floods. These barriers to adaptation 
exist in the context of Zambia’s and Barotseland’s contentious political history 
which has left much of the Western Province and part of the Southern Province 
underdeveloped and ignored. 
My research also found that initiatives aimed at enhancing community 
resilience over the long-term require communities to act collectively, especially in 
the face of weak institutions. At the community-scale, this would involve 
individuals cooperating to determine how assets should be used and innovate 
disaster risk reduction and preparedness strategies. Beyond the community-scale, 
this would involve communities cooperating with the Red Cross, government, and 
civil society/non-governmental organizations for joint ownership of disaster 
management projects (i.e. ZRBI) and joint decision-making (Roberts, 2006; Bijman 
and Doorneweert, 2008; Burress and Cook, 2010). Such a partnership embodies a 
knowledge network. 
 The VCA helps elucidate the types of risks faced by communities, the 
perceptions of those risks, socio-economic characteristics that indicate vulnerability, 
the impacts of natural disasters, perceptions of household and community and 
preparedness to cope with disasters, the involvement of external agencies in 
communities, and the systems communities have in place to cope with hazards. 
However, the VCA has limited use on its own to determine the mechanisms of 
vulnerability. Rather, researchers need to depend on secondary sources such as 
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government documents about institutions and peer-reviewed studies about political 
histories and make connections between local vulnerabilities and historical and 
current political factors. The VCA process needs to be redesigned so that Red Cross 
National Societies conducting VCAs are required to engage with and challenge 
political discourses that cause vulnerability in select groups of people.  
This is needed to fulfill the stated objectives and goals of the ZRBI. The VCA 
protocol also needs to be redesigned to allow for knowledge co-production between 
communities and the Red Cross. This will ensure that VCAs are designed for 
specific communities and Red Cross objectives. Consequently, the Red Cross will be 
able to collect information and generate solutions that are based on local 
conceptions and experiences of vulnerability and capacity.  
Going forward, my research seeks to contribute to critiques of measuring 
vulnerability using standardized methods and indicators and make a case for the 
development of more adaptive methods for measuring vulnerability. These methods 
need to be participatory and allow for knowledge to be co-produced between the 
different stakeholders. Furthermore, conceptual frameworks of vulnerability in the 
social-ecological research tradition need to incorporate political ecology to account 
for the political, historical, and scalar dimensions of vulnerability. Current 
frameworks and resulting methods are lacking in their consideration of these 
elements of vulnerability. This makes it challenging to understand the underlying 
mechanisms of vulnerability and consequently for disaster management agencies to 
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design initiatives that decrease overall vulnerability to environmental or social 
shocks.  
  
!133"
References 
 
 
Adger, W. N., Benjaminsen, T. A., Brown, K., & Svarstad, H. (2001). Advancing a political 
ecology of global environmental discourses. Development and change, 32(4), 681-715. 
 
Adger, W. N., Brooks, N., Bentham, G., Agnew, M., & Eriksen, S. (2004). New indicators of 
vulnerability and adaptive capacity (Vol. 122). Norwich: Tyndall Centre for Climate 
Change Research. 
Adger, W. N., Dessai, S., Goulden, M., Hulme, M., Lorenzoni, I., Nelson, D. R., … Wreford, 
A. (2009). Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change? Climatic Change, 
93(3-4), 335–354. doi:10.1007/s10584-008-9520-z 
Adger, W., Hughes, T., Folke, C., Carpenter, S. R., & Rockstrom, J. (2005). Social-Ecological 
Resilience to Coastal Disasters. Science, 309, 1036–1039. 
doi:10.1126/science.1112122 
 
Adger, W. N., & Kelly, P. M. (1999). Social vulnerability to climate change and the 
architecture of entitlements. Mitigation and adaptation strategies for global change, 
4(3-4), 253-266. 
 
Adger, W. N. (2001). Scales of governance and environmental justice for adaptation and 
mitigation of climate change. Journal of International Development, 13(7), 921-931. 
Adger, W. N. (2003). Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to Climate Change. 
Economic Geography, 79(4), 387–404. doi:10.1111/j.1944-8287.2003.tb00220.x 
Adger, W. (2006). Vulnerability. Global Environmental Change, 16(3), 268–281. 
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.02.006 
Adger, W. N. (2009). Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to Climate Change. 
Economic Geography, 79(4), 387–404. doi:10.1111/j.1944-8287.2003.tb00220.x 
Agrawal, A. (2010). Local Institutions and Adaptation to Climate Change. In Mearns, R., & 
Norton, A. (Eds.). Social Dimensions of Climate Change: Equity and Vulnerability in 
a Warming World (p. 173-198). Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Andersson, K. (2006). Understanding decentralized forest governance: an application of the 
institutional analysis and development framework. Sustainability: Science Practice 
and Policy, 2(1), 25-35. 
 
Andersson, K., Ostrom, E., & Shivakumar, S. (2005). The Samaritan's dilemma: the 
political economy of development aid. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Archer, E. R. (2003). Identifying Underserved End-User Groups in the Provision of Climate 
Information. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 84, 1525-1532. 
!134"
 
Baron, J., & Ritov, I. (1994). Reference points and omission bias. organizational Behavior 
and human Decision Processes, 59(3), 475-498. 
 
Berkes, F. (2007). Understanding uncertainty and reducing vulnerability: lessons from 
resilience thinking. Natural hazards, 41(2), 283-295. 
 
Berkes, F., Colding, J., & Folke, C. (Eds.). (2003). Navigating social-ecological systems: 
building resilience for complexity and change. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bijman, J., & Doorneweert, B. (2008). Entrepreneurship, collective entrepreneurship and 
the producer-owned firm. In 12th Congress of the European Association of 
Agricultural Economists, Ghent, Belgium. 
 
Birkmann, J. (2007). Risk and vulnerability indicators at different scales: applicability, 
usefulness and policy implications. Environmental Hazards, 7(1), 20-31. 
 
Blaikie, P., Cannon, T. D., & Davis, I. I. and Wisner, B. (1994). At Risk: Natural Hazards, 
People’s Vulnerability and Disasters. Routledge, London. 
 
Braman, L. M., Suarez, P., & Van Aalst, M. K. (2010). Climate change adaptation: 
integrating climate science into humanitarian work. International Review of the Red 
Cross (2005), 92(879), 693. 
 
Brooks, N., Neil Adger, W., & Mick Kelly, P. (2005). The determinants of vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity at the national level and the implications for adaptation. Global 
environmental change, 15(2), 151-163. 
 
Burress, M. J., & Cook, M. L. (2010). A primer on collective entrepreneurship: A 
preliminary taxonomy. Agricultural Economics publications (MU). 
  
Burton, I., Kates, R.W., White, G.F., 1993. The Environment as Hazard, Second ed. 
Guilford, New York. 
  
Cannon, T. (1994). Vulnerability analysis and the explanation of natural disasters. In 
Varley, A., editor, Disasters development and environment. Chichester: John Wiley, 
13–30. 
  
Caplan, G. L. (1970). The Elites of Barotseland, 1878-1969: A Political History of Zambia's 
Western Province. Univ of California Press. 
 
Cash, D. W., Borck, J. C., & Patt, A. G. (2006). Countering the loading-dock approach to 
linking science and decision making comparative analysis of El Niño/Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) Forecasting Systems. Science, Technology & Human Values, 31(4), 
465-494. 
 
Cleaver, F. (2005). The inequality of social capital and the reproduction of chronic poverty. 
World Development, 33(6), 893-906. 
 
!135"
Cutter, S. L. (1996). Vulnerability to environmental hazards. Progress in human geography, 
20, 529-539. 
 
Cutter, S. L., Boruff, B. J., & Shirley, W. L. (2003). Social vulnerability to environmental 
hazards*. Social science quarterly, 84(2), 242-261. 
 
Cutter, S. L., Barnes, L., Berry, M., Burton, C., Evans, E., Tate, E., & Webb, J. (2008). A 
place-based model for understanding community resilience to natural disasters. 
Global environmental change, 18(4), 598-606. 
Dilling, L., & Lemos, M. C. (2011). Creating usable science: Opportunities and constraints 
for climate knowledge use and their implications for science policy. Global 
Environmental Change, 21(2), 680-689. 
 
DMMU. (2005). Disaster Management Operations Manual. Lusaka. 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/11771_11756DisasterManagementOperationsMa
.pdf. Accessed on November 28, 2013. 
 
DMMU. (2009). 2009/10 National Contingency Plan. Lusaka. 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/11451_11430200910ZambiaNationalContingenc.
pdf. Accessed on November 28, 2013. 
 
DMMU. (2010). The Disaster Management Act, 2010. Lusaka. 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/17032_17032disastermgtact1.PDF. Accessed on 
November 28, 2013. 
 
Du, W., FitzGerald, G., Clark, M. J., & Hou, X. Y. (2010). Health impacts of floods. 
Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, 25(3), 265-272. 
 
Eakin, H., & Lemos, M. C. (2006). Adaptation and the state: Latin America and the 
challenge of capacity-building under globalization. Global environmental change, 
16(1), 7-18. 
 
Eakin, H., & Luers, A. L. (2006). Assessing the Vulnerability of Social-Environmental 
Systems. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 31(1), 365–394. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.energy.30.050504.144352 
 
Ellis, F. (2000). Rural livelihoods and diversity in developing countries. Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Engle, N. L., & Lemos, M. C. (2010). Unpacking governance: building adaptive capacity to 
climate change of river basins in Brazil. Global Environmental Change, 20(1), 4-13. 
 
Engle, N. L. (2007). Adaptive Capacity of Water Management to Climate Change in Brazil: 
A Case Study Analysis of the Baixo Jaguaribe and Pirapama River Basins (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Michigan). 
 
Eriksen, S., & Selboe, E. (2012). The social organisation of adaptation to climate variability 
and global change: The case of a mountain farming community in Norway. Applied 
Geography, 33, 159-167. 
!136"
 
Feldman, D. L., & Ingram, H. M. (2009). Making science useful to decision makers: climate 
forecasts, water management, and knowledge networks. Weather, Climate, and 
Society, 1(1), 9-21. 
 
Folke, C. (2006). Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social–ecological systems 
analyses. Global environmental change, 16(3), 253-267. 
 
Forsyth, T. (2002). Critical political ecology: The politics of environmental science. Routledge, 
London, UK. 
 
Füssel, H. M. (2007). Adaptation planning for climate change: concepts, assessment 
approaches, and key lessons. Sustainability science, 2(2), 265-275. 
 
Gallopín, G. C. (2006). Linkages between vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity. 
Global Environmental Change, 16(3), 293–303. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.02.004 
Hewitt, K., Ed. (1983). Interpretation of Calamity: From the Viewpoint of Human Ecology. 
Boston, Allen. 
 
Gaillard, J., Liamzon, C., & Villanueva, J. (2007). “Natural” disaster? A retrospect into the 
causes of the late-2004 typhoon disaster in Eastern Luzon, Philippines. 
Environmental Hazards, 7(4), 257–270.  
 
Garrote, L., & Bras, R. L. (1995). A distributed model for real-time flood forecasting using 
digital elevation models. Journal of Hydrology, 167(1), 279-306. 
 
Gregory, P. J., Ingram, J. S., & Brklacich, M. (2005). Climate change and food security. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 360(1463), 
2139-2148. 
 
Grothmann, T., & Patt, A. (2005). Adaptive capacity and human cognition: the process of 
individual adaptation to climate change. Global Environmental Change, 15(3), 199-
213. 
 
Grothmann, T., & Reusswig, F. (2006). People at risk of flooding: why some residents take 
precautionary action while others do not. Natural hazards, 38(1-2), 101-120. 
 
Haddad, B. M. (2005). Ranking the adaptive capacity of nations to climate change when 
socio-political goals are explicit. Global Environmental Change, 15: 165-76. Holling, 
 
Hammer, G. L., Hansen, J. W., Phillips, J. G., Mjelde, J. W., Hill, H., Love, A., & Potgieter, 
A. (2001). Advances in application of climate prediction in agriculture. Agricultural 
Systems, 70(2), 515-553. 
 
Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the 
privilege of partial perspective. Feminist studies, 14(3), 575-599. 
 
Harding, S. (2011). The postcolonial science and technology studies reader. Duke University 
Press Books, Durham, NC. 
!137"
 
Hewitt, K. (1983) The Idea of Calamity in a Technocratic Age. In K. Hewitt (ed.) 
Interpretations of Calamity: From the Viewpoint of Human Ecology. Allen and 
Unwin, London. 
 
Hinkel, J. (2011). “Indicators of vulnerability and adaptive capacity”: Towards a 
clarification of the science–policy interface. Global Environmental Change, 21(1), 
198-208. 
 
Holmes, R., & Slater, R. (2007). Social Protection for Low Capacity Households in Zambia. 
ODI Project Briefing, (11), ODI, London. 
 
Imperial, M. T., & Yandle, T. (2005). Taking institutions seriously: using the IAD 
framework to analyze fisheries policy. Society and Natural Resources, 18(6), 493-509. 
 
IPCC. (2001). Climate change 2001: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability: contribution of 
Working Group II to the third assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. Cambridge University Press. 
 
IPCC. (2007). Summary for policymakers. In: Solomon S, Qin D, Manning M, Chen Z, 
Marquis M, Averyt KB, Tignor M, Miller HL, editors. Climate Change 2007: the 
physical science basis, Contribution of working group I to the fourth assessment 
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
 
IFRC. (2007a). VCA toolbox: with reference sheets. Geneva.  
 
IFRC. (2007b) How to do a VCA: A practical step-by-step guide for Red Cross Red Crescent 
staff and volunteers. Geneva. 
 
IFRC. (2008a). Early warning > Early Action. Geneva.  
 
IFRC. (2008b). VCA training guide: Classroom training and learning-by-doing. Geneva. 
 
IFRC. (2009). Zambezi River Basin Initiative. Geneva. 
IFRC and ICRC. (1995). The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. Geneva. 
Jasanoff, S. and Martello, M.L (eds.) 2004. Earthly Politics: Local and Global in 
Environmental Governance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Jasanoff, S. (Ed.). (2004). States of knowledge: the co-production of science and the social 
order. Routledge, London, UK. 
Jones, L., & Boyd, E. (2011). Exploring social barriers to adaptation: Insights from Western 
Nepal. Global Environmental Change, 21(4), 1262–1274. 
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.06.002 
!138"
Kasperson, R.E., Dow, K., Archer, E., Caceres, D., Downing, T., Elmqvist, T., Eriksen, S., 
Folke, C., Han, G., Iyengar, K., Vogel, C., Wilson, K., Ziervogel, G., 2005. Vulnerable 
people and places. In: Hassan, R., Scholes, R., Ash, N. (Eds.), Ecosystems and 
Human Well- being: Current State and Trends, vol. 1. Island Press, Washington, DC, 
pp. 143–164. 
 
Keim, M. E. (2008). Building Human Resilience: The Role of Public Health Preparedness 
and Response As an Adaptation to Climate Change. American Journal of Preventive 
Medicine, 35(5), 508-516. 
 
Kelly, P. M., & Adger, W. N. (2000). Theory and practice in assessing vulnerability to 
climate change andFacilitating adaptation. Climatic change, 47(4), 325-352. 
 
Klein, R. J. T., Nicholls, R. J., & Thomalla, F. (2003). Resilience to natural hazards: How 
useful is this concept? Environmental Hazards, 5(1), 35–45. 
doi:10.1016/j.hazards.2004.02.001 
 
Latour, B. (1993). We have never been modern. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Lemos, M. C., Finan, T. J., Fox, R. W., Nelson, D. R., & Tucker, J. (2002). The use of 
seasonal climate forecasting in policymaking: lessons from Northeast Brazil. 
Climatic Change, 55(4), 479-507. 
 
Lemos, M. C., & Morehouse, B. J. (2005). The co-production of science and policy in 
integrated climate assessments. Global Environmental Change, 15(1), 57-68. 
 
Lemos, M. C., & Rood, R. B. (2010). Climate projections and their impact on policy and 
practice. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 1(5), 670-682. 
 
Liu, Y. B., & De Smedt, F. (2004). WetSpa extension, a GIS-based hydrologic model for flood 
prediction and watershed management. User Manual, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 
Brussels. 
 
Luers, A. L., Lobell, D. B., Sklar, L. S., Addams, C. L., & Matson, P. a. (2003). A method for 
quantifying vulnerability, applied to the agricultural system of the Yaqui Valley, 
Mexico. Global Environmental Change, 13(4), 255–267. doi:10.1016/S0959-
3780(03)00054-2 
 
Luers, A. L. (2005). The surface of vulnerability: An analytical framework for examining 
environmental change. Global Environmental Change, 15(3), 214–223. 
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2005.04.003 
 
Machlis, G. E., Force, J. E., & Burch Jr, W. R. (1997). The human ecosystem part I: the 
human ecosystem as an organizing concept in ecosystem management. Society & 
Natural Resources, 10(4), 347-367. 
 
Mercer, J., Kelman, I., Taranis, L., & Suchet-Pearson, S. (2010). Framework for integrating 
indigenous and scientific knowledge for DRR. Disasters, 34(1), 214–39.  
 
!139"
Moore, S., Daniel, M., Linnan, L., Campbell, M., Benedict, S., & Meier, A. (2004). After 
Hurricane Floyd passed: Investigating the social determinants of disaster 
preparedness and recovery. Family & community health, 27(3), 204-217. 
 
Morrow, B. H. (1999). Identifying and mapping community vulnerability. Disasters, 23(1), 
1-18. 
 
Moser, S. C., & Ekstrom, J. A. (2010). A framework to diagnose barriers to climate change 
adaptation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(51), 22026-22031. 
 
Norris, F. H., Stevens, S. P., Pfefferbaum, B., Wyche, K. F., & Pfefferbaum, R. L. (2008). 
Community resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and strategy for 
disaster readiness. American journal of community psychology, 41(1-2), 127-150. 
 
Noyoo, N. (2012). Social welfare in Zambia: The search for a transformative agenda. Adonis 
And Abbey Pub. 
 
Nuzzo, R. (2014). Statistical Errors. Nature (506), 149-152. 
 
O'Brien, G., O'Keefe, P., Rose, J., & Wisner, B. (2006). Climate change and disaster 
management. Disasters, 30(1), 64-80. 
 
Oliver-Smith, A. (2004). Theorizing vulnerability in a globalized world: a political ecological 
perspective. Mapping vulnerability: disasters, development and people. Earthscan, 
London, 10-24. 
 
Ostrom, E. (1994). Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action. Journal of Theoretical 
Politics, 6(4), 527-562. 
 
Patt, A., & Gwata, C. (2002). Effective seasonal climate forecast applications: examining 
constraints for subsistence farmers in Zimbabwe. Global Environmental Change, 
12(3), 185-195. 
 
Pelling, M., & High, C. (2005). Understanding adaptation: what can social capital offer 
assessments of adaptive capacity?. Global Environmental Change, 15(4), 308-319. 
 
Phadke, R. (2011). Reclaiming the Technological Imagination: Water, Power, and Place in 
India. In: Goldman, M. J., Nadasdy, P., & Turner, M. D. (Eds.), Knowing nature: 
Conversations at the intersection of political ecology and science studies. University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 244-262. 
Pictet, J. (1979). The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross. Geneva. 
Pomeroy, R. S., Ratner, B. D., Hall, S. J., Pimoljinda, J., & Vivekanandan, V. (2006). Coping 
with disaster: Rehabilitating coastal livelihoods and communities. Marine Policy, 
30(6), 786-793. 
 
!140"
Posthumus, H., Morris, J., Hess, T. M., Neville, D., Phillips, E., & Baylis, A. (2009). Impacts 
of the summer 2007 floods on agriculture in England. Journal of Flood Risk 
Management, 2(3), 182-189. 
 
Pritchett, L., & Woolcock, M. (2004). Solutions When the Solution is the Problem: Arraying 
the Disarray in Development. World Development, 32(2), 191-212. 
 
Pulwarty, R.S. and W.E. Riebsame (1997) The Political Ecology of Vulnerability to 
Hurricane-Related Hazards. In H.F. Diaz and R.S. Pulwarty (eds.) Hurricanes: 
Climate and Socioeconomic Impacts. Springer, New York. 
 
Redman, C. L., Grove, J. M., & Kuby, L. H. (2004). Integrating Social Science into the Long-
Term Ecological Research (LTER) Network: Social Dimensions of Ecological Change 
and Ecological Dimensions of Social Change. Ecosystems, 7(2), 161–171. 
doi:10.1007/s10021-003-0215-z 
 
Robbins, P., Hintz, J., & Moore, S. A. (2010). Environment and society: a critical 
introduction. Environment and society: a critical introduction. Wiley-Blackwell, 
Hoboken, NJ. 
 
Roberts, N. C. (2006). Public entrepreneurship as social creativity. World Futures, 62(8), 
595-609. 
 
Roncoli, C., Jost, C., Kirshen, P., Sanon, M., Ingram, K. T., Woodin, M., ... & Hoogenboom, 
G. (2009). From accessing to assessing forecasts: an end-to-end study of 
participatory climate forecast dissemination in Burkina Faso (West Africa). Climatic 
Change, 92(3-4), 433-460. 
 
Sarewitz, D., & Pielke Jr, R. A. (2007). The neglected heart of science policy: reconciling 
supply of and demand for science. environmental science & policy, 10(1), 5-16. 
 
Schipper, E. L. F. (2009). Meeting at the crossroads?: Exploring the linkages between 
climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. Climate and Development, 
1(1), 16-30. 
 
Schroter, D., Polsky, C., & Patt, A. G. (2005). Assessing vulnerabilities to the effects of 
global change: an eight step approach. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for 
Global Change, 10, 573–596. 
 
Sen, A. (1981). Ingredients of famine analysis: availability and entitlements. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 96(3), 433-464. 
  
Sen, A.K., 1984. Resources, Values and Development. Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Skocpol, T. (1995). Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in 
United States. Harvard University Press. 
 
Skocpol, T. (1996). Unravelling from Above. The American Prospect, 25. 
 
!141"
Smit, B., & Pilifosova, O. (2003). Adaptation to climate change in the context of sustainable 
development and equity. Sustainable Development, 8(9), 9. 
 
Smit, B., & Wandel, J. (2006). Adaptation, adaptive capacity and vulnerability. Global 
Environmental Change, 16(3), 282–292. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.03.008 
 
Sparrow, A. (2011). Creating income while wildlife is protected. Rural 21, 45(4), 28-30. 
 
Star, S. L. & Griesemer, J. R. (1989). Institutional Ecology, “Translation," and Boundary 
Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertabrate Zoology, 
1907-39. Social Studies of Science 19 387–420. 
Stieglitz, M., Rind, D., Famiglietti, J., & Rosenzweig, C. (1997). An efficient approach to 
modeling the topographic control of surface hydrology for regional and global climate 
modeling. Journal of Climate, 10(1), 118-137. 
 
Suarez, P., & Tall, A. (2010). Towards forecastbased humanitarian decisions: Climate 
science to get from early warning to early action. HFP. 
 
Suddaby, R., Elsbach, K. D., Greenwood, R., Meyer, J. W., & Zilber, T. B. (2010). 
Organizations and their institutional environments—bringing meaning, values, and 
culture back in: introduction to the special research forum. Academy of Management 
Journal, 53(6), 1234-1240. 
 
Thomalla, F., Downing, T., SpangerSiegfried, E., Han, G., & Rockström, J. (2006). 
Reducing hazard vulnerability: towards a common approach between disaster risk 
reduction and climate adaptation. Disasters, 30(1), 39-48. 
 
Toya, H., & Skidmore, M. (2007). Economic development and the impacts of natural 
disasters. Economics Letters, 94(1), 20-25. 
 
Turner, B. L., Kasperson, R. E., Matson, P. a, McCarthy, J. J., Corell, R. W., Christensen, L., 
… Schiller, A. (2003a). A framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability 
science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 100(14), 8074–9. doi:10.1073/pnas.1231335100 
 
Turner, B. L., Matson, P. a, McCarthy, J. J., Corell, R. W., Christensen, L., Eckley, N., … 
Tyler, N. (2003b). Illustrating the coupled human-environment system for 
vulnerability analysis: three case studies. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 100(14), 8080–5. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1231334100 
 
van Loenen, B. (1999). Land tenure in Zambia. University of Maine. 
 
Walker, B., Holling, C. S., Carpenter, S. R., & Kinzig, A. (2004). Resilience, adaptability 
and transformability in social-ecological systems. Ecology and society, 9(2), 5. 
 
!142"
Watts, M., 1983. On the poverty of theory: natural hazards research in context. In: Hewitt, 
K. (Ed.), Interpretations of Calamity for the Viewpoint of Human Ecology. Allen and 
Unwin, Boston, pp. 231–262. 
 
Winchester, P., 1992. Power, Choice and Vulnerability: A Case Study in Disaster 
Management in South India. James and James, London. 
 
Wisner, B. (Ed.). (2004). At risk: natural hazards, people's vulnerability and disasters. 
Psychology Press. 
 
Woolcock, M., & Narayan, D. (2000). Social capital: Implications for development theory, 
research, and policy. The World Bank Research Observer, 15(2), 225-249. 
 
Yohe, G., & Tol, R. S. (2002). Indicators for social and economic coping capacity—moving 
toward a working definition of adaptive capacity. Global Environmental Change, 
12(1), 25-40. 
  
!143"
Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 1 – Baseline Survey 
Date:" " " " " " " " Community:"
"
Village:" " " " " " " " Household"ID:"
""
"
READ%CONSENT%SCRIPT%
"
Do"you"agree"to"be"interviewed?""☐"Yes"""""☐"No"
"
%
READ%ALOUD:"I"would"like"to"begin"the"interview"by"asking"some"questions"about"you"and"your"household."
"
1."What"is"your"gender?"☐"Male"" ☐""Female"
"
2."What"is"your"age?"________________"
"
3."What"is"your"relationship"to"the"head"of"the"household?"
☐"Head"""""☐""Spouse"""""☐"Son/daughter"""""☐""Spouse"of"child"""""☐""Grandchild""""""
☐""Father/mother"""""☐""Grandchild"""""☐""Brother/sister"""""☐""Father/mother^in^law""""""
☐""Brother/sister^in^law"""""☐""Servant/other"
"
4."What"is"your"marital"status?""☐"Unmarried""""""☐""Married"""""☐"Divorced"""""☐""Widowed"
"
5."What"is"your"education"level?"_________________________________"
"
6."What"it"your"primary"occupation?"___________________________________________________"
a. What"is"your"income"from"your"primary"occupation?"____________________________________"
"
7."What"is"your"secondary"occupation?"___________________________________________________"
a. What"is"your"income"from"your"secondary"occupation?"____________________________________"
"
8."Now"I"would"like"to"know"about"the"other"members"of"your"household."
"
Gender" Age" Relationship"to"head"of"
household"
Marital"status" Level"of"education"
completed"
Enrolled"in"
school?"
"
"
" " " " "
"
"
" " " " "
"
"
" " " " "
"
"
" " " " "
"
"
" " " " "
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"
"
" " " " "
"
"
" " " " "
"
"
" " " " "
"
"
" " " " "
"
"
" " " " "
"
"
9."How"much"did"you"spend"on"tuition"in"the"past"year"for"all"children?"_______________________"
a. Are"school"lunches"provided?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"
"
10."Does"your"home"have"electricity?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"
"
11."Does"your"home"have"piped"water?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"
"
12."What"is"your"main"source"of"drinking"water?"""
☐"Piped"water""""☐""Rain"water"""""☐"Spring"water"""""☐"River"water"""""☐"Shallow"well"""""""""""
"
☐""Borewell"""""☐"Pond"""""☐"Vendor/tanker/bottled"""""☐"Other:"__________________________________"
"
13."How"long"does"it"take"to"travel"to"water"source"(number"of"hours/minutes)?"__________________"
"
14."How"many"jerry"cans"of"water"do"you"use"per"day?"____________________________________"
"
15."Do"you"have"access"to"roads?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"
"
16."What"type"of"toilet"facility"do"household"members"use?"
☐"Pit"latrine""""☐""Neighbour’s"latrine"""""☐"Field/yard"(no"toilet)""""""
"
☐""River/ditch"(no"toilet)"""""☐"Other:"____________________________________________________"
"
17."Not"including"the"bathroom,"how"many"rooms"does"your"home"have?"""
☐"1^2"""""☐""3^4"""""☐"5+"
"
18."Which"of"the"following"statements"best"describes"your"house?"
☐"Owned"(with"land"title)"""""☐""Owned"(without"land"title)"""""☐"Rented"
"
☐"Other:"____________________________________________________"
"
19."Do"you"think"your"house"is"at"risk"because"of"location"or"construction"type?""
☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know""
!
If!yes,!why?!
"
"
"
20."Has"your"house"ever"been"flooded?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know""
"
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21."Have"you"improved"the"construction"of"your"house?"""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
a. If"yes,"when"did"you"improve"the"construction"of"your"house?"__________________"
b. How"did"you"improve"the"construction"of"your"house?"
"
"
"
22."Does"your"household"cultivate?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"
"
a. How"many"acres"did"you"plant"(i)"in"the"first"rains"of"2012?"_____________"
(ii)"in"the"second"rains"of"2012?"____________"
"
b. Have"you"ever"lost"any"crop"due"to"droughts?""
"☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
i. If"yes,"when"did"this"happen"(most"recent"occurrence)?"_________________"
"
ii. Which"crop(s)"was"lost?"____________________________________________________"
"
c. Have"you"ever"lost"any"crop"due"to"floods?""
☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
i. If"yes,"when"did"this"happen"(most"recent"occurrence)?"_________________"
"
ii. Which"crop(s)"was"lost?"____________________________________________________"
"
d. Does"your"household"have"a"homestead"garden?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
e. Where"do"you"buy"tree"seedling?""
☐"In"town/market"""""☐""In"the"village"""""☐"I"do"not"have"access"
"
f. Have"you"ever"received"information"to"know"when"to"start"planting"during"the"year?"""
☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
i. If"yes,"who"informed"you"when"to"start"planting?"
☐"Government"""""☐""Red"Cross"""""☐"Religious"groups"
☐"Community"members/organizations"""""☐"NGOs/Civil"service"org."
"
☐"Other:"_____________________________________________________________________________"
ii. Did"you"use"this"information?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"
!
If!no,!why!not?"
"
"
"
"
23."What"livestock"do"you"currently"own"and"how"many"of"each"do"you"own?"
a. Cows/cattle"_____________________"
b. Goats/sheep"_____________________"
c. Pigs"_____________________"
d. Chickens,"turkeys,"and"ducks"_____________________"
"
24."Does"your"household"own"any"of"the"following?"
☐"Radio"""""☐""TV"""""☐"Clock/watch"""""☐"Axe""""☐"Mobile"phone"""""☐"Bicycle"""""☐""Sewing"machine"""""☐"Jewelry"""""☐"Car"""""
☐"Motorbike"""""☐"Refrigerator"
"
25."What"type"of"cooking"fuel"do"you"use?"
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☐"Gas""""☐""Solar"""""☐"Charcoal"""""☐"Biogas"""""☐"Firewood"""""☐"Paraffin""""""
☐""Electricity"""""☐"Don’t"cook"
"
26."Does"your"household"have"any"sources"of"non^farm"income?""""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"
"
27."What"is"your"household’s"most"important"income"source?"
☐"Agriculture""""☐""Salaried"employment"""""☐"Business"""""☐"Biogas""""""
"
☐"Other:"_____________________________________________________________________________________"
"
28."To"whom"do"you"sell"your"agricultural"products?"
☐"We"don’t"sell""""☐""Family,"friends,"and"neighbours"""""☐"In"the"market""""""
"
☐"Micro^credit"group"""""☐"Other:"________________________________________________________""""
"
29."To"whom"do"you"sell"livestock"products?"
"☐"We"don’t"sell""""☐""Family,"friends,"and"neighbours"""""☐"In"the"market""""""
"
☐"Micro^credit"group"""""☐"Other:"________________________________________________________""""
"
30."Are"any"members"of"your"household"disabled?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"
"
31."How"much"have"you"spent"on"health"during"the"past"year?"
a. Clinic"visits:"_______________________"
b. Community"health"worker"care:"_______________________"
c. Traditional"care"or"medicines:"_______________________"
d. Village"health"team:"_______________________"
"
"
READ%ALOUD:"Now"I"would"like"to"ask"you"some"questions"about"disasters"in"your"community."
"
32."How"much"of"a"concern"are"natural"disasters"to"you?"""
☐"Great"concern"""""☐""Little"concern"""""☐"No"concern"
"
33."What"types"of"natural"disasters"threaten"your"community?"(DO%NOT%READ%RESPONSES%ALOUD)%
☐"Rains"""""☐""Severe"storms"""""☐"Floods""""""☐"Tropical"cyclone/hurricane""""""
☐""Extreme"temperature"""""☐"Drought""""""☐"Fires"""""☐""Earthquake"""""
"
☐"High"waves/swells"""""☐"Landslides""""""☐"Other:"________________________________________"
☐"None""""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
34."Could"your"community"experience"a"natural"disaster"in"the"next"5"years?"
☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
35."Do"you"know"the"term"‘climate"change’?"""☐"Yes"""""☐""No""
"
36."How"has"temperature"changed"over"the"past"5"years?""
☐"Increased"""""☐""Decreased"""""☐"No"change"
"
37."How"has"rainfall"changed"over"the"past"5"years?""☐"Increased"""""☐""Decreased"""""☐"No"change"
"
38."How"has"onset"of"the"wet"season"changed"over"the"past"5"years?"
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☐"Early"""""☐""Late"""""☐"On"time"
"
39."Are"disasters"becoming"more"common"or"less"common?""""
☐"More"common"""""☐""Less"common"""""☐"No"change"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
40."Has"your"community"been"affected"by"natural"disasters"in"the"last"5"years?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No""""""
a. How"many"natural"disasters"have"occurred"in"this"time?"_______________"
b. What"types"of"disasters?"(DO%NOT%READ%RESPONSES%ALOUD)"
☐"Rains"""""☐""Severe"storms"""""☐"Floods""""""☐"Tropical"cyclone/hurricane""""""
☐""Extreme"temperature"""""☐"Drought""""""☐"Fires"""""☐""Earthquake"""""
☐"High"waves/swells"""""☐"Landslides"""""""
"
☐"Other:"____________________________________________________________________"
"
41."Has"your"family"been"affected"by"a"disaster"in"the"past"5"years?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No""""""
a. If"yes,"which"disaster?"(DO%NOT%READ%RESPONSES%ALOUD)"
☐"Rains"""""☐""Severe"storms"""""☐"Floods""""""☐"Tropical"cyclone/hurricane""""""
☐""Extreme"temperature"""""☐"Drought""""""☐"Fires"""""☐""Earthquake"""""
☐"High"waves/swells"""""☐"Landslides"""""""
"
☐"Other:"____________________________________________________________________"
"
b. When"did"it"happen"(year"and"season"or"date)?"_______________________________________"
"
c. Did"you"or"your"family"members"experience"any"of"the"following?"
☐"Evacuation"""""☐""Serious"injury"(required"medical"attention)"""""☐"Death""
☐""Minor"injury"(did"not"seek"medical"attention)"""""☐"Property"damage""""""
☐"Loss"of"business"or"livelihood"activity"""""""
"
☐"Other:"______________________________________________________________________"
"
"
READ%ALOUD:"Now"I"would"like"to"ask"you"some"questions"about"being"prepared"for"disasters."
"
42."Will"being"prepared"help"your"family"in"an"emergency"situation?""
☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
43."How"prepared"is"your"family"to"handle"a"disaster?"
☐"Very"prepared"""""☐""Somewhat"prepared"""""☐"Not"prepared"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
44."Compared"to"a"year"ago,"is"your"family"more"or"less"able"to"handle"a"disaster?"
☐"More"able"""""☐""No"change"""""☐"Less"able"""""☐"Don’t"know"
a. If"less"able,"why"are"you"less"able"to"handle"a"disaster?"(DO%NOT%READ%RESPONSES%ALOUD)"
☐"Lost"job"or"income"source""""""
☐""Reduced"earnings"(same"job/income"earning"activities)""""""
☐"Family"member"died"or"moved"away"(includes"resulting"loss"of"income)"
☐"Family"member"became"sick,"disabled,"or"couldn’t"work"for"health"reasons"
☐""Family"is"worst"off"financially"than"before"because"cost"of"living"has"increased"
☐"Other:"
"
"
"
!148"
45."Which"of"the"following"statements"best"describes"your"family?"
☐"We"have"not"done"anything"to"prepare"for"a"disaster"and"we"do"not"plan"to""
☐""We"have"not"done"anything"to"prepare"for"a"disaster"but"we"plan"to"in"the"coming"months"
☐"We"just"recently"began"preparing"for"a"disaster"
☐"We"are"prepared"for"a"disaster"
"
46."Do"you"have"supplies"or"other"things"in"your"home"that"can"be"used"in"the"case"of"a"disaster?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""
☐"Don’t"know"
a. If"yes,"what"supplies"do"you"have?"(DO%NOT%READ%RESPONSES%ALOUD)"
☐"Packaged"food"""""☐""First"aid"kit"""""☐"Eyeglasses"or"medicine""""☐"Cash""""""
☐""Bottled"water"""""☐"Flashlight""""""☐"Important"documents"""""☐""Radio"""""
☐"Nothing"""""☐"Other:""
"
47."Have"you"and"your"family"members"ever"spoken"about"or"planned"what"you"would"do"if"a"disaster"occurs?""☐"
Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
a. If"yes,"what"did"you"discuss?"(DO%NOT%READ%RESPONSES%ALOUD)"
☐"Planned"meeting"place"for"family"members""""""
☐""List"of"important"phone"numbers"or"contacts""""""
☐"Activities"to"strengthen"your"home"or"reduce"risk"or"damage"to"your"property"
☐"A"planned"list"of"items"to"bring"with"you"in"case"you"have"to"leave"in"a"hurry"
☐""Evacuation"
☐"Going"to"a"shelter/place"to"stay"
☐""Nothing"
☐"Other:"
"
48."In"the"past"year,"have"you"or"your"family"done"any"of"the"following?"
a. Attended"a"meeting"on"how"to"be"better"prepared"for"a"disaster?""
☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
i. If"yes,"who"conducted"the"meeting?"_______________________________________________"
b. Attended"a"First"Aid"training?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
i. If"yes,"who"conducted"the"training?"_______________________________________________"
c. Participated"in"a"disaster"or"evacuation"drill?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
i. If"yes,"who"conducted"the"drill?"_______________________________________________"
d. Participated"in"a"community"or"volunteer"activity"related"to"disaster"preparedness"or"prevention?""☐"Yes"""""
☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
i. If"yes,"who"conducted"the"activity?"_______________________________________________"
"
49."Have"you"ever"received"information"about"rainfall"that"might"come"in"the"next"few"months"or"days?""☐"Yes"""""☐""
No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
a. If"yes,"who"informed"you?""
☐"Government"""""☐""Red"Cross"""""☐"Religious"groups"""""☐"My"family"
☐"Community"members/organizations"""""☐"NGOs/Civil"service"org."
☐"Media"(radio/TV/newspaper)"""""☐"Nobody/no"organization"
"
☐"Other:"_____________________________________________________________________________"
"
b. Did"you"do"anything"when"you"received"that"rainfall"forecast?"""
☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
ii. If"yes,"what"did"you"do?"
"
"
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"
"
iii. If"no,"why"didn’t"you"do"anything?"
"
"
"
"
50."In"the"past"6"months,"have"you"received"information"on"disasters"from"any"of"the"following"sources?"
a. A"person"visited"your"home"to"talk"about"disasters""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
b. Received"a"pamphlet"or"flyer""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
c. Television,"radio,"newspaper,"internet,"or"other"media"source"""
☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
d. A"community"leader""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
e. Government"source""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
f. Other"source,"such"as"community"or"religious"groups,"classmates,"friends,"or"neighbours"
☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
51."Does"you"community"have"a"committee"or"organized"group"that"decides"what"to"do"in"disasters"or"
emergencies?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
52."Does"your"community"have"a"disaster"plan?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
53."Does"your"community"have"an"early"warning"system?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
54."Does"your"community"have"evacuation"routes?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
55."Does"your"community"have"a"shelter"identified"where"people"can"go"in"the"event"of"a"disaster?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""
☐"Don’t"know"
"
56."Have"community"members"been"trained"to"assist"others"in"the"event"of"a"disaster?"
☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
57."Are"your"community"members"involved"in"planning"or"coordinating"with"the"local"government?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""
☐"Don’t"know"
"
58."In"the"past"year,"has"the"government"been"involved"in"any"projects"or"activities"related"to"reducing"risk"or"
vulnerability"in"the"event"of"disaster"in"your"community?"
☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
59."Can"your"community"access"government"resources"or"programs"for"disaster"response"and/or"recovery?""☐"Yes"""""
☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
"
60."In"the"event"of"a"disaster,"what"people"or"organizations"do"you"have"confidence"in"to"respond"and"provide"
assistance?"(DO%NOT%READ%RESPONSES%ALOUD)"
☐"Government"""""☐""Red"Cross"""""☐"Religious"groups"""""☐"My"family"
☐"Community"members/organizations"""""☐"NGOs/Civil"service"org."
☐"Media"(radio/TV/newspaper)"""""☐"Nobody/no"organization"
"
☐"Other:"_____________________________________________________________________________"
"
61."Have"you"lost"anything"due"to"a"flood"in"the"past?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
a. If"yes,"when"did"that"flood"happen?""___________________________"
b. Describe"the"flood"(i.e"water"level)"
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"
"
"
c. Were"crops"lost?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""""☐"Don’t"know"
d. Was"your"house"damaged?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No""
i. Describe"the"damages"to"your"house:"
"
"
"
e. Did"you"lose"livestock?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No""""""
i. If"yes,"which"livestock"and"how"many?""
☐""Cattle:"_______________________"""""☐""Goat/sheep:"_______________________""
☐""Pigs:"_______________________"""""☐""Chicken/turkeys/ducks:"_______________________"
f. Did"you"lose"stored"food?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No""""""
g. What"other"assets"did"you"lose?"
"
"
"
62."Have"you"ever"had"to"rebuild"your"home"or"any"part"of"your"home"because"of"a"disaster?"""
☐"Yes"""""☐""No""""""
a. If"yes,"how"did"you"pay"for"this?"
☐"Loan"""""☐""Community"assistance"""☐"Family"income"""""☐""Savings""
"
☐""Other:"
___________________________________________________________________________________"
"
63."Has"anyone"in"your"household"lost"their"lives"due"to"a"disaster"in"the"past"year?""
☐"Yes"""""☐""No""""""
"
64."Has"anyone"in"your"household"ever"lost"their"lives"due"to"a"disaster?""☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""
"
"
READ%ALOUD:"This"is"the"end"of"the"interview."Thank"you"for"taking"the"time"to"speak"with"me."This"information"
will"be"very"important"for"your"community."
"
65."Can"we"return"to"your"household"for"any"follow^up"questions"at"a"later"date?"""
☐"Yes"""""☐""No"""
"
66."Before"I"go,"do"you"have"any"questions"about"the"survey"or"the"Red"Cross"or"is"there"anything"else"that"you"
think"I"should"know?"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
TO%BE%FILLED%OUT%BY%INTERVIEWER.%Wait%until%end%of%interview%before%completing%this%section.%
"
67."""
General%Sanitary%Conditions% Yes% No% Don’t%know%
House"surrounded"by"human/animal"waste" " " "
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House"surrounded"by"piles"of"rubbish" " " "
House"surround"by"stagnant"water" " " "
House"has"kitchen"outside" " " "
Cooking"room"and"sleeping"room"are"the"same" " " "
Yard"is"well^maintained" " " "
"
68."Main"flooring"type:"☐"Tiles"""""☐""Mud"""""☐"Mud"with"DPC"""""☐""Cement/bricks""""""
☐"Other:"_____________________________________________"
"
69."Main"material"for"outer"wall:"☐"Cement"""""☐""Mud"""""☐"Burnt"bricks""""☐""Lumber/board""""""
☐"Other:"_____________________________________________"
"
70."Main"roofing"type:"☐"Thatched"roof"""""☐""Tarpaulin"""""☐"Cement/slate"""""☐""Iron"sheets""""""
☐"Other:"____________________________________________"
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Appendix 2 – Historical Data Questionnaire 
 
Date:&
&
&
READ%CONSENT%SCRIPT%
%
Do&you&agree&to&be&interviewed?&&&☐&Yes&&&&&☐&No&
&
&
Village:&
&
Zone/Community:&
&
Gender:&
&
Age:
&
No.% Type%of%
hazard%
Year%of%
Occurrence%
Describe%
hazard%(i.e.%
water%level)%
No.%
houses%
in%village%
No.%
houses%
affected%
No.%crop%
fields%in%
village%
No.%crop%
fields%
damaged%
Other%related%damages%(i.e.%
infrastructure,%disease,%etc)%
Community%response%
actions%
Success%of%
community%
response%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
% % % % % % % % % %
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
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Appendix 3 – Focus Group Consultation Questions 
1. How"have"floods"affected"your"community"in"the"past?"
"
2. How"has"your"community"responded"to"those"floods?"
a. How"successful"were"these"responses?"Why?"
"
3. What"do"people"do"when"their"crops"fail?"
"
4. What"resources"are"available"in"your"community"for"flood"response?"
a. Where"and"how"did"you"obtain"these"resources?"
"
5. Do"you"have"a"disaster"committee"within"your"community?""
a. If"yes,"what"is"the"committee’s"role"and"how"does"it"function?"How"are"decisions"made?""
b. If"no,"how"do"you"manage"floods?"Who"is"responsible"for"disaster"coordination"in"your"
community?"
c. Do"you"have"a"local"disaster"plan?"If"yes,"how"was"this"plan"made"and"who"was"involved"in"the"
planning"process?"
"
6. Has"the"government"been"involved"in"your"area"(not"limited"to"disaster"management)?""
a. If"yes,"how"has"the"government"been"involved?"How"do"you"interact"with"the"government?"
b. How"have"they"been"involved"in"disaster"management,"specifically?""
"
7. What"are"the"roles"of"different"agencies"in"flood"risk"management"and"response?""
a. What"is"your"relationship"with"these"agencies?""
b. How"do"you"interact"with"them?""
c. How"do"they"make"and"implement"decisions?"Are"you"involved"in"their"decision^making"process?"
"
8. Have"you"ever"received"early"warnings"about"floods"from"any"of"these"agencies?""
a. If"yes,"what"did"you"do"with"the"information"received?"Did"you"benefit"from"this"information?"
How?""
b. If"no,"why"did"you"not"utilize"the"information?"
c. Do"you"have"a"flood"contingency"plan?"If"so,"when"was"it"developed?""How"was"this"plan"made"
and"who"was"involved"in"the"planning"process?"
"
9. How"can"flood"risk"be"reduced"in"your"community?"How"can"disaster^preparedness"with"regards"to"floods"
be"increased"in"the"long^term"to"minimize"losses?"How"can"the"Red"Cross"help?"
"
10. Have"you"heard"about"early"warning"systems?"How"about"community^based"early"warning"systems?"
"
11. Do"you"think"you"would"have"benefited"had"early"warning"systems"been"in"place"in"the"past?""
a. If"yes,"how?"
b. If"not,"why"not?"
"
12. What"are"your"traditional"methods"of"forecasting"floods?"Who"is"responsible"for"producing"these"
forecasts?"And"how"are"they"disseminated"to"communities?"
"
13. Do"you"think"it"is"feasible"to"implement"an"early"warning"system"in"your"community?"How"can"this"system"
be"tailored"to"suit"your"needs?"What"kinds"of"community"resources"can"you"provide"to"monitor"risk,"
receive"and"disseminate"warnings,"and"coordinate"flood"response?"
"
14. What"kinds"of"emergency"relief"do"you"require"before"a"flood?"During?"After?  
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Appendix 4 – Semi-structured Interview Questions for ZRC Staff 
1. What"are"the"goals"of"forecast^based"decision"making?"
"
2. How"does"the"Zambian"Red"Cross"National"Society"integrate"forecasts"into"decision^making?"
"
3. Where"do"you"receive"forecasts"from?"How"do"you"disseminate"this"information?"
"
4. How"do"you"determine"whether"or"not"a"community"is"vulnerable"to"a"particular"climate"risk?"
"
5. What"is"your"relationship"with"vulnerable"communities?"How"do"you"interact"with"community"members?"
"
6. How"successful"do"you"think"forecast^based"decision"making"has"been?"
"
7. How"do"you"decide"what"actions"need"to"be"taken"in"the"event"of"a"flood?"
"
8. How"do"you"take"action?"What"is"the"communication"chain"when"disseminating"forecast"information"and"
decisions?"Who"has"ultimate"disaster"related"decision^making"authority"within"the"Zambian"Red"Cross?"
"
9. How"have"you"responded"to"floods"in"the"past?"Were"your"actions"successful?"
"
10. What"relief"items"do"you"distribute?"Who"supplies"them"and"where"are"they"stored?"
"
11. Do"you"have"a"source"from"which"you"can"acquire"funds"from"rapidly"once"a"disaster"strikes?"
"
12. How"much"certainty"is"enough"certainty"to"warrant"taking"anticipatory"action?"What"determines"when"is"a"
good"time"to"act?"
"
13. What"are"the"challenges"of"implementing"forecast^based"decisions?"
"
14. Where"do"you"see"room"for"improvement?"Has"the"integration"of"forecasts"into"decision^making"
improved"over"the"past"few"years?"Why"and"how?"Or"why"not"and"how"not?""
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Appendix 5 – Codebook 
1. What"future"is"valued"in"each"of"the"communities"–"goals,"desires,"hopes"expressed"by"individuals."
(FUTURE)"
"
2. Indications"of"sensitivities"to"floods"(SENSITIVITY)"
"
a. Wealth/poverty"(SENS_WEALTH)"
"
b. Education"(SENS_EDU)"
"
c. Type"of"livelihood"(SENS_LIV)"
"
d. Household"construction"(SENS_HHQUAL)"
"
e. Access"to"entitlements"(SENS_ENT)"
"
f. Other"(SENS_OTHER)"
"
3. Indications"of"differential"sensitivities"to"floods"(DIFFSENSITIVITY)"
"
a. according"to"wealth"(DIFFSENS_WEALTH)"
"
b. according"to"educational"attainment"(DIFFSENS_EDU)"
"
c. according"to"secondary"livelihoods"(DIFFSENS_LIV)"
"
d. according"to"agricultural"dependency"(DIFFSENS_AGR)"
"
e. according"to"household"construction"(DIFFSENS_HHQUAL)"
"
f. according"to"water"access"and"availability"(DIFFSENS_WAT)"
"
g. other"(DIFFSENS_OTHER)"
"
4. Social"capital"(SOCIAL"CAPITAL)"
"
a. Roles"of"individuals"(village"headmen,"community"leaders,"community"members)"(IND"ROLES)"
"
b. Structure"and"roles"of"communities"and"villages"(COMMVILL"ROLES)"
"
c. Structure"and"roles"of"households"and"families"(HHFAM"ROLES)"
"
5. Ecosystem"services/goods"provided"by"biophysical"subsystem"(ECOSERVICES)"
"
6. Long^term"effects"of"floods"and"droughts"on"sensitivity"to"floods"(LONG"TERM"EFFECTS)"
"
7. How"have"communities"responded"to"floods"in"past?"(HIST"RESPONSE)"
"
8. How"do"communities"respond"to"floods"now?"(CURR"RESPONSE)"
"
9. Capacities"in"the"community"(CAPACITIES)"
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"
10. Vulnerable"groups"in"the"community"(VUL"GROUPS)"
"
11. Community"preparedness"for"floods"(PREPAREDNESS)"
"
12. Normative"barriers"(NORM"BARRIERS)"
"
a. Traditional"practices"in"communities"(TRADPRAC)"
"
b. How"are"traditional"practices"affected"by"floods?"(TRADPRAC_AFFECT)"
"
c. How"do"these"practices"exacerbate"the"effects"of"floods?"(TRADPRAC_EXACERBATE)"
"
13. Cognitive"barriers"(COG"BARRIERS)"
"
a. Perceptions"of"risk"and"preparedness"(PERC"RISK"PREP)"
"
b. Fatalism"(FATALISM)"
"
c. Denial"(DENIAL)"
"
d. Wishful"thinking"(WISHFUL"THINKING)"
"
14. Political"barriers"(POL"BARRIERS)"
"
15. Institutional"barriers"(INST"BARRIERS)"
"
a. Role"of"households,"individuals,"and"traditional"leadership"in"disaster"management"(SOC"ACTOR"
ROLES)"
"
b. Role"of"government"(GOV"ROLE)"
"
c. Role"of"RC"(RC"ROLE)"
"
d. How"do"government"and"communities"interact?""(GOV"COMM)"
"
16. Human/informational"barriers"(INFO"BARRIERS)"
"
a. What"kind"of"knowledge/information"do"community"members"think"they"need?"(INFO)"
"
b. Do"they"have"access"to"that"knowledge?"(INFO_ACCESS)"
"
c. Do"they"use"the"knowledge"they"receive?"(INFO_USE)"
"
d. Involvement"of"external"organizations/agencies"in"promoting"preparedness"(ORG_PREP)"
"
17. Technological"barriers"(TECH"BARRIERS)"
"
18. Economic"barriers"(ECON"BARRIERS)"
"
19. Natural/physical"barriers/limits"(NATURAL"BARRIERS)"
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Appendix 6 – Historical Flood Profiles 
The ‘related damages’ and ‘range of community responses’ columns do not necessarily 
represent the full range of experiences of community members; rather, they are 
representative of what interviewed members experienced. The ‘range of community 
responses’ column does not indicate how every community member responded to a hazard – 
many community members during each disaster took no action, or took different actions 
(that were not stated to us). 
Kasaya Historical Profile 
 
Year Flood Description Damages Range of community 
responses 
1958 Water level was high • Crops fields damaged 
• Animal disease 
outbreaks 
• Bridges destroyed 
• No response 
• Used boats for survival 
1959 Water was 8.25 m from 
the banks 
• Crop failure 
• CBPP 
• Ringworms 
• FMD 
• Diarrhea 
• Malaria 
• Measles 
• Scabies 
• No response 
• Shifted to upper land 
1978 Water level was high • Malaria 
• Diarrhea 
• Houses damaged 
• Crop failure 
• No response 
• Shifted to upper land 
1988 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
1.3 m in their fields 
• Diarrhea 
• Vomiting 
• Homes 
submerged/destroyed 
• Fields damaged 
• Measles 
• CBPP 
• Malaria 
• No response 
• Shifted to upper land 
• CARE and PUSH 
distributed food 
2000 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
1.3 m in their fields 
• Houses collapses 
• Crop failure 
• No response 
• Collapsed structures 
were rebuilt 
2006 Water level was high, • Fields damaged • No response 
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some estimated it to be 
up to 1.3 m in their 
fields 
• Crop failure 
• CBPP 
• Ringworms 
• FMD 
• Malaria (poor response 
from clinics) 
• Houses damaged 
• Household belongings 
lost (clothing, cooking 
utensils) 
• Shifted to upper land 
• Evacuation to Kazungula 
conducted by headmen 
and government 
• Rebuilt homes 
 
2008 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to 1.2 m in their 
fields 
• Crop failure 
• Hunger 
• CBPP 
• Malaria 
• Diarrhea 
• Chicken pox 
• FMD 
• Houses damaged 
• No response 
• Shifted to upper land 
• Requested government 
support – government 
conducted part of the 
evacuation 
• Rebuilt homes 
2012 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to knee high in their 
fields 
• Fields damaged 
• Household goods 
damaged 
• Livestock disease 
outbreak 
• Livestock death 
• Houses damaged 
• No response 
• Shifted to upper land 
• Rebuilt homes 
2013 Water level was high • Crop failure 
• Houses damaged 
• No response 
• Shifted to upper land 
 
Sikaunzwe Historical Profile 
 
Year Flood Description Damages Range of community 
responses 
1942 Water level was high   
1948 Water level was high • Broke bridge 
• Destroyed all fields 
• Headmen given food by 
government 
 
1952 Water level was high • People could not find 
food 
 
 
1958 Water level was high • Disease outbreak 
• Mass livestock death 
 
 
1964 Water level waist high • Damages were vast 
 
 
1995 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
• Fields submerged 
• Crop failure 
• No response 
• Turned to alternative 
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up to 1 m high in their 
fields 
• Human disease 
outbreaks 
• Livestock disease 
outbreaks 
• Infrastructural 
damage 
livelihoods i.e. charcoal 
burning 
2001 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to 1 m high in their 
fields 
• Livestock disease 
outbreaks 
• Poverty 
• Crop failure 
• No response 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods 
2004  • Roads submerged 
• Crop failure 
 
2006 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to 1.5 m in their 
fields. Levels were so 
high that anthills on 
the plains were 
submerged. The water 
was moving very fast. 
• Crop failure 
• Mass livestock deaths 
• Human death 
• Livestock disease 
outbreaks (CBPP) 
• Food shortages/ 
hunger 
• Water borne disease 
outbreaks (i.e. 
typhoid) 
• Malaria 
• Diarrhea 
• Children unable to 
attend school 
• Domestic disputes due 
to hardships 
• Pit latrines damaged 
• Homes damaged 
• No response 
• Sold livestock for income 
and to prevent further 
spread of livestock 
diseases 
• Shifted to upper lands 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. charcoal 
burning, small-scale 
business 
• Applied for government 
assistance 
2007 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to knee high in their 
fields. 
• Crop failure 
• CBPP 
• Flu (chicken and pigs) 
• Cough (pigs) 
No response 
2012 Water level was high • Crop failure 
• Contaminated water 
No response 
2013 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to chest high in 
their fields 
• Crop failure 
• Grazing pastures 
damaged 
• Livestock disease 
outbreaks (i.e. CBPP 
in cattle, ‘lamp skin’ in 
goats) 
• Malaria 
• Homes damaged 
• No response 
• Contacted District 
Commissioner to assess 
situation, but he was 
unable to come as the 
roads were submerged 
• Dug furrows/drainages 
and dams around fields 
• Made ledges to obstruct 
water 
• Bought medicines to treat 
livestock 
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• Shifted to upper land 
 
Sikuzu Historical Profile 
 
Year Flood Description Damages Range of community 
responses 
1937 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to ankle high in 
their fields 
• Crop failure 
• Measles 
• Malaria 
• No response 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. gardening 
and making mats using 
reeds 
1942 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to shoulder high in 
their fields 
• Crop failure 
• Starvation 
No response 
1948 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to waist high in 
their fields.  
• Households damaged 
• Crop failure 
• Human death 
• Malaria 
 No response 
1949 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to shoulder high in 
their fields. 
• Crop failure 
• Livestock death 
• Livestock disease 
outbreaks 
• Malaria 
• Water borne disease 
outbreaks 
• Diarrhea 
• No response 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods, i.e. gardening 
• People were evacuated 
• Shifted to upper land 
• Applied to for 
government aid 
 
1958 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to shoulder high in 
their fields. 
• Crop failure 
• Fields damaged 
• Gardens damaged 
• Livestock disease 
outbreaks 
• Livestock death 
• Malaria 
• Cholera 
• Diarrhea 
 
• No response 
• People were evacuated 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. gardening, 
selling cut reeds 
• NGOs provided some aid 
1959 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to ankle high in 
their fields. 
• Crop failure 
• Malaria 
• Cholera 
No response 
1968 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to waist high in 
their fields. 
• Crop failure 
(especially sweet 
potato) 
• Reptiles ate chicken 
• No response 
• Shifted to upper land 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. making 
mats using reeds 
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1978 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to shoulder high in 
their fields 
• Crop failure 
(especially maize) 
• Gardens damaged 
• Malaria 
• Livestock disease 
outbreaks 
• No response 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. fishing 
• People were evacuated 
1982 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to knee high in their 
fields. 
• Crop failure • No response 
• Received aid from the 
government 
1988 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to shoulder high in 
their fields. 
• Fields destroyed 
(especially maize) 
• Hunger 
• Livestock disease 
outbreaks (i.e. foot and 
mouth disease) 
• No response 
• Receive aid from 
government 
1989 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to knee high in their 
fields. 
• Crop failure 
• Soil was waterlogged 
• Soil erosion 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. fishing 
1990 Water was 7 m from 
the banks 
• Crop failure 
• Soil erosion 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. making 
mats using reeds (but 
there was no market or 
demand for the goods) 
1998 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to waist high in 
their fields. 
  
2001 Water level was high • Soil erosion • Turned to alternative 
livelihood i.e. selling cut 
reeds 
2004 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to waist high in 
their fields. 
• Crop failure 
(especially sweet 
potato) 
• Shifted to upper land 
2005 Water was 6.5 m from 
the banks 
• Crop failure 
• Reptiles ate chickens, 
pigs and goats 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. making 
mats using reeds, fishing 
2006 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to chest high in 
their fields. 
• Crop failure • Shifted to upper land 
2007 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to ankle high in 
their fields. 
• Crop failure 
• Soil erosion 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. selling cut 
reeds 
2008 Water level was high, • Crop failure • People were evacuated 
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some estimated it to be 
up to waist high in 
their fields. 
• Hippos entered 
villages 
• Water borne disease 
outbreaks 
• Malaria 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. selling cut 
reeds, making mats using 
reeds 
2010 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to knee high in their 
fields. 
• Crop failure 
• Gardens destroyed 
 
2011 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to waist high in 
their fields. 
• Crop failure 
• Soil erosion 
• Grazing pastures 
affected 
• Livestock affected 
• Water borne disease 
outbreak 
• Malaria 
• People were evacuated 
• Shifted to upper land 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. gardening, 
making mates using 
reeds, fishing,  
2012 Water was 6.0 m from 
the banks, water was 
moving very fast 
• Crop failure 
(especially maize) 
• Fields damaged 
• Gardens damaged 
• Mass livestock death 
• Reptiles ate chickens 
• Hippos destroyed 
gardens and fields 
• Soil erosion 
• Malaria 
• Community leaders and 
CARE responded 
• Conducted community 
meetings 
• Sent report to agriculture 
office 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. gardening, 
making mats using reeds, 
selling fish in the market 
2013 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to knee high in their 
fields. 
• Crop failure 
• Malaria 
 
 
Situlu Historical Profile 
 
Year Flood Description Damages Range of community 
responses 
1940 Water level was high • Crop failure 
• Livestock disease 
outbreak 
• Malaria 
• Shifted to upper land 
• Found other places to 
plough 
• Had to search for food 
1948 Water level was high • Crop failure 
• Livestock disease 
outbreaks 
• Malaria 
•  Shifted to upper land 
• Found other places to 
plough 
• Had to search for food 
1953 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to thigh high in 
• Crop failure 
• Livestock disease 
• Asked community 
members in the upper 
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their fields. outbreak 
• Grazing pastures 
damaged 
lands for help 
1958 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to shoulder high in 
their fields. 
• Houses collapsed 
• Crop failure 
• Crop fields submerged 
• Malaria 
• Malnutrition 
• Livestock disease 
outbreak 
• Dug ridges to obstruct 
flood waters 
• People shifted (with their 
livestock) to upper lands 
• Farmed on anthills 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. selling cut 
grass 
• Found other places to 
plough 
• Had to search for food 
• Stored food so that it 
couldn’t be destroyed by 
water or pests 
1968 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to waist high in 
their fields. 
• Crop failure 
• Grazing pastures 
affected 
• Houses collapsed 
• Malnutrition 
• Dug ridges to obstruct 
flood waters 
• Dug furrows to drain 
flood waters 
• Shifted cattle to upper 
lands for pastures 
• People shifted 
temporarily to anthills 
for shelter 
1972 Water level was high, 
water was moving very 
fast 
• Livestock diseases 
(foot and mouth) 
• Crop failure 
• Children unable to go 
to school 
 
1974 Water level was high • Crop failure 
• Livestock disease 
outbreak 
• Malaria 
• Shifted to upper land 
• Found other places to 
plough 
• Had to search for food 
1975 Water level was high • Crop failure 
• Malaria 
• Livestock disease 
outbreak (foot and 
mouth) 
• Shifted to upper land 
1976 Water level was high • Crop failure 
• Livestock disease 
outbreak 
• Malaria 
• Shifted to upper land 
• Found other places to 
plough 
• Had to search for food 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. gardening 
1978 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
• Crop failure 
• Starvation 
• Dug furrows to drain 
flood waters 
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up to knee high in their 
fields. 
• Houses collapsed 
• Malaria 
• Diarrhea 
• Farmed on mounds and 
anthills 
• Ate wild fruits 
• Ate fish 
1993 Water level was high • Crop failure 
• Malaria 
• Bilharzia 
• Children unable to go 
to school 
• Shifted to upper land 
2007 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to knee high in their 
fields 
• Crop failure 
• Crop disease 
• Shifted to upper land 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. gardening 
2008 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to waist high in 
their fields. 
• Crop failure 
• Houses collapsed 
• Fields submerged 
• Malaria 
• Livestock disease 
outbreaks (i.e. CBPP) 
• Malaria 
• Diarrhea 
• Tick borne diseases 
• Shifted cattle to upper 
land for pastures 
• People farmed on anthills 
• Unsuccessfully tried to 
block flood waters 
• Sick people were rushed 
to the clinic 
• Made appeals to the 
government for food aid 
• Turned to alternative 
livelihoods i.e. goat 
rearing 
• Regular cattle 
vaccination against 
CBPP prevented cattle 
death 
2013 Water level was high, 
some estimated it to be 
up to knee high in their 
fields. 
• Crop failure 
• Malaria 
• Food shortages 
• Grazing pastures 
affected 
• Shifted cattle to upper 
land for pastures 
• Each household received 
a net from the Health 
Department 
• Shifted cultivation from 
floodplain to upper land 
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